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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on designing e cient mechanisms for controlling infor-
mation spread in networks. We consider two models for information spread.
The first one is the well-known distributed averaging dynamics. The second
model is a nonlinear one that describes virus spread in computer and biolog-
ical networks. We seek to design optimal, robust, and stabilizing controllers
under practical constraints.
For distributed averaging networks, we study the interaction between a
network designer and an adversary. We consider two types of attacks on
the network. In Attack-I, the adversary strategically disconnects a set of
links to prevent the nodes from reaching consensus. Meanwhile, the network
designer assists the nodes in reaching consensus by changing the weights
of a limited number of links in the network. We formulate two problems
to describe this competition where the order in which the players act is
reversed in the two problems. Although the canonical equations provided
by the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (MP) seem to be intractable, we
provide an alternative characterization for the optimal strategies that makes
connection to potential theory. Further, we provide a su cient condition for
the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE) for the underlying zero-sum
game.
In Attack-II, the designer and the adversary are both capable of altering
the measurements of all nodes in the network by injecting global signals. We
impose two constraints on both players: a power constraint and an energy
constraint. We assume that the available energy to each player is not suf-
ficient to operate at maximum power throughout the horizon of the game.
We show the existence of an SPE and derive the optimal strategies in closed
form for this attack scenario.
As an alternative to the “network designer vs. adversary” framework, we
investigate the possibility of stabilizing unknown network di↵usion processes
ii
using a distributed mechanism, where the uncertainty is due to an attack on
the network. To this end, we propose a distributed version of the classical
logic-based supervisory control scheme. Given a network of agents whose
dynamics contain unknown parameters, the distributed supervisory control
scheme is used to assist the agents to converge to a certain set-point with-
out requiring them to have explicit knowledge of that set-point. Unlike the
classical supervisory control scheme where a centralized supervisor makes
switching decisions among the candidate controllers, in our scheme, each
agent is equipped with a local supervisor that switches among the available
controllers. The switching decisions made at a certain agent depend only
on the information from its neighboring agents. We provide su cient condi-
tions for stabilization and apply our framework to the distributed averaging
problem in the presence of large modeling uncertainty.
For infected networks, we study the stability properties of a susceptible-
infected-susceptible (SIS) di↵usion model, so-called the n-intertwined Markov
model, over arbitrary network topologies. Similar to the majority of infection
spread dynamics, this model exhibits a threshold phenomenon. When the
curing rates in the network are high, the all-healthy state is the unique equi-
librium over the network. Otherwise, an endemic equilibrium state emerges,
where some infection remains within the network. Using notions from posi-
tive systems theory, we provide conditions for the global asymptotic stability
of the equilibrium points in both cases over strongly and weakly connected
directed networks based on the value of the basic reproduction number, a
fundamental quantity in the study of epidemics.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that the n-intertwined Markov model can be
viewed as a best-response dynamical system of a concave game among the
nodes. This characterization allows us to cast new infection spread dynamics;
additionally, we provide a su cient condition, for the global convergence to
the all-healthy state, that can be checked in a distributed fashion. Moreover,
we investigate the problem of stabilizing the network when the curing rates
of a limited number of nodes can be controlled. In particular, we characterize
the number of controllers required for a class of undirected graphs. We also
design optimal controllers capable of minimizing the total infection in the
network at minimum cost. Finally, we outline a set of open problems in the
area of information spread control.
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In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
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Verily, knowledge is a lock and its key is the question.
Imam Ja’far ibn Muh.ammad al-S. a¯diq (a.s.)
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To my Wife, Son, Daughter, Parents, and Siblings
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a motivation for the questions studied in the thesis. We
provide examples of how information spread in networks could have drastic
economical and financial impact on society. We motivate the idea of con-
trol intervention in networks to control di↵usion processes, describe existing
attempts, and outline our approach and control design methodology.
1.1 Why Study Information Spread?
Various global patterns in computer, social, and biological networks stem
from local interactions among nodes. Examples include birds flying in for-
mation, propagation of rumors and computer viruses, and epidemics. A
common ingredient among these examples is the exchange of information in
the network, where “information” may refer to ideas, products, or viruses.
Studying the propagation of information in networks is important in and
relevant to many fields including control, communications, signal processing,
and social sciences. Depending on the type of information, the objective of
the nodes or the network designer can be either accelerating or decelerating
the spread of information across the network. For example, while a network
designer would be interested in containing a rumor in an infected network, he
would attempt to increase the adoption of a new product in a viral market-
ing scenario. A large body of literature is dedicated to modeling information
di↵usion processes in networks; however, controlling such processes is a rela-
tively new area that presents many open problems. Controlling information
spread is challenging primarily due to the dependence of the information
spread dynamics on the underlying network structure, and the networks we
are interested in studying tend to contain a large number of nodes. A typical
communication or online social network in today’s world comprises millions
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of users with numerous connections. While high connectivity provides an
unprecedented source of data, controlling such networks is a tall order.
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that tools from control and
game theories can be utilized to tackle the problem of information spread
control in networks. Before we delve into the details of the problems we
study, we provide practical examples that highlight the magnitude of the
impact that information spread can have on society.
1.2 Societal Impact of Information Spread
Below we list a few recent events which motivated our research, and occurred
due to the propagation of information in networks.
Spread of Rumors and Misinformation over Networks Online so-
cial networks provide a medium for the rapid spread of misinformation and
rumors. A recent example of how detrimental rumor spread can be occurred
in April 2013 when the Twitter account of the Associated Press (AP) was
hacked, and a false message claiming that the White House was attacked
was sent to the many followers of the account. The message was reportedly
retweeted more than 3000 times within a few minutes. The security breach
was quickly detected by the AP; nonetheless, this rumor led to a sharp 143
points drop in the Dow Jones industrial average [1] as shown in Fig. 1.1.
Virus Spread in Biological and Computer Networks The spread
of viruses among humans is largely dependent on one-to-one interactions.
Advances in ground and air transportation systems enabled humans to cover
larger distances in shorter times; however, travelers also carry infections with
them across borders which may lead to global epidemic outbreaks [3]. Fig-
ure 1.2 illustrates disease spread along travel routes and demonstrates the
possibility of the emergence of global pandemics.
Computer networks are also prone to virus propagation. The last decade
has witnessed many examples of security breaches resulting from virus spread
across networks. Perhaps the most notable of this is the recent outbreak of
Stuxnet, which is a computer worm designed to attack control machinery in
various systems such as assembly lines, power plants, and nuclear plants [5].
2
Figure 1.1: E↵ect of a rumor that was broadcast via the AP Twitter
account on the Dow Jones industrial average [2].
Figure 1.2: Disease spread via mobility [4].
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Stuxnet has the ability to spread over computer networks, and it was reported
that it was successful in compromising control mechanisms in Iranian nuclear
facilities [6].
Delay Propagation in Transportation Networks Another example
of information di↵usion arises in transportation networks in the form of de-
lay propagation. In the US, it has been estimated that flight delays cost an
estimated $40 billion per year according to the 2008 Report of the Congress
Joint Economic Committee [7]. Researchers have found that crew and pas-
senger connections are a major source of delays in flight schedules. Further
congestion in an airport was shown to propagate to surrounding airports and
beyond [8] as demonstrated in Fig. 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Delay propagation across US airports [7].
Whether it is a rumor spreading in a social network or delays propagat-
ing across airports, di↵usion processes across networks have the ability to
replicate local behaviors over extremely large networks in a very short time.
These examples emphasize the importance of designing control mechanisms
that are capable of e↵ectively responding to such cascading e↵ects.
1.3 Dynamical Models for Information Di↵usion
The literature is rich with dynamical models that describe information dif-
fusion for various types of networks. Earlier models did not depend on the
network structure explicitly. Examples include the Bass model [9] that de-
scribes the adoption of a new product in a population, a game-theoretic
model to describe the evolution of conventions by Young [10], and a spread
model for gonorrhea by Lajmanovich and Yorke [11].
The availability of data in recent years makes capturing the network e↵ect
on the di↵usion of information a viable direction to pursue. In fact, the
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examples we listed in Section 1.2, which emanate from di↵erent fields, all
have clear dependence on the underlying network structure. A wide range of
models that depend explicitly on the network structure have been proposed
to describe di↵erent phenomena occurring in biological and social networks,
and we will describe several of them next.
A popular information spread model is the distributed averaging dynamics.
In this model, an agent updates its value as a linear combination of the val-
ues of its neighbors. Averaging dynamics is the basic building block in many
multi-agent systems, and they are widely used whenever an application re-
quires multiple agents, who are graphically constrained, to synchronize their
measurements. Examples include formation control, coverage, distributed
estimation and optimization, and flocking [12–14]. Besides engineering, lin-
ear averaging finds applications in other fields as well. For instance, social
scientists use averaging to describe the evolution of opinions in networks [15].
The Hegselmann-Krause dynamics [16] are also used to describe the evo-
lution of opinions. Unlike distributed averaging, the Hegselmann-Krause dy-
namics allow the underlying graph to change with time as the nodes update
their values. Many threshold based models, such as Granovetter’s model [17],
where agents adopt a certain behavior based on the choices of their neigh-
bors, have been previously proposed; see [18] for an extensive review of such
models. These models have applications in voting, riot behavior, and rumor
di↵usion. Recently proposed models have also incorporated stubborn agents
who may represent religious or political leaders. Examples include the voter
model and opinion dynamics in the presence of stubborn agents [19–21].
For epidemics, the susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) [22] and susceptible-
infected-susceptible (SIS) models are commonly used to describe the spread
of viruses in networks [23, 24]. In SIS models, a node is always susceptible
to infection, even if it has been infected and cured previously. On the other
hand, a cured node becomes immune to infection in SIR models, and hence
it is called a “removed” node. Many variants and extensions of the SIS and
SIR models are also available in the literature [23, 25–27].
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1.4 Control Intervention
As mentioned earlier, the main goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the
e↵ectiveness of control intervention in networks. In this section, we provide
an overview of previous approaches to information spread control. We also
describe the main properties of the control strategies we design in this thesis,
and we identify ways in which our designs complement the current literature.
1.4.1 Existing Work
When examining the literature on control of di↵usion dynamics, one can
observe that the majority of approaches can be classified under four main
categories. We identify these categories below along with relevant examples.
Static Approaches Goyal and Vigier investigate the construction of
network topologies that facilitate the exchange of goods and information
in [28]. The objective of the network designer is to make the network robust
to adversarial attacks. Kempe et al. study the problem of finding the optimal
set of nodes to maximize the spread of influence in a social network [29].
They propose a polynomial-time algorithm based on submodular functions
that finds a near-optimal solution. A competition between two opposing
campaigns to influence the largest set of nodes was studied in [30], where a
greedy algorithm was proposed to find the best set of nodes for one campaign
to limit the influence of the other. In the context of epidemics control, Borgs
et al. propose a static curing rate allocation mechanism in order to cure the
network from infection [31]. Omic et al. study a similar problem, and they
adopt a static game-theoretic approach to perform the curing rates allocation
across the network [32].
The controlled parameters in all the above problems are chosen at the ini-
tial time and are left static onward. These designs, therefore, cannot handle
dynamically changing networks or the presence of other strategic players in
the network.
Randomized Algorithms To cure computer networks and populations
from viruses, Cohen et al. propose the so-called acquaintance immunization
strategy in which random acquaintances of a randomly selected set of nodes
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are immunized [33]. This approach was shown to dramatically reduce the
required number of immunized nodes in order to cure the network. Genetic
algorithms and random mutation hill climbing were used in [34] to find op-
timal vaccine distributions in order to minimize the number of illnesses in
the event of pandemic influenza. In order to achieve fast information spread,
a hybrid algorithm was proposed in [35], which alternates between random-
ized and deterministic neighbor selection in order to maximize the speed of
information spread.
While the above approaches are computationally e cient, they are neither
robust to failures in the network nor to adversarial interventions. Networks
are susceptible to attacks, and immunization techniques must be robust to
such security breaches.
Controller at Each Node A common theme in current research is to
assume that the network designer can control all the nodes in the network in
order to limit the infection’s spread. For instance, Preciado et al. have devel-
oped a convex framework for optimizing the curing rates across the network,
where it is assumed that the curing rate of each node can be controlled [36,37].
Similar optimization problems were also studied in [32,38].
In reality, such freedom in placing controllers may not be possible. As
networks grow in size to include millions of nodes, reducing the number of
controllers required to counter the infection’s spread will result in vast cost
reductions.
Adoption Rate Control In networks described using SIS or SIR mod-
els, a large body of literature focuses on controlling the rate at which the
numbers of infected, susceptible, or removed nodes increase; see [39, 40] and
the references therein. In such approaches, controllers are not explicitly allo-
cated to the nodes, and the graph structure is not exploited. An alternative
approach would be to control node-specific parameters such as the curing or
infection rates, which will in turn control the adoption rate.
1.4.2 A New Approach
In view of the current state of the literature, we take an alternative approach
to the problem of information spread control in networks, where we focus
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on designing control mechanisms that are dynamic, robust, constrained, and
capable of exploiting the underlying network structure. In addition to these
properties, we rely on graph theoretical modeling, which allows our results
to be applicable in a rich class of networks including computer, social, and
biological networks. Below, we highlight the main features of the controllers
we design throughout the thesis.
Dynamic By relying on optimal control design, we construct strategies
that are capable of responding to dynamical changes in the network.
Robust Using the framework of di↵erential game theory, we propose
zero-sum games to construct controllers suitable for competitive dynamic
environments, which are robust also to adversarial intervention.
Constrained and Limited As opposed to controlling each and every
node in the network, we use tools from nonlinear control to propose a frame-
work for achieving certain control objectives using a limited number of con-
trollers.
Network Structure Dependent By controlling node-specific parame-
ters, we construct controllers that exploit the underlying network structure.
Such designs are motivated by the availability of data, e.g., connectivity in-
formation of users, which allows for designing more intelligent controllers.
To demonstrate how such controllers can be designed, we consider two
models of information spread: one is linear and the other one is nonlinear.
We will refer to networks described by linear (nonlinear) information di↵usion
dynamics as linear (nonlinear) dynamical networks. We now briefly describe
the problems we study under each type of dynamics.
1.4.3 Linear Dynamical Networks
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we study the problem of robust information spread
control over linear dynamical networks. In Chapters 2 and 3, we design ro-
bust strategies by formulating a zero-sum game that describes the interaction
between an adversary and a network designer who compete to control a net-
work of nodes performing distributed averaging. The adversary can launch
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two network-wide attacks which we study separately. In Attack-I, the ad-
versary is capable of disconnecting certain links in the network, while the
designer can change the weights of certain links. In Attack-II, the players
are capable of injecting global signals to alter the states of the nodes. Both
the adversary and the designer are constrained by their physical capabilities,
e.g., battery life and communication range. To capture such constraints, we
allow the adversary and the designer to a↵ect only a fixed number of links in
Attack-I. As for Attack-II, we impose power and energy constraints on
both players. However, we assume that the energy constraint does not allow
for maximum power operation; this necessitates studying the problem under
both constraints as the power constraint does not capture the limited energy
budget.
In Chapter 4, we take an alternative approach to this problem, where we
model the adversary as a large modeling uncertainty, and focus on designing
distributed defense mechanisms, as opposed to having a centralized network
designer. In particular, we study the problem of distributed stabilization of
linear dynamical networks in the presence of uncertainties, where we extend
the classical adaptive supervisory control framework to a distributed setting
and investigate the conditions required for stability.
1.4.4 Nonlinear Dynamical Networks
The nonlinear model we study here is the so-called n-intertwined Markov
model [41], which belongs to the SIS class of epidemiological models. Similar
to the majority of virus spread models, the n-intertwined Markov model
exhibits a threshold phenomenon. When the curing rate is high, the all-
healthy state is the unique equilibrium. When the curing rates are low,
however, a strictly positive equilibrium point arises, and a residual infection
could persist in the network. We are interested in constructing constrained
and dynamic mechanisms that control the virus propagation, while satisfying
certain design objectives.
As a first step, we perform stability analysis for this model in Chapter 5,
where we employ notions from positive systems theory to thoroughly study
the stability properties of both equilibrium points over arbitrary network
topologies. Further, we introduce a generic infection di↵usion model that
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is motivated by theory of noncooperative games and show that this model
subsumes existing virus spread models.
In Chapter 6, we shift our attention to control design questions. In particu-
lar, we identify su cient conditions for stabilizing the network by controlling
the curing rates of a limited number of nodes. We also formulate and solve
multiple optimal control problems which aid a network designer in minimiz-
ing control cost while reducing infection levels across the network.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we formulate the
problems describing Attack-I and Attack-II and derive the worst-case
adversarial attacks in the absence of the network designer. We introduce a
network designer in Chapter 3 and study its interaction with the adversary
under Attack-I and Attack-II using tools from di↵erential game theory.
The distributed supervisory control framework is introduced in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, we review the n-intertwined Markov model and discuss its
stability properties. We design stabilizing and optimal controllers for infected
networks in Chapter 6. We outline open problems in information spread
control in Chapter 7 and collect our concluding remarks in Chapter 8.
1.6 Mathematical Preliminaries
We start with some terminology and notational conventions. We use the
words “nodes” and “agents” interchangeably. All the matrices and vectors
in this thesis are real valued. For a set of n 2 Z 1 elements, we use the
combinatorial notation [n] to denote {1, . . . , n}. Unless otherwise mentioned,
the (i, j)-th entry of a matrix X 2 Rn⇥m, n,m 2 Z 1 is denoted by Xij, and
the i-th entry of a vector x 2 Rn, n 2 Z 1, is denoted by xi. For two real
vectors x, y 2 Rn, we write x   y if xi > yi for all i 2 [n], x   y if xi   yi
for all i 2 [n] but x 6= y, and x ⌫ y if xi   yi for all i 2 [n]. We say a vector
x 2 Rn is strictly positive if x  0. For any vector x 2 Rn, we define
xmin := min
i2[n]
xi, xmax := max
i2[n]
xi.
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The absolute value of a scalar variable is denoted by |.|. We also denote the
cardinality of a finite set by |.|, and the purpose this operator is being used
for will be clear from the context. The set of eigenvalues of a matrix X is
denoted by  (X). The spectral radius of a matrix X 2 Rn⇥n is given by
⇢(X) = max
 2 (X)
| |,
and its abscissa is given by
µ(X) = max
 2 (X)
Re( ).
When the eigenvalues of a matrix X are real, we denote the largest eigenvalue
by  1(X) and the smallest eigenvalue by  n(X). The Euclidean norm of a
vector is denoted by k.k2, the `1-norm is denoted by k.k1, and the `1-norm
is denoted by k.k1. The induced 2-norm of a matrix X 2 Rn⇥n is given by
kXk2 = max
y2Rn
kyk2=1
kXyk2 =
p
 1 (XTX).
The L2-norm of a function f defined over a vector space X is given by
kfkL2 =
✓Z
X
kf(x)k22dx
◆ 1
2
,
and its L1-norm is given by
kfkL1 = sup
x2X
kf(x)k1.
If f is di↵erentiable, we can define the C1-norm of f as follows:
kfkC1 = kfkL1 +
     ddxf
    
L1
.
The vector space L2 is the space of all measurable functions for which kfkL2
is bounded. Given a time interval [0, T ] ⇢ R, we denote the space of contin-
uously di↵erentiable functions over this interval by C1[0, T ]. We recall that
C1[0, T ] is a Banach space when endowed with the C1-norm.
We use the operator diag(.) for two purposes. When applied to a square
matrix X 2 Rn⇥n, diag(X) returns a column vector that contains the diago-
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nal entries of X. For a vector x 2 Rn, X = diag(x), or X = diag(x1, . . . , xn),
is a diagonal matrix with Xii = xi, i 2 [n]. When a diagonal matrix has
positive diagonal entries, we call it a positive diagonal matrix. The identity
matrix is denoted by I, and the all-ones vector is denoted by 1. We assume
both I and 1 have the appropriate dimensions whenever they are used. We
use [.] 1 to denote the inverse of a square matrix and [.]T to denote the trans-
pose of a vector or a matrix. We use the game theoretic notation x i to refer
to the vector comprised of the decision variables of all players except that of
player i, where the dimension of x i will be defined once a game is formally
introduced.
Let f : Rn ! Rn be a continuously di↵erentiable function that defines
a dynamical system x˙ = f(x), and let x be an equilibrium point of this
system, i.e., f(x) = 0. The Jacobian matrix of f , J(x) 2 Rn⇥n, is given by
J(x) = @@xf(x). Let D ⇢ Rn⇥n be a compact domain where the trajectories
of the dynamical system x˙ = f(x) lie. A continuously di↵erentiable function
V : D ! R is a Lyapunov function if, V (x) = 0 and V (x) > 0 for all
x 2 D \ {x}. The Lie derivative of V along f is given by
LfV (x) := d
dx
V (x)Tf(x).
Matrix Theory
We call two matricesX, Y 2 Rn⇥n similar if there exists a nonsingular matrix
T 2 Rn⇥n such that Y = T 1XT . An important property of similar matrices
is that they share the same set of eigenvalues [42]. Some of our results rely
on properties of Metzler matrices. A real square matrix X is called Metzler
if its o↵-diagonal entries are nonnegative. We say that a matrix X 2 Rn⇥n
is reducible if there exists a permutation matrix T such that
T 1XT =
"
Y Z
0 W
#
,
where Y and W are square matrices, or if n = 1 and X = 0 [43]. A real
square matrix is called irreducible if it is not reducible. A survey on Metzler
matrices and their stability properties can be found in [43–45]. Hurwitz
Metzler matrices have the following equivalent characterizations.
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Proposition 1.1 ([46]). For a Metzler matrix X 2 Rn⇥n, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) The matrix X is Hurwitz.
(ii) There exists a vector ⇠   0 such that X⇠ ⌧ 0.
(iii) There exists a vector ⌫   0 such that ⌫TX ⌧ 0.
(iv) There exists a positive diagonal matrix Q such that
XTQ+QX =  K,
where K is a positive definite matrix.
The last characterization is often referred to as diagonal stability [43, 47].
The Perron-Frobenius (PF) theorem is a fundamental result in spectral
graph theory that characterizes some of the properties of the spectra of Met-
zler and nonnegative matrices, i.e., matrices whose entries are all nonnega-
tive. We first state the PF theorem for irreducible Metzler matrices [44, The-
orem 17].
Theorem 1.1 (PF – Irreducible Metzler Case). Let X 2 Rn⇥n be an irre-
ducible Metzler matrix. Then
(i) µ(X) is an algebraically simple eigenvalue of X.
(ii) Let vF be such that XvF = µ(X)vF . Then vF is unique (up to scalar
multiple) and vF   0.
(iii) If v   0 is an eigenvector of X, then Xv = µ(X)v, and, hence, v is a
scalar multiple of vF .
For irreducible nonnegative matrices, the following version of the PF the-
orem applies [42, Theorem 8.2.11].
Theorem 1.2 (PF – Irreducible Nonnegative Case). Let X 2 Rn⇥n be an
irreducible nonnegative matrix. Then
(i) ⇢(X) > 0.
(ii) ⇢(X) is an algebraically simple eigenvalue of X.
(iii) If Xv = ⇢(X)v, then v   0.
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Graph Theory
A directed graph, or digraph, is a pair G = (V , E), where V is the set of nodes
and E ✓ V ⇥ V is the set of edges. Given G, we denote an edge from node
i 2 V to node j 2 V by (i, j). We say node i 2 V is a neighbor of node
j 2 V if and only if (i, j) 2 E . When (i, j) 2 E if and only if (j, i) 2 E , we
call the graph undirected. For a graph with n 2 Z 1 nodes, we associate an
adjacency matrix A 2 Rn⇥n with entries aij 2 R 0, where aij = 0 if and only
if (i, j) /2 E . For undirected graphs, the adjacency matrix is symmetric, i.e.,
A = AT .
In a digraph, a directed path is a collection of nodes {i1, . . . , i`} ✓ V , ` 2
Z>1, such that (ik, ik+1) 2 E for all k 2 [` 1]. A digraph is strongly connected
if there exists a directed path between any two nodes in V . A strongly
connected component (SCC) of a graph is a subgraph which itself is strongly
connected. When a nonnegative square matrix X is viewed as an adjacency
matrix of a digraph, then X is irreducible if and only if its corresponding
digraph is strongly connected [43]. A path in an undirected graph is defined
in a similar manner. We call an undirected graph connected if it contains a
path between any two nodes in V . A digraph is called weakly connected if
when every edge in E is viewed as an undirected edge, the resulting graph
is a connected undirected graph. We call a graph, whether it is directed
or undirected, disconnected if it contains at least two isolated subgraphs.
Throughout the thesis, when the graph G is directed, we assume that it is
either strongly or weakly connected. When G is undirected, we assume that
it is connected.
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a digraph with no directed cycles. A
node i 2 V is called a source node if Pj 6=i {aji 6=0} = 0, and it is called a sink
node if
P
j 6=i {aij 6=0} = 0, where {aij 6=0} = 1 if and only if aij 6= 0, and is
zero otherwise. A DAG can have multiple sources and multiple sinks. For a
given graph G, let Ssource denote the set of source nodes, and let SN-source be
the set of all nodes i in G such that aji 6= 0 for some j 2 Ssource.
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CHAPTER 2
WORST-CASE ATTACKS ON CONSENSUS
NETWORKS
2.1 Background
In practice, communication among agents performing averaging is prone to
di↵erent types of non-idealities which can a↵ect the convergence properties
of the associated distributed algorithms. Transmission delays [48], noisy
links [49, 50], and quantization [51] are some examples of non-idealities that
are due to the physical nature of the application. In addition to physical
restrictions, researchers have also studied averaging dynamics in the presence
of malicious nodes in the network [52,53]. Various algorithms that guarantee
resilience against node failures have been proposed in the literature [54].
Here, we study the problem of continuous-time distributed averaging in
the presence of an intelligent adversary. We consider two network-wide at-
tacks launched by an adversary attempting to hinder the convergence of the
nodes to consensus. The adversarial attacks we explore here di↵er from the
ones studied by [52], [55], and [53], who consider the e↵ect of malicious and
compromised agents who could update their values arbitrarily. In the first
scenario (called Attack-I) we consider, the adversary can break a set of
edges in the network at each time instant. In practice, the adversary would
be limited in its resources; we translate this practical limitation to a hard
constraint on the total number of links the adversary can compromise at each
time instant. In the second case (called Attack-II), the adversary can cor-
rupt the measurements of the nodes by injecting a signal under a maximum
power constraint. Our goal is to study the optimal behavior of the adversary
in each case, given the imposed constraints.
For both attacks, we formulate the problem of the adversary as a finite
horizon maximization problem in which the adversary seeks to maximize the
Euclidean distance between the nodes’ state and the consensus line. We com-
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pletely characterize the optimal strategy of the adversary under both attacks;
for each case we obtain a closed-form solution, providing also a potential-
theoretic interpretation of the adversary’s optimal strategy in Attack-I.
Our model is di↵erent from the models in the current literature in two ways:
(i) the adversary interacts with a dynamical network. This is di↵erent from
the problems studied in the computer science and economics communities
where the network is usually static [28]; (ii) the adversary in our model is
constrained and does not have an infinite budget. This enables us to model
practical scenarios more closely rather than allowing the malicious behavior
to be unrestricted as in [52, 55, 56], where it is assumed that the network
contains nodes that are misbehaving. In addition, those papers focus on
finding necessary and su cient conditions for the network to reach consensus
in the presence of malicious nodes, and observability theory is the main tool
used to study such problems. Here, we assume that all the nodes are normal,
and we focus on identifying the links that are of importance to the adversary.
This requires us to borrow tools from optimal control theory.
2.2 Main Results
The contributions of this chapter are as follows. ForAttack-I, we model the
behavior of the adversary using an optimal control problem. We study the
existence of solutions and the structure of the solution using Pontryagin’s
maximum principle (MP). We provide a method to compute the optimal
attack strategy without requiring the adjoint equations to be solved. This
method provides a new characterization for the optimal strategies in terms of
potential-theoretic quantities. For Attack-II, we derive the optimal attack
strategy in closed form using a fixed-point argument.
Organization
In Section 2.3, we formulate and provide the preliminaries of Attack-I.
We show the existence of solutions, study the problem using the MP, and
derive the optimal attack strategy. Attack-II is formulated and studied in
Section 2.4. Numerical examples are provided in Section 2.5. We summarize
16
the main results of the chapter in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 contains a technical
result that is used in proving one of the main results.
Terminology and Notation
We will often use x to refer to a function or its value at a given time instant;
the context should make the distinction clear. We will use the words “strat-
egy” and “action” interchangeably; since we are seeking optimal open-loop
strategies in this chapter, both terms are equivalent. We will use
P
j>i(.)
to mean
Pn
j=2
Pj 1
i=1 (.), for some n 2 Z 2. Given an undirected graph
G = (N , E), where N is the set of nodes and E ✓ N ⇥N is the set of edges,
we will use eij as a shorthand notation for an edge from node i 2 N to node
j 2 N , i.e., eij := (i, j). We define the projection operator   : E ⇥ R ! E
such that  ((e, r)) = e, for some (e, r) 2 E ⇥ R. When applied to a set
S ⇢ E ⇥ R, the mapping   is defined as follows:
 (S) =
8<:
S
(e,r)2S
 ((e, r)), S 6= ;
0, S = ;
.
Given S ⇢ E ⇥ R, with |S| = k, let ⇡(S) = {(e1, r1), . . . , (ek, rk)}, where
ri 2 R and ei 2 E for all i 2 [k], be an ordering of the elements of S
such that r1  . . .  rk. Then, given ` 2 Z 0, we define the set operator
 ` : E ⇥ R! E as:
 `(S) =
8><>:
 (S), ` > k
{e1, . . . , e`}, 0 < `  k
0, ` = 0 or k = 0
.
Throughout this chapter, we will be dealing with undirected graphs. Al-
though both eij, eji belong to the set of edges E in such graphs, we do not
distinguish between the two edges, and we treat them as a single edge. As
a result, in any set defined over E ⇥ R, we include a single tuple (eij, rij),
rij 2 R, to represent both edges.
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2.3 Attack-I: Single-Player Case
Consider a connected network of n nodes andm links described by a weighted
undirected graph G = (N , E) with vertex set N , |N | = n, and edge set E ,
|E| = m. The value, or state, of the nodes at time instant t 2 [0,1) is
given by x(t) = [x1(t), ..., xn(t)]T . The nodes start with an initial value
x(0) = x0, and they are interested in computing the average of their initial
measurements, xavg =
1
n
Pn
i=1 xi(0), via local averaging. We consider the
continuous-time averaging dynamics given by
x˙(t) = Ax(t), x(0) = x0, (2.1)
where the matrix A, Aij = aij, has the following properties:
A = AT , A1 = 0, (2.2)
Aij   0, Aij = 0 () eij /2 E , i 6= j. (2.3)
Define x¯ = 1xavg and let M =
11T
n . A well-known result states that, un-
der the above assumptions, the nodes will reach consensus as t ! 1, i.e.,
limt!1 x(t) = x¯ [12]. To achieve his objectives, the adversary controls the
elements of A as we describe next. This will render the matrix A to be
time-varying.
The adversary attempts to slow down convergence by breaking at most
`  m links at each time t. Let uij(t) 2 {0, 1} be the weight the adversary
assigns to link eij at time t. He breaks link eij when uij(t) = 1. Define
r :=
 
n
2
 
. The action set of the adversary can then be written as
U = {w 2 Rr | w = [w12, ..., w1n, w23, ..., w(n 1)n]T , wij 2 {0, 1},
wij = 0 if eij /2 E , kwk1  `}.
The set of admissible controls consists of all functions that are piecewise
continuous in time and whose range is U . Given a time interval [0, T ], we
can formally write
U = {u : [0, T ]! U | u is a piecewise continuous function of t} .
Given the above definitions, we can write down the (i, j)-th element of the
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matrix A(u(t)) as
Aij(u(t)) = aij(1  uij(t)).
Note that using the structure of A, we can re-write the dynamics (2.1) as
follows:
x˙ = G(x(t))(1  u(t)), (2.4)
where Gij = aij(xj   xi). This demonstrates that the system we are consid-
ering is a ne in the adversary’s control u.
Define the functional:
J(u) =
1
2
Z T
0
k(t) kx(t)  x¯k22 dt,
where the weighting factor k is positive and integrable over [0, T ], which can,
for example, be viewed as a discounting factor, such as k(t) = e ↵t for some
↵ > 0. This constitutes the utility function of the adversary. The adversary’s
problem can now be formally written as
sup
u2U
J(u)
subject to x˙(t) = A(u(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.1. The initial matrix A(0), the time interval [0, T ], the value
`, and the initial state x0 are known to the adversary.
Based on the above formulation, the adversary is capable of changing the
system matrix. This renders the system we are studying as a switched one.
The optimal controllers for such systems can exhibit Zeno behavior, i.e., they
may switch infinitely many times over a finite interval. Extensive simulation
results show that the optimal controllers derived below switch a few times
only. In order to explicitly eliminate the possibility of infinite switching, we
make the following assumption in the remainder of this chapter.
Assumption 2.2. Let u 2 U be an arbitrary controller with switching times
0  r1 < . . . < rKu  T . We assume that Ku 2 Z 0 is finite, and that there
exists a globally minimum dwell time ⌧ > 0 such that
⌧  min
i2[Ku]
ri+1   ri (2.5)
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over which the system matrix A(u) is time-invariant.
Note that this assumption is well motivated for practical reasons. Consider,
for example, a communication network where an adversary is a jammer in-
jecting an interfering signal at some links. If the adversary chooses to change
the set of links it is jamming, there must be some delay for it to change its
configuration. This shows that the above assumption is not restrictive. Note
that we do not require the computation of ⌧ ; we just need ⌧ to be nonzero.
Since simulation results show that Zeno behavior does not occur, we strongly
believe that this assumption is not required.
Under the above assumption, we can restrict our development to piecewise
continuous controllers. Hence, the right hand side of the ordinary di↵erential
equation (ODE) is piecewise continuous in t, continuous in u, and Lipschitz
in x (uniformly over u). Hence, the ODE admits a unique solution over
[0, T ], and the optimal control problem is well-posed by Filippov’s Theorem
(see the next subsection).
To arrive at the optimal strategy of the adversary, we employ the maximum
principle. In what follows, we will often drop the time index and other
arguments for notational simplicity.
2.3.1 Existence of Optimal Control
The MP provides a necessary condition for optimality, and before one can
apply it, it is important to show that an optimal solution indeed exists for
the given problem. Recall Filippov’s Existence Theorem.
Theorem 2.1 ([57, 58]). Consider the following optimal control problem:
sup
u2U
Z T
0
L(x, u, t)dt subject to x˙ = f(x, u, t), x(0) = x0.
Assume that the solutions of the ODE exist over [0, T ] for all u : [0, T ]! U
and that for every pair (t, x), the set U is compact, and the set
Q(x, t) = {(z0, z) | z0   L(x, u, t), z = f(x, w, t) for some w 2 U}
is convex. Then, an optimal control exists for the above problem.
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In order to apply Filippov’s Theorem, we first need to convexity the action
set U as follows:
Uc = {w 2 Rr | w = [w12, ..., w1n, w23, ..., w(n 1)n]T , wij 2 [0, 1],
wij = 0 if eij /2 E , kwk1  `}.
Consider the convexified problem:
sup
u2Uc
J(u)
subject to x˙ = A(u)x, x(0) = x0,
where Uc is defined in a similar manner to U with U replaced with Uc in its
definition.
In the remainder of this subsection, we will work with the convexified
problem. We will show that the optimal solution of the convexified problems
takes values at the boundaries of the set Uc. Hence, this convexification does
not change the optimal solution of the original problem. We are now ready
to prove the existence of optimal controls for the convexified problem.
Lemma 2.1. The convexified problem admits an optimal solution.
Proof. For each fixed pair (x, t), the set
Qu(x, t) =
⇢
(z0, z)
     z0   k2 kx  x¯k22 , z = A(w)x for some w 2 Uc
 
is convex and compact. Indeed, let   2 [0, 1], and let (z01 , z1), (z02 , z2) 2
Qu(x, t). We then have  z01 + (1    )z02   k2 kx  x¯k22. Recalling the a ne
representation in (2.4), we can write
 z1 + (1   )z2 =  G(x)(1  w1) + (1   )G(x)(1  w2)
= G(x)( (1  w1) + (1   )(1  w2))
= A(w˜)x, w˜ =  w1 + (1   )w2 2 Uc.
Having shown that optimal solutions exists, we can now replace “sup” by
“max” in what follows.
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2.3.2 Solution via the MP
The Hamiltonian associated with the above problem is:
H(x, p, u) =
1
2
k(t) kx(t)  x¯k22 + pT (t)A(u(t))x(t).
The first-order necessary conditions for optimality are (noting that AT = A)
[58]:
p˙ =   @
@x
H
=  k(x  x¯)  Ap, p(T ) = 0 (2.6)
x˙ = Ax, x(0) = x0 (2.7)
u? = argmax
Uc
H(x, p, u).
To find the optimal strategies, let us first write
pTAx =
nX
i=1
pi
 
nX
j=1
Aijxj
!
=
nX
i=1
pi
 
 
nX
j=1,j 6=i
Aijxi +
nX
j=1,j 6=i
Aijxj
!
=
X
j>i
aij(1  uij)(pj   pi)(xi   xj).
Define the function
fij = (pj   pi)(xi   xj),
and write
max
u2Uc
H =
1
2
k kx  x¯k22 +maxu2Uc
X
j>i
Aijfij. (2.8)
Note that we cannot decouple the maximization into
 
n
2
 
maximization
problems, each corresponding to a link or a single term inside the double
summation. This is due to the constraint on the number of links that can be
targeted by the adversary. To find the optimal strategy, let D` ✓ E be the set
containing the ` links with the lowest negative fij values, if such links exist.
Formally, define the set S = {(eij, aijfij) | eij 2 E , fij < 0} ⇢ E ⇥R. We can
then write D` =  `(S). Note that the definition of  ` allows us to account
for the case when |S| < `. Given this definition and Eq. (2.8), we conclude
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that the optimal control of the adversary in the convexified maximization
problem should be of the following form:
u?ij(t) =
8><>:
1, eij 2 D`
0, eij /2 D` or fij > 0
{0, 1}, otherwise
. (2.9)
Since the optimal control takes values at the boundaries Uc, it constitutes a
solution for the original nonconvex maximization problem.
2.3.3 Solution via Potential Theory
The optimal strategy is defined in terms fij’s, for eij 2 E , which depend
on the state x and the costate p. However, we have not derived the optimal
trajectories that satisfy the canonical equations given by the MP in (2.6) and
(2.7), and hence in that sense the solution is incomplete. Since the system is
linear time-varying, the solutions will be given in terms of a state transition
matrix. Also, the functions fij depend on both the state and the costate,
which in turn are defined in terms of the control. This makes working with
fij intractable.
Under Assumption 2.2, the following theorem provides a procedure to ar-
rive at the optimal solutions without the need to compute p. We will be
using the term “connected component” to refer to a set of connected nodes
which have the same values. Define ⌫ij =  (xi   xj)2, eij 2 E .
Theorem 2.2. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, the rankings performed as
part of the optimal strategies of the maximization problem can be carried out
by replacing fij(t) by ⌫ij(t), for all eij 2 E.
Furthermore, it is optimal for the adversary to modify a total of ` links.
If the adversary has an optimal strategy of modifying less than ` links, then
either G has a cut of size less than ` or the nodes have reached consensus at
time t. In either of the cases, modifying ` links is also optimal.
Proof. We will show that it is optimal for the adversary to rank the links
based on their wij := aij⌫ij values instead of the aijfij’s. The main complica-
tion in solving the adjoint equations is that the system is time-varying. How-
ever, under Assumption 2.2, the functions x, p become piecewise continuous.
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Hence, the function fij, for all eij 2 G, is also piecewise continuous and its
value cannot change abruptly over a finite interval. As a result, we can regard
the system as a time-invariant one over a small interval [t0, t0 +  ] ⇢ [0, T ],
where 0 <    ⌧ , and ⌧ was defined in (2.5). The proof consists of three
steps.
(i) Show that it is optimal for the adversary to change ` links.
(ii) Show that, over a small interval [t0, t0+ ], it is optimal for the adversary
to switch from a strategy u 2 U to another strategy u? 2 U , where u?
entails ranking the links based on their wij values.
(iii) Show that allowing u? to mimic u for the remaining time of the problem
preserves the gain obtained over [t0, t0 +  ].
Over a small interval, u and u? induce certain system matrices. Let the
system matrix corresponding to u over [t0, t0 +  ] be A(u) = A, and let
kuk1 < ` over this interval. Since the control strategy of the adversary is
fixed over this interval, the state trajectory is given by
x(t) = eA(t t0)x(t0), t 2 [t0, t0 +  ].
Let P (t) := eAt. Due to the structure of A, P (t) is a doubly stochastic matrix
for t   0; see [59, p. 63].
Note that we can write x(t0) = P˜ x0, where P˜ is some doubly stochastic ma-
trix. Indeed, assume that either or both controls had switched once at some
time t˜0 2 [0, t0), and that the system matrix over [0, t˜0) was A˜1, and the sys-
tem matrix corresponding to [t˜0, t0) was A˜2. Then x(t0) = eA˜2(t0 t˜0)eA˜1 t˜0x0.
Since both eA˜1t, eA˜2t are doubly stochastic matrices, their product is also
doubly stochastic. We can readily generalize this result to any number of
switches in the interval [0, t0). With this observation, we can write
x(t)  x¯ = P (t  t0)P˜ x0  Mx0 = (P (t  t0) M)x(t0),
where the last equality follows from the fact that
P˜M =MP˜ =M, P˜ is doubly stochastic. (2.10)
We want to show that switching to strategy u? at some time t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ]
can improve the utility of the adversary. To this end, we assume that the
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matrix induced by u? over [t0, t?) is A, while the system matrix corresponding
to u? over [t?, t0 +  ] is B. Define the doubly stochastic matrix Q(t) := eBt,
t   0. Over [t?, t0 +  ], the strategies u and u? are identical except at link
eij 2 E , where uij = 0 and u?ij = 1. It follows that:
Aij > Bij = 0, Akl = Bkl 8ekl 6= eij. (2.11)
Formally, we want to prove the following inequality:Z t0+ 
t0
k(t) k(P (t  t0) M)x(t0)k22 dt
<
Z t?
t0
k(t) k(P (t  t0) M)x(t0)k22 dt
+
Z t0+ 
t?
k(t) k(Q(t  t?) M)P (t?   t0)x(t0)k22 dt,
or equivalentlyZ t0+ 
t?
k(t) · ⇥k(Q(t  t?) M)P (t?   t0)x(t0)k22
  k(P (t  t0) M)x(t0)k22
⇤
dt > 0. (2.12)
Using (2.10) and the semi-group property, Eq. (2.12) simplifies toZ t0+ 
t?
k(t) · x(t0)T⇤(t, t?)x(t0)dt > 0, (2.13)
where ⇤(t, t?) = P (t?   t0)Q(2(t  t?))P (t?   t0)  P (2(t  t0)). A su cient
condition for (2.13) to hold is
h(t, x(t0)) = x(t0)
T⇤(t, t?)x(t0) > 0, for t > t
?.
As   # 0, we can write P (t) = I + tA + O ( 2), where O ( 2) /   L for
su ciently small   and some finite constant L. We therefore have
⇤(t, t⇤) =
 
I + (t?   t0)A+O
 
 2
    
I + 2(t  t?)B +O   2   
I + (t?   t0)A+O
 
 2
     I + 2(t  t0)A+O   2  
= 2(t  t?)B + 2(t?   t0)A  2(t  t0)A+O
 
 2
 
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= 2(t  t?)(B   A) +O   2  .
For su ciently small  , the first term dominates the second term. Recall
that the quadratic form of a Laplacian matrix L exhibits the following form:
xTLx =
P
l>k Lkl(xl   xk)2, for any x 2 Rn. Note that B   A is in fact a
negative Laplacian. Using (2.11), we can then write
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t  t?)
X
r>s
(Asr   Bsr) (xr(t0)  xs(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
= 2(t  t?)Aij (xj(t0)  xi(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
. (2.14)
For small enough  , the higher order terms are dominated by the first term.
Hence, if there is a link eij such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0), there exists t? such that
h(t, x(t0)) > 0 for t 2 (t?, t0 +  ]. Since t0 was arbitrary, we conclude that
the optimal strategy must satisfy ku?(t)k1 = ` for all t, given that each of
the ` links connects two nodes having di↵erent values.
If no link such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0) exists at a given time t0, the adversary
does not need to break additional links, although breaking more links does
not a↵ect optimality because h(t, x(t0)) = 0 in such a case. There are two
cases under which the adversary cannot find a link to make h(t, x(t0)) > 0:
(i) The graph at time t0 is one connected component. In this case, the nodes
have already reached consensus and ku?k1 < `. This is a losing strategy for
the adversary as it failed in preventing nodes from reaching agreement; (ii)
The graph at time t0 has multiple connected components, and the number of
links connecting the components is less than `. The adversary here possesses
a winning strategy with ku?k1 < `, as it can disconnect G into multiple
components and prevent consensus.
The second step is to show that the adversary will modify the ` links with
the lowest wij = aij⌫ij values, eij 2 E . Let us again restrict our attention to
the interval [t0, t0+ ] where the adversary applies strategy u. Assume (to the
contrary) that the links the adversary breaks over this interval are not the
ones with the lowest wij(t) values. In particular, assume that the adversary
chooses to break link ekl 2 E , while there is a link eij 2 E such that wij < wkl.
Assume that the adversary switches at time t? 2 [t0, t0+  ] to strategy u? by
breaking link eij and unbreaking link ekl. Then, (2.14) becomes
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t  t⇤) (wkl(t0)  wij(t0)) +O
 
 2
 
.
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tt t0 t0 +   t0 + 2 
A(u) = A
A(u ) = B
A(u) = C
A(u) = CA(u) = A
Figure 2.1: A demonstration of the technique used in the third step of the
proof. The blue solid trajectory corresponds to u while the red dashed
trajectory corresponds to u?.
Hence, by following the same arguments as above, we can conclude that
breaking ekl is not optimal. This proves that the optimal strategy for the
adversary is to break the links with the lowest wij values.
The final step of the proof is to show that switching to strategy u? guar-
antees an improved utility for the adversary regardless of how the original
trajectory corresponding to u changes beyond time t0 +  . To this end, we
will assume that from time t0 +   onward, strategy u? will mimic strategy
u. Assume that strategy u switches from matrix A to matrix C over the
interval [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ], and define R(t) := eCt. Hence, strategy u? will also
switch from the system matrix B to matrix C. However, the trajectories
corresponding to u and u? will have di↵erent initial conditions at time t0+  ,
due to the switch that strategy u? made at time t?. Figure 2.1 illustrates this
idea. Consider the behavior of the system over the interval [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]
where we can assume that the system is time-invariant. To show that the
gain obtained over [t0, t0 +  ] by the switch made by u? is maintained over
[t0 +  , t0 + 2 ], we must prove the following inequality:
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Z t0+2 
t0+ 
k(t) ·
24k(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)Q(t0 +     t?)P (t?   t0)x(t0)k22| {z }
:=L1
 k(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)P (t0 +     t0)x(t0)k22| {z }
:=L2
35 dt > 0.(2.15)
As before, it su ces to prove that the integrant L1   L2 is positive. Let us
now expand both L1 and L2.
L1 = x(t0)
TP (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)
(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)Q(t0 +     t?)P (t?   s)x(t0)
= x(t0)
TP (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)(R(2(t  (t0 +  ))) M)
Q(t0 +     t?)P (t?   t0)x(t0)
= x(t0)
T (P (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)R(2(t  (t0 +  )))
Q(t0 +     t?)P (t?   t0) M)x(t0).
Similarly,
L2 = x(t0)
T (P ( )R(2(t  (t0 +  )))P ( ) M)x(t0).
We can then write
L1   L2 = x(t0)T (P (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)R(2(t  (t0 +  )))Q(t0 +     t?)
P (t?   t0)  P ( )R(2(t  (t0 +  )))P ( ))x(t0)
:= x(t0)
T (F1   F2)x(t0).
Before we perform a first-order Taylor expansion to the above terms, let us
define the following quantities:
⌧1 = t
?   t0, ⌧2 = (t0 +  )  t?, ⌧3 = t  (t0 +  ),
where t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] and t 2 [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ].
Using Proposition 2.1 (see Section 2.7), we can now expand F1 and F2 as
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follows:
F1 =
 
I + ⌧1A+O
 
⌧ 21
    
I + ⌧2B +O
 
⌧ 22
    
I + 2⌧3C +O
 
⌧ 23
   
I + ⌧2B +O
 
⌧ 22
    
I + ⌧1A+O
 
⌧ 21
  
=
 
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B +O
 
 2
    
I + 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
   
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B +O
 
 2
  
=
 
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B + 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
    
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B +O
 
 2
  
= I + 2⌧1A+ 2⌧2B + 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
 
.
F2 =
 
I +  A+O   2    I + 2⌧3C +O  ⌧ 23     I +  A+O   2  
=
 
I +  A+ 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
    
I +  A+O   2  
= I + 2 A+ 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
 
.
Hence, we have
F1   F2 = 2 (⌧1    )A+ 2⌧2B +O
 
 2
 
,
= 2⌧2 (B   A) +O
 
 2
 
= 2 ((t0 +  )  t?) (B   A) +O
 
 2
 
,
and thereby we obtain
L1   L2 = 2 ((t0 +  )  t?)
X
r>s
(Asr   Bsr) (xr(t0)  xs(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
= 2 (t0 +     t?)Aij (xj(t0)  xi(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
.
Thus, for small enough  , we conclude that L1   L2 > 0, which implies that
(2.15) is satisfied, and the gain obtained by switching to system matrix B
at t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] is maintained over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]. Note that the e↵ect
of switching to matrix C is cancelled in F1   F2, and hence L1   L2, since
the strategy u? is mimicking strategy u. Hence, by dividing the interval
(t0 + 2 , T ] into small intervals of length   and repeating the above analysis,
we conclude that the gain due to the switch at time t? is preserved over the
remaining time of the problem. The proof is therefore complete.
Remark 2.1. (Potential-Theoretic Analogy) When the graph is viewed as
an electrical network, aij can be viewed as the conductance of link eij 2 E
and xi xj as the potential di↵erence across the link. Therefore, the optimal
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strategy of the adversary involves breaking the links with highest power dis-
sipation given by aij(xi   xj)2. These links correspond to the edges with the
highest information flow; therefore, for the purpose of delaying or preventing
consensus, attacking these links is optimal. •
2.4 Attack II: Single Player Case
Assume now that the adversary is capable of adding a noise signal to all the
nodes in the network in order to slow down convergence. The dynamics in
this case are:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + u(t), x(0) = x0. (2.16)
We assume that the instantaneous power ku(t)k22 that the adversary can
expend cannot exceed a fixed value Pmax. We also assume that the adversary
has su cient energy Emax to allow it to operate at maximum instantaneous
power. Accordingly, the action set of the adversary is
U = {w 2 Rn | kwk22  Pmax}.
The set of admissible controls consists of all functions that are continuously
di↵erentiable in time and whose range is U . Given a time interval [0, T ], we
can formally write
U =  u : [0, T ]! U | u 2 C1[0, T ] .
The adversary’s problem is given by
max
u2U
J(u) (2.17)
subject to x˙(t) = Ax(t) + u(t), x(0) = x0, (2.18)
where A satisfies the properties given in (2.2) and (2.3). The Hamiltonian in
this case is given by
H(x, p, u) = k(t) kx(t)  x¯k22 + p(t)T (Ax(t) + u(t))
+ (t)
 ku(t)k22   Pmax  ,
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where   is a continuously di↵erentiable scalar Lagrange multiplier associated
with the power constraint. As before, we let x, p 2 C1[0, T ]. Here,   must
satisfy
 (t)  0,  (t)  ku(t)k22   Pmax  = 0, 8t 2 [0, T ].
The first-order necessary conditions for optimality are:
p˙(t) =   @
@x
H(x, p, u)
=  2k(t)(x(t)  x¯)  Ap(t), p(T ) = 0
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + u(t), x(0) = x0
@
@u
H(x, p, u) = 2 (t)u(t) + p(t) = 0. (2.19)
To find u?, consider the following cases:
Case 1: ( (t0) < 0 =) ku(t0)k22 = Pmax, for some t0 2 [0, T ]) Using
(2.19), we obtain  (t0)ku(t0)k22 =  12u(t0)Tp(t0); hence,
 (t0) =   1
2Pmax
u(t0)
Tp(t0), (2.20)
which we can then use to solve for the optimal control:
u?(t0) = Pmax
p(t0)
u(t0)Tp(t0)
=
Emax
T
· p(t0)
u(t0)Tp(t0)
.
Remark 2.2. The optimal strategy u?(t0) is the vector of maximum power
that it is aligned with p(t0). To see this, note that (2.20) implies that u(t0)Tp(t0) >
0, because  (t0) < 0. Hence, the vectors u?(t0) and p(t0) are aligned. Define
the unit vector p¯(t0) = p(t0)/kp(t0)k2. Then, we can further write
u?(t0) =
Emax/T
ku(t0)k22
· p¯(t0) =
p
Pmax · p¯(t0). (2.21)
Hence, the adversary’s optimal solution in this case is to operate at the max-
imum power available. •
Case 2: (ku(t0)k22 < Pmax =)  (t0) = 0, for some t0 2 [0, T ]) Using
(2.19), we obtain p(t0) = 0. In this case the control is singular, since it
does not appear in @@uH = 0. By continuity of the costate p, there exists an
interval  t = [t0, t0 +  ],   > 0, such that p(t) = 0, for all t 2  t. This
31
implies that all the time derivatives of p must also be zero:
d
dt
@
@u
H = p˙(t) =  2k(t) (x(t)  x¯)  ATp(t) = 0, 8t 2  t,
which implies that x(t) = x¯, for all t 2  t. The conditions obtained by taking
the time derivatives are also necessary conditions that must be satisfied at the
optimal trajectory. However, having x(t) = x¯, for all t 2  t, could violate
the initial condition when t0 = 0. In order to resolve this inconsistency, we
set the control at t = 0 to be an impulse, ui(t) = c ·  (t), for all i 2 V , in
order to make x(0) = x¯, where c 2 R is chosen to guarantee ku(t)k22 < Pmax.
Note that we still have not recovered the control, and therefore we need to
di↵erentiate again:
d2
dt2
@
@u
H = x˙(t) = Ax(t) + u(t) = 0, 8t 2  t,
which implies that u(t) =  Ax(t) =  Ax¯ = 0, for all t 2  t.
Remark 2.3. Note that x(t) = x¯ leads to having u(t) = 0. This result
matches intuition; when the nodes reach consensus, J(u) = 0 for all u 2 U .
Hence, no matter what the control is, the utility of the adversary will always
be zero. Thus, expending power becomes sub-optimal, and the optimal strategy
is to do nothing. •
Since the adversary attempts to increase the Euclidean distance between
x and x¯, we can readily see that u ⌘ 0 cannot be optimal, unless x(0) = x¯.
The following lemma proves this formally.
Lemma 2.2. The solution of the problem (2.17)-(2.18) satisfies ku(t)k22 =
Pmax.
Proof. Let u1 2 U be such that ku1(t)k22 < Pmax, for all t 2 [0, T ]. Then, it
follows from Case 2 that J(u1) = 0. Consider another solution, u2 2 U , which
satisfies the power constraint with equality. Namely, let u2(t) =
q
Pmax
n 1,
for all t 2 [0, T ]. Using the solution to (2.16), and by defining the doubly
stochastic matrix P (t) = eAt we can write
x(t) = P (t)x0 +
r
Pmax
n
1t, t 2 [0, T ].
32
In this case, for all t 2 [0, T ], we have
kx(t)  x¯k22 = xT0 (P (t) M)T (P (t) M)x0
+Pmaxt
2 + 2
r
Pmax
n
xT0 (P (t) M)1t
= xT0 (P (t)
2   2MP (t) M2)x0 + Pmaxt2 (2.22)
= xT0 P (2t)(I  M)x0 + Pmaxt2, (2.23)
where (2.22) follows because P (t), t 2 [0, T ], and M are stochastic matrices,
and (2.23) follows from (2.10) and the semi-group property. Being a stochas-
tic matrix, P (2t) is positive semidefinite, for t 2 [0, T ]. Also, I  M is a
Laplacian matrix; therefore, it is also positive semidefinite. Further, note
that
P (2t)(I  M) = P (2t) MP (2t) = (I  M)P (2t), t 2 [0, T ].
Hence, P (2t)(I M) is also positive semidefinite, and therefore xT0 P (2t)(I 
M)x0   0, for all t 2 [0, T ]. This in turn implies
J(u2) =
Z T
0
k(t)
⇥
xT0 P (2t)(I  M)x0 + Pmaxt2
⇤
dt
  Pmax
3
T 3 > J(u1) = 0.
We conclude that not utilizing the power budget available yields a lower
utility for the adversary.
From the above analysis, and with Lemma 2.2 at hand, we conclude that
the optimal control of the adversary must be given by (2.21), for all t0 2 [0, T ].
Hence, it remains to determine the costate vector in order to completely char-
acterize u?. To do so, we will invoke Banach’s fixed-point theorem. To this
end, we will work with the scaled utility J˜(u) = ⌫J(u), ⌫ > 0, without loss
of generality. Note that u? in (2.21) is also the solution to the maximization
problem of J˜(u). The costate trajectory is given by
p(t) = 2⌫
Z T
t
k(⌧)P (⌧   t)(x(⌧)  x¯)d⌧. (2.24)
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Substituting (2.21) and the solution to (2.16) into (2.24) yields
p(t) = g(t) + 2⌫
p
Pmax
Z T
t
Z ⌧
0
k(⌧)P (2⌧   (t+ s))p¯(s)dsd⌧,
where g(t) = 2⌫
R T
t P (⌧   t)k(⌧)(P (⌧)x0   x¯)d⌧ . Note that 2⌧   (t+ s)   0
for 0  s  ⌧ , t  ⌧  T , and hence P (.) is a well-defined doubly stochastic
matrix over the region of integration. We define the mapping T (p)(t) := p(t).
By its structure, it is readily seen that T (p)(t) : C1[0, T ] ! C1[0, T ]. The
following lemma aids in obtaining the costate vector.
Lemma 2.3. Let T˜ (x)(t) := k(t) R t0 P (s)x(s)ds, t 2 [0, T ], where P (t) is a
doubly stochastic matrix, and fix x(t) 2 C1[0, T ]. Then   T˜ (x)   
L1
 sup
0tT
tk(t) · kxkL1 .
Proof. We have:   T˜ (x)   
L1
= sup
0tT
    k(t) Z t
0
P (s)x(s)ds
    
1
= sup
0tT
k(t) sup
1in
     
Z t
0
nX
j=1
Pij(s)xj(s)ds
     
 sup
0tT
k(t) sup
1in
Z t
0
nX
j=1
Pij(s) |xj(s)| ds
 sup
0tT
k(t) sup
1in
Z t
0
 
nX
j=1
Pij(s)
!
sup
1jn
|xj(s)| ds
= sup
0tT
k(t)
Z t
0
sup
1jn
|xj(s)| ds
 sup
0tT
k(t)
Z t
0
sup
0sT
sup
1jn
|xj(s)| ds
= sup
0tT
tk(t) · kxkL1 ,
where the second inequality follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality.
Theorem 2.3. By choosing ⌫ < 1
2
p
Pmax(kˇ+kˆ)
, where kˇ = sup0tT tk(t) and
kˆ = sup0tT
R T
t ⌧k(⌧)d⌧ , the mapping T (p)(t) : C1[0, T ] ! C1[0, T ] has a
unique fixed point p? 2 C1[0, T ] that can be obtained by any sequence gener-
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ated by the iteration pk+1(t) = T (pk)(t), t 2 [0, T ], starting from an arbitrary
vector p0 2 C1[0, T ].
Proof. The theorem will follow if for this choice of ⌫, the mapping T is a
contraction. Consider two vectors y, z 2 C1[0, T ] and let y¯, z¯ be the corre-
sponding normalized unit norm vectors. Let w¯ = y¯   z¯. Then
1
2⌫
p
Pmax
kT (y)  T (z)kC1 =
sup
0tT
k(t) sup
1in
     
Z t
0
nX
j=1
Pij(t  s)w¯j(s)ds
     
+ sup
0tT
sup
1in
     
Z T
t
k(⌧)
Z ⌧
0
nX
j=1
Pij(2⌧   (t+ s))w¯j(s)dsd⌧
     
 sup
0tT
tk(t) kw¯kL1 + sup
0tT
sup
1in
Z T
t
k(⌧)
·
Z ⌧
0
nX
j=1
Pij(2⌧   (t+ s)) |w¯j(s)| dsd⌧,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.3. Using arguments similar
to those used in proving Lemma 2.3, we have:
1
2⌫
p
Pmax
kT (y)  T (z)kC1

✓
sup
0tT
tk(t) + sup
0tT
Z T
t
⌧k(⌧)d⌧
◆
kw¯kL1
 (kˇ + kˆ) ky   zkL1  2⌫
p
Pmax(kˇ + kˆ) ky   zkC1 ,
where the second inequality follows from the properties of similar triangles.
We readily see that by selecting ⌫ < 1
2
p
Pmax(kˇ+kˆ)
, the last inequality implies
that T (p)(t) is a contraction mapping. Since C1[0, T ] endowed with k.kC1
is a Banach space, Banach’s contraction mapping principle guarantees the
existence of a unique fixed point p? 2 C1[0, T ] which can be obtained from the
iteration pk+1(t) = T (pk)(t) as k !1, t 2 [0, T ], for any initial point.
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Figure 2.2: E↵ect of Attack-I on the convergence to consensus. T = 2,
n = 4, ` = 2, and x0 = [1, 2, 3, 4].
2.5 Numerical Studies
In this section, we provide numerical examples for Attack-I and Attack-
II. We consider the complete graph with n = 4. The matrix A(0) was
generated. We let T = 2 and x0 = [1, 2, 3, 4]T—hence, xavg = 2.5. We
simulated the network using Matlab’s Bvp Solver.
For Attack-I, we fixed ` = 2, and computed the optimal control using
(2.9), which was found to be u?(t) = [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1]T for t 2 [0, 2]. Indeed, at
t = 0, the highest wij values are w13(0) = 2.2101 and w14(0) = 13.8979 which
confirms the conclusion of Theorem 2.2. In this particular example, w13, w14
remain dominant throughout the problem’s horizon, and hence the control is
stationary. Figure 2.2 simulates the network at hand with and without the
presence of the adversary. Note that the adversary was successful in delaying
convergence. Since both links the adversary broke emanate from node 1, x1
is far from consensus.
For Attack-II, we fixed Pmax = 2, and Fig. 2.3 demonstrates the network
with and without the presence of the adversary. Since the adversary in this
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Figure 2.3: E↵ect of Attack-II on the convergence to consensus. T = 2,
n = 4, and x0 = [1, 2, 3, 4].
attack is capable of targeting nodes, he was capable of diverting the values
of all the nodes away from xavg.
2.6 Summary
We have considered two types of adversarial attacks on a network of agents
performing distributed averaging. Both attacks have the common objective of
slowing down the convergence of the nodes to the global average. Attack-I
involves an adversary that is capable of compromising links, with a constraint
on the number of links it can break. Despite the interdependence of the state,
costate, and control, we were able to find the optimal strategy. We also
presented a potential-theoretic interpretation of the solution. In Attack-
II, a finite power adversary attempts to corrupt the values of the nodes
by injecting a signal of bounded power. We assumed that the adversary
has su cient energy Emax to operate at maximum instantaneous power and
derived the corresponding optimal strategy.
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2.7 Additional Proof
The following proposition is used in proof Theorem 2.2. It will also be used
in proving some of the main results of Chapter 3.
Proposition 2.1. Given ⌧1, ⌧2, ⌧3, which were defined in terms of   > 0 in the
proof of Theorem 2.2, let f be a real-valued function. Then, if f( ) = O (⌧ 2i )
as   ! 0, we have f( ) = O ( 2) , i 2 [3]. Also, if f( ) = ⌧iO
 
⌧ 2j
 
as   ! 0,
then f( ) = O ( 3) , i, j 2 [3].
Proof. Recall that we write f(x) = O (g(x)), for some real-valued function
g, as x! a if there exist constants M,   such that |f(x)|  M |g(x)|, for all
x satisfying |x  a| <  . Since f( ) = O (⌧ 2i ) as   ! 0, and recalling that by
definition we have ⌧i    for i 2 [3], we can write f( ) M⌧ 2i M 2. Hence,
f( ) = O ( 2). To prove the second statement, recall that h(x)O (g(x)) =
O (h(x)g(x)), for any two real-valued functions h, g. Hence, as   ! 0, we
have f( ) = ⌧iO
 
⌧ 2j
 
= O  ⌧i⌧ 2j  . Therefore, f( )  M⌧i⌧ 2j  M 3 and
f( ) = O ( 3).
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CHAPTER 3
A COMPETITION OVER CONSENSUS
NETWORKS
3.1 Background
Having studied the worst-case attacks on consensus networks in the previous
chapter, we now introduce a network designer and study its interaction with
the adversary. We consider a setting similar to that of the previous chapter:
the network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averag-
ing, and the adversary strategically attempts to prevent the nodes from reach-
ing consensus by launching either Attack-I or Attack-II. By modeling the
adversary as a strategic player and deriving optimal defense strategies, we
guarantee robustness against worst-case attacks, unlike existing approaches
in which attacks on links were modeled as random failures [60].
For Attack-I, the adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to pre-
vent the nodes from reaching consensus. Meanwhile, the network designer
assists the nodes in reaching consensus by changing the weights of a lim-
ited number of links in the network. We formulate two Stackelberg games
to describe this competition where the order in which the players act is re-
versed in the two problems. Although the canonical equations provided by
the Pontryagin’s maximum principle seem to be intractable, we provide an
alternative characterization for the optimal strategies that makes connection
to potential theory. Finally, we provide a su cient condition for the existence
of a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE) for the underlying zero-sum game.
In Attack-II, the designer and the adversary are both capable of altering
the measurements of all nodes in the network by injecting global signals. We
impose two constraints on both players: a power constraint and an energy
constraint. We assume that the available energy to each player is not su -
cient to operate at the maximum power throughout the horizon of the game.
We show the existence of an SPE and derive the optimal strategies in closed
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form for this attack scenario.
Such an interaction between a network designer and an adversary can oc-
cur in various practical applications. For example, in a wireless network, the
adversary can be a jammer who is capable of breaking links by injecting high
noise signals that disrupt the communication among nodes. The link weights
in such a network represent the capacities of the corresponding links. The
designer can modify the capacity of a certain link using various communica-
tion techniques such as introducing parallel channels between two nodes as
in orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) networks [61]. In
OFDMA networks, the number of parallel links between two nodes is usu-
ally limited [62]. To capture this limitation, we limit the amount by which
the designer can increase the capacity of a given link. The adversary can
be a jammer who is capable of breaking links by injecting high noise signals
that disrupt the communication among nodes. The adversary is assumed to
have su cient transmit power to disrupt the communication over any link,
no matter what the number of parallel channels is.
3.2 Main Results
For Attack-I, we capture the interaction between the designer and the
adversary by formulating two separate problems. In the min–max problem,
the designer declares a strategy first to which the adversary reacts by its
optimal response. The second problem is a max–min one, where the order
of play is reversed. Assuming that the controllers do not switch infinitely
many times over a finite interval among the available actions, we derive the
optimal strategies for both problems in terms of potential-theoretic quantities
by working directly with the utility functional. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that the derived strategies satisfy the necessary conditions provided by the
MP. Further, we derive a su cient condition guaranteeing the existence of
an SPE. For Attack-II, we show that an SPE always exists and derive the
optimal strategies in closed-form.
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Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we provide
the preliminaries of Attack-I and formulate the min–max and max–min
problems. In Section 3.4, we derive the Stackelberg strategies and show that
they satisfy the MP. We provide a su cient condition for the existence of
an SPE in Section 3.5. Attack-II is introduced in Section 3.6, where the
optimal strategies for both players are derived in closed form. We end the
chapter with the concluding remarks of Section 3.7. Section 3.8 includes a
proof of one of the theorems and a technical result.
Terminology and Notation
We will adopt the same notation and terminology outlined in Chapter 2.
3.3 Attack-I: Adversary vs. Network Designer
Consider a connected network of n nodes andm links described by a weighted
undirected graph G = (N , E). The value, or state, of the nodes at time
instant t 2 R 0 is given by x(t) = [x1(t), ..., xn(t)]T . The nodes start with
an initial value x(0) = x0, and they are interested in computing the average
of their initial values, xavg =
1
n
Pn
i=1 xi(0), via local averaging. We consider
the continuous-time averaging dynamics given by
x˙(t) = Ax(t), x(0) = x0, (3.1)
where the matrix A, Aij = aij 2 R, has the following properties:
A = AT , A1 = 0, (3.2)
Aij   0, Aij = 0 () eij /2 E , i 6= j. (3.3)
Define x¯ = 1xavg 2 Rn and let M = 1n11T . A well-known result states that,
under the above assumptions, the nodes will reach consensus as t!1, i.e.,
limt!1 x(t) = x¯ [12]. To achieve their respective objectives, the designer and
the adversary control the elements of A as we describe next. This will render
the matrix A to be time-varying.
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The adversary attempts to slow down convergence by breaking at most
`  m links at each time t. Let uij(t) 2 {0, 1} be the weight the adversary
assigns to link eij 2 E at time t 2 R 0. He breaks link eij when uij(t) = 1.
Define r :=
 
n
2
 
. The action set of the adversary is then
U = {w 2 Rr | w = [w12, ..., w1n, w23, ..., w(n 1)n]T , wij 2 {0, 1},
wij = 0 if eij /2 E , kwk1  `}.
The set of admissible controls, U , consists of all functions that are piecewise
continuous in time and whose range is U . Given a time interval [0, T ], we
can formally write
U = {u : [0, T ]! U | u is a piecewise continuous function of t} .
We introduce a network designer who attempts to accelerate convergence
by controlling the weights of the edges. The designer can change the weight of
a given link by adding vij(t) to its weight aij. We assume that vij(t) 2 {0, b}
and that the number of links the designer modifies is at most `  m. Given
the above definitions, we can write down the (i, j)-th element, i 6= j, of the
matrix A(u(t), v(t)) as
Aij(u(t), v(t)) = (aij + vij(t))(1  uij(t)), for all eij 2 E . (3.4)
We require that the resulting matrix is a negative Laplacian of the graph;
hence, we must have Aii(u(t), v(t)) =  
P
j 6=iAij(u(t), v(t)), for all i 2 V .
Given a time interval [0, T ], define the following functional:
J(u, v) =
1
2
Z T
0
k(t) kx(t)  x¯k22 dt,
where the weighting factor k(t) is positive and integrable over [0, T ]. This
constitutes the utility function of the adversary, and that of the designer is
 J(u, v). We will study two problems. In the first one, the adversary acts
first by selecting the links he is interested in breaking. Then, the network
designer optimizes his choices over the resulting graph, which we denote by
G(u(t)) = (N , E(u(t))), where E(u(t)) = E \ {eij 2 E : uij(t) = 1}. In this
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case, the action set of the designer can be written as
V (u(t)) =
 
w 2 Rr | w = [w12, ..., w1n, w23, ..., w(n 1)n]T , wij 2 {0, b},
wij = 0 if eij /2 E(u(t)), kwk1  b`} .
The set of admissible controls for the designer, V(u), consists of all piecewise
continuous functions whose range is V (u). Formally, we define
V(u) = {v : [0, T ]! V (u(t)) | v is a piecewise continuous function of t} .
The max–min problem can now be formally written as1
sup
u2U
inf
v2V(u)
J(u, v)
subject to x˙(t) = A(u(t), v(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
In the second problem, the order is reversed. Since the designer acts first
in this problem, he can optimize over the entire graph G. Thus, the action
set of the designer in this problem is V := V (0) and the set of its admissible
controls is V := V(0); the sets of actions and admissible controls of the
adversary remain the same. We can then write
inf
v2V
sup
u2U
J(u, v)
subject to x˙(t) = A(u(t), v(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
In a computer network, the max–min problem allows the network designer
(who is the maximizer here) to architect networks that are robust against
strategic virus di↵usion. The min–max problem finds applications in army
combat situations where the designer (the minimizer) attempts to counter
the attacks of the enemy intending to disrupt the network communication.
Given the nature of the players’ possible modifications of the network, as
described by (3.4), we can view the actions of the players as switches among
the possible Laplacian matrices resulting from modifying the links. Moreover,
the capability of the designer and the adversary to change the system matrix
1Even though existence of a maximum and a minimum has not yet been shown at this
stage, we will still call this the “max–min” problem in anticipation of such an existence
result later in the chapter. The formal definition below is still in terms of sup and inf.
The same argument applies to the min–max problem to be introduced shortly.
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renders it as a “switched” one. The optimal controllers for such systems can
exhibit Zeno e↵ect, i.e., they may switch infinitely many times over a finite
interval. In order to explicitly eliminate the possibility of infinite switching,
we make the following assumption in the remainder of this chapter.
Assumption 3.1. Let 0  r1 < . . . < rKu  T be the switching times of
some u 2 U and 0  s1 < . . . < sKv  T be those of some v 2 V. We assume
that Ku, Kv 2 Z 0 are finite, and that there exists a globally minimum dwell
time ⌧ > 0 such that
⌧  min
⇢
ri+1   ri, si+1   si, |ri   sj|
     i 2 [Ku], j 2 [Kv]  , (3.5)
over which the system matrix A(u, v) is time-invariant.
Note that this assumption is well motivated for practical reasons. Consider,
for example, a communication network where an adversary is a jammer in-
jecting an interfering signal at some links. If the adversary chooses to change
the set of links it is jamming, there must be some delay for the adversary to
change its configuration. Now, we make the following assumption for both
problems:
Assumption 3.2. The initial matrix A(0, 0), the time interval [0, T ], the
values ` and b, and the initial state x0 are common information to both
players.
We recall the definition of an SPE.
Definition 3.1 (Saddle-Point Equilibrium (SPE) [63]). The pair (u?, v?)
constitutes an SPE if it satisfies the following pair of inequalities
J(u, v?)  J(u?, v?)  J(u?, v), (3.6)
for u 2 U , v 2 V.
The following remarks are now in order.
Remark 3.1. (Non-Rectangular Strategy Sets and Existence of SPE) When
the strategy sets are rectangular, i.e., the strategy of one player does not
restrict the strategy space of the other, the following relationship holds:
V = sup
u2U
inf
v2V
J(u, v)  inf
v2V
sup
u2U
J(u, v) = V , (3.7)
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where V , V are called, respectively, the lower and upper values of the game.
When the strategy sets are non-rectangular, however, the order in (3.7) may
not hold. Moreover, one should not expect the pair of inequalities (3.6) to
hold, and hence an SPE may not exist. In the max–min problem in this
chapter, the strategy sets of the players are non-rectangular as the adver-
sary’s action, removing links from G, could restrict the actions available to
the designer. •
Remark 3.2. (Problem Complexity) Let us consider the problem of the ad-
versary for a given strategy of the designer. Assume that the adversary can
act at Ku 2 Z 0 given time instances over the interval [0, T ]. Then, for
`  m, assuming that ku(t)k1 = ` for all t 2 R 0, the total number of links
that need to be tested in a brute-force approach is✓
m
`
◆Ku
 
⇣m
`
⌘`Ku
. (3.8)
Clearly, the brute-force approach leads to an exponential number of computa-
tions as a function of Ku. The same argument applies to the problem faced
by the network designer. •
3.4 Optimal Strategies
We will now present the solutions to the two problems introduced above.
In [64], we have shown that the canonical equations provided by the MP
are intractable due to the interdependence between the state, costate, and
the optimal controls; therefore, it may not be possible to obtain the optimal
strategies in closed form using the MP. Here, we take an alternative route
to arrive at the optimal strategies of the players by working directly with
the objective functional. In what follows, we will often drop the time index
and other arguments for notational simplicity. We will be using the term
“connected component” to refer to a set of connected nodes which have the
same values. The following quantities, which we associate with each eij 2 E ,
will be central to the derivation of the optimal strategies:
⌫ij :=  (xi   xj)2, wij := (aij + vij)⌫ij. (3.9)
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3.4.1 The Min–Max Problem
The following theorem presents the optimal strategy of the adversary in the
min–max problem. Define the set
L`(v) =  ` ({(eij, (aij + vij)⌫ij) | eij 2 E}) ✓ E . (3.10)
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, and for a fixed strategy v of
the designer, the optimal strategy of the adversary in the min–max problem
is
u?ij(v) =
(
1, eij 2 L`(v)
0, eij /2 L`(v)
.
If the adversary has an optimal strategy of breaking fewer than ` links, then
either G has a cut of size less than ` or the nodes have reached consensus by
time t. In either of these cases, breaking ` links is also optimal.
Proof. For a fixed strategy of the designer v 2 V , we will show that it is
optimal for the maximizer to rank the links based on their wij values, where
wij was defined in (3.9). Under Assumption 3.1, the function x becomes
piecewise continuous. Hence, the function wij, for all eij 2 E , is also piecewise
continuous and its value cannot change abruptly over a finite interval. As a
result, we can regard the system as a time-invariant one over a small interval
[t0, t0 +  ] ⇢ [0, T ], where 0 <    ⌧ , and ⌧ was defined in (3.5). The proof
consists of two steps.
(i) Showing that, over a small interval [t0, t0 +  ], it is optimal for the
adversary to switch from a strategy u 2 U to another strategy u? 2 U ,
where u? entails breaking the ` links with the lowest wij values.
(ii) Showing that allowing u? to mimic u for the remaining time of the
problem preserves the gain obtained over [t0, t0 +  ].
Over a small interval, u and u? induce certain system matrices. Let the
system matrix corresponding to u over [t0, t0 +  ] be A(u, v) = A, and let
kuk1 < ` over this interval. Since the control strategies of both players are
time-invariant over this interval, we have
x(t) = eA(t t0)x(t0), t 2 [t0, t0 +  ]. (3.11)
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Let P (t) := eAt. Due to the structure of A, P (t) is a doubly stochastic matrix
for t   0 [59, p. 63]. Note that we can write x(t0) = P˜ x0, where P˜ is some
doubly stochastic matrix. Indeed, assume that either or both controls had
switched once at some time t˜0 2 [0, t0), and that the system matrix over
[0, t˜0) was A˜1, and the system matrix corresponding to [t˜0, t0) was A˜2. Then
x(t0) = eA˜2(t0 t˜0)eA˜1 t˜0x0. Since both eA˜1t, eA˜2t are doubly stochastic matrices,
their product is also doubly stochastic. We can readily generalize this result
to any number of switches in the interval [0, t0). With this observation, we
can write
x(t)  x¯ = P (t  t0)P˜ x0  Mx0 = (P (t  t0) M)x(t0),
where the last equality follows from the fact that
P˜M =MP˜ =M, P˜ is doubly stochastic. (3.12)
We want to show that switching from strategy u to strategy u? at some time
t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ], can improve the utility of the adversary. To this end, we
assume that the matrix induced by u? over [t0, t?) is A, while the system
matrix corresponding to u? over [t?, t0+ ] is B. Define the doubly stochastic
matrix Q(t) := eBt, t   0. Over [t?, t0 +  ], the strategies u and u? are
identical except at link eij 2 E , where uij = 0 and u?ij = 1, i.e., kuk1 < ku?k1
over this sub-interval. It follows that:
Aij > Bij = 0, Akl = Bkl 8ekl 6= eij. (3.13)
Formally, we want to prove the following inequality:Z t0+ 
t0
k(t) k(P (t  t0) M)x(t0)k22 dt
<
Z t?
t0
k(t) k(P (t  t0) M)x(t0)k22 dt
+
Z t0+ 
t?
k(t) k(Q(t  t?) M)P (t?   t0)x(t0)k22 dt,
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or equivalentlyZ t0+ 
t?
k(t) · ⇥k(Q(t  t?) M)P (t?   t0)x(t0)k22
  k(P (t  t0) M)x(t0)k22
⇤
dt > 0. (3.14)
Using (3.12) and the semi-group property, (3.14) simplifies toZ t0+ 
t?
k(t) · x(t0)T⇤(t, t?)x(t0)dt > 0, (3.15)
where ⇤(t, t?) = P (t?   t0)Q(2(t  t?))P (t?   t0)  P (2(t  t0)). A su cient
condition for (3.15) to hold is
h(t, x(t0)) = x(t0)
T⇤(t, t?)x(t0) > 0, for t > t
?.
As   # 0, we can write P (t) = I + tA + O ( 2), where O ( 2) /   L for
su ciently small   and some finite constant L. We therefore have
⇤(t, t⇤) =
 
I + (t?   t0)A+O
 
 2
    
I + 2(t  t?)B +O   2   
I + (t?   t0)A+O
 
 2
     I + 2(t  t0)A+O   2  
= 2(t  t?)B + 2(t?   t0)A  2(t  t0)A+O
 
 2
 
= 2(t  t?)(B   A) +O   2  . (3.16)
For su ciently small  , the first term dominates the second term. Recall
that the quadratic form of a Laplacian matrix L exhibits the following form:
xTLx =
Pn
l=1
Pl 1
k=1 Lkl(xl xk)2, for any x 2 Rn. Note that B A is in fact
a negative Laplacian. Using (3.13), we can then write
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t  t?)
X
r>s
(Asr   Bsr) (xr(t0)  xs(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
= 2(t  t?)Aij (xj(t0)  xi(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
. (3.17)
For small enough  , the higher order terms are dominated by the first term.
Hence, if there is a link eij such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0), there exists t? such that
h(t, x(t0)) > 0 for t 2 (t?, t0 +  ]. Since t0 was arbitrary, we conclude that
the optimal strategy must satisfy ku?(t)k1 = ` for all t, given that each of
the ` links connects two nodes having di↵erent values.
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If no link such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0) exists at a given time t0, the adversary
does not need to break additional links, although breaking more links does
not a↵ect optimality because h(t, x(t0)) = 0 in such a case. There are two
cases under which the adversary cannot find a link to make h(t, x(t0)) > 0:
(i) The graph at time t0 is one connected component. In this case, the
nodes have already reached consensus and ku?(t)k1 < `. This is a losing
strategy for the adversary as he has failed in preventing nodes from reaching
agreement; (ii) The graph at time t0 has multiple connected components, and
the number of links connecting the components is less than `. The adversary
here possesses a winning strategy with ku?(t)k1 < `, as he can disconnect G
into multiple components and prevent consensus.
Next, we need to show that the adversary will modify the ` links with
the lowest wij values. Let us again restrict our attention to the interval
[t0, t0 +  ] where the adversary applies strategy u. Assume (to the contrary)
that the links the adversary breaks over this interval are not the ones with
the lowest wij values. In particular, assume that the adversary chooses to
break link ekl, while there is a link eij such that wij < wkl. Assume that the
adversary switches at time t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] to strategy u? by breaking link eij
and unbreaking link ekl. Then, (3.17) becomes
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t  t⇤) (wkl(t0)  wij(t0)) +O
 
 2
 
.
Hence, by following the same arguments as above, we can conclude that
breaking ekl is not optimal.
The second step of the proof is to show that switching to strategy u?
guarantees an improved utility for the adversary regardless of how the original
trajectory corresponding to u changes beyond time t0 +  . To this end, we
will assume that from time t0+   onward, strategy u? will mimic strategy u.
Assume that strategy u switches from matrix A to matrix C over the interval
[t0+ , t0+2 ], and define R(t) := eCt. Hence, strategy u? will also switch from
the system matrix B to matrix C. However, the trajectories corresponding to
u and u? will have di↵erent initial conditions at time t0+ , due to the switch
that strategy u? made at time t?. Figure 3.1 illustrates this idea. Recall that
according to A, we have kuk1 < ` and uij = 0. Here, the system matrix
B can di↵er from the matrix A in two ways: either (i) B dictates breaking
one additional link compared to A, or (ii) B dictates breaking link eij and
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tt t0 t0 +   t0 + 2 
A(u , v ) = A A(u , v ) = B A(u , v ) = C
A(u , v ) = CA(u , v ) = A
Figure 3.1: A demonstration of the technique used in the proof. The blue
solid trajectory corresponds to u while the red dashed trajectory
corresponds to u?.
unbreaking link ekl where wij < wkl. Consider Case (i) first and let us study
the behavior of the system over the interval [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ] where we can
assume that the system is time-invariant. To show that the gain obtained
over [t0, t0 +  ] by the switch made by u? is maintained over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ],
we must prove the following inequality:Z t0+2 
t0+ 
k(t) · [L1   L2] dt > 0, (3.18)
where
L1 := k(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)Q(t0 +     t?)P (t?   t0)x(t0)k22 ,
L2 := k(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)P (t0 +     t0)x(t0)k22 .
As before, it su ces to prove that the integrand L1   L2 is positive. Let us
now expand both L1 and L2.
L1 = x(t0)
TP (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)
(R(t  (t0 +  )) M)Q(t0 +     t?)P (t?   s)x(t0)
= x(t0)
TP (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)(R(2(t  (t0 +  ))) M)Q(t0 +     t?)
P (t?   t0)x(t0)
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= x(t0)
T (P (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)R(2(t  (t0 +  )))Q(t0 +     t?)
P (t?   t0) M)x(t0).
Similarly,
L2 = x(t0)
T (P ( )R(2(t  (t0 +  )))P ( ) M)x(t0).
We can then write
L1   L2 = x(t0)T (P (t?   t0)Q(t0 +     t?)R(2(t  (t0 +  )))Q(t0 +     t?)
P (t?   t0)  P ( )R(2(t  (t0 +  )))P ( ))x(t0)
:= x(t0)
T (F1   F2)x(t0).
Before we perform a first-order Taylor expansion to the above terms, let
us define the following quantities: ⌧1 = t?   t0, ⌧2 = (t0 +  )   t?, and
⌧3 = t   (t0 +  ), where t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] and t 2 [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]. Using
Proposition 2.1 in Section 2.7, we can now expand F1 and F2 as follows:
F1 =
 
I + ⌧1A+O
 
⌧ 21
    
I + ⌧2B +O
 
⌧ 22
    
I + 2⌧3C +O
 
⌧ 23
   
I + ⌧2B +O
 
⌧ 22
    
I + ⌧1A+O
 
⌧ 21
  
=
 
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B +O
 
 2
    
I + 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
   
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B +O
 
 2
  
=
 
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B + 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
    
I + ⌧1A+ ⌧2B +O
 
 2
  
= I + 2⌧1A+ 2⌧2B + 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
 
F2 =
 
I +  A+O   2    I + 2⌧3C +O  ⌧ 23     I +  A+O   2  
=
 
I +  A+ 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
    
I +  A+O   2  
= I + 2 A+ 2⌧3C +O
 
 2
 
.
Hence, we have
F1   F2 = 2 (⌧1    )A+ 2⌧2B +O
 
 2
 
= 2⌧2 (B   A) +O
 
 2
 
= 2 ((t0 +  )  t?) (B   A) +O
 
 2
 
,
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and thereby we obtain
L1   L2 = 2 ((t0 +  )  t?)
X
r>s
(Asr   Bsr) (xr(t0)  xs(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
= 2 (t0 +     t?)Aij (xj(t0)  xi(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
.
If instead the matrix B dictates breaking link eij and unbreaking link ekl,
where wij < wkl, the di↵erence in the utilities would be
L1   L2 = 2 (t0 +     t?) (wkl(t0)  wij(t0)) +O
 
 2
 
.
Hence, in both cases, for small enough  , we conclude that L1   L2 > 0,
which implies that (3.18) is satisfied, and the gain obtained by switching to
system matrix B at t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] is maintained over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]. Note
that the e↵ect of switching to matrix C is cancelled out in F1 F2, and hence
L1 L2, since the strategy u? is mimicking strategy u. Hence, by partitioning
the interval (t0+2 , T ] into small sub-intervals of length   and repeating the
above analysis, we conclude that the gain due to the switch at time t? is
preserved over the remaining time of the problem.
We can now derive the optimal strategy of the designer in the min–max
problem. Recall the set L`(v) ✓ E defined in (3.10). Let L`,k(v) 2 E denote
the k-th link of L`(v), k 2 [`]. Also, define L 1`,k(v) 2 R as the value such
that  (L`,k(v),L 1`,k(v)) = L`,k(v). We assume that L 1`,1(v)   . . .   L 1`,` (v).
Further, define the sets P(v) = {(eij, aij⌫ij) | eij /2 L`(v)} ⇢ E ⇥ R and
P(v) = {(eij, ⌫ij) | eij /2 L`(v)} ⇢ E ⇥ R. We also define
[vS(b)]ij =
(
b, eij 2 S
0, eij /2 S
.
Theorem 3.2. In the min–max problem, and under Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2, the optimal strategy of the designer is to run Algorithm 3.1 and set
v?ij 2 {0, b} if ⌫ij = 0. Further, it is optimal for the designer to modify `
links.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, we deduce that kv?(t)k1 = b`, because the designer
would be at a disadvantage if he modifies fewer links than the adversary.
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Algorithm 3.1: Computing the optimal strategy for the minimizer in the
min–max problem.
0: input: a strategy v with kvk1 = 0
1: for i = ` # 1
2: if 9S ✓  (P(0)), |S| = i, L`,i(0) /2 L`(vS(b))
3: Set v?ij = b, 8eij 2 S [  ` i
 P(vS(b)) .
4: Exit for loop.
5: end
6: end
7: if kvk1 = 0
8: Set v?ij = b for all eij 2  `
 P(0) .
9: end
We first consider the designer’s strategy over a fixed small interval [t0, t0+ ]
over which both u and v are fixed. Using similar steps as those leading to
(3.15), and after applying a first-order Taylor expansion, we can write the
designer’s utility over [t0, t0 +  ] asZ t0+ 
t0
k(t) ·2(t t0)
X
j>i
(aij+vij)(1 uij)(xi(t0) xj(t0))2dt+O
 
 2
 
. (3.19)
According to Theorem 3.1, and in the absence of the designer, it is optimal
for the adversary to break the links in L`(0). Therefore, the designer must
attempt to modify the ranking of the links such that the links (or a subset
of them) in L`(0) are not in L`(v?). In essence, this is what Algorithm 3.1
attempts to achieve. Being of the lowest negative value, and hence the link
both the adversary and the designer are interested in, let us explore how
the designer can push L`,`(0) higher in the ranking of the link values. The
designer can achieve this if under some strategy v 2 V , the value L 1`,` (0) is
no longer among the lowest ` negative values; in other words, the designer
can alter the ranking if there is a set S ⇢ P(0), |S| = `, such that when he
sets vij = b for all links in S, there will be ` values that are smaller than
L 1`,` (0) (steps 2 and 3 in Algorithm 3.1). The adversary will then break the
links in S and will spare the link corresponding to L 1`,` (0) as required. To
see why this is optimal, consider the following two cases, covering the types
of links that can be in S.
Case 1: If a link in S is also in L`(0), then this is optimal due to the fact
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that the adversary will disconnect that link since it is in L`(0). Hence, if the
designer can utilize this link to modify the ranking and protect a link whose
associated value is more negative (L`,`(0) in this case), then this can only
improve his utility. The same reasoning applies if more than one of the links
in S are also in L`(0).
Case 2: If none of the links in S is in L`(0), then necessarily some of the
links in L`(0) will also be protected along with the link corresponding to
L 1`,` (0). This is because |S| = `, and the adversary can break at most ` links.
Hence, this scenario is more favorable to the designer than the previous one
and can therefore only improve his utility.
If such an S exists, then the designer would have exhausted all possible
moves, since |S| = `, and the algorithm terminates (step 4 of the algorithm).
Otherwise, if no such set exists in P(0), then the designer should try to
protect the next most negative link whose value is precisely L 1`,` 1(0) by
finding a set S of size ` 1. Since L 1`,` 1(0)   L 1`,` (0), the link corresponding
to L 1`,` (0) along with S will constitute the set of ` links that the adversary
will break. Then, the designer should set vij = b for all the links in S, and
for the remaining action the designer should select the link with the most
negative ⌫ij that is not in L`(vS(b)); this is precisely the set  1
 P(vS(b)) 
(step 3 of the algorithm). The reason behind searching in P(vS(b)) and not in
P(vS(b)) after finding S is that the aij’s only a↵ect the utility of the designer
when he attempts to alter the ranking.
This procedure then repeats until the designer has tried to protect all the
links in L`(0). If the designer fails in protecting all the links in L`(0), then
we must have kvk1 = 0, i.e., the input strategy was not altered. Then, the
optimal strategy is to set vij = b for the links with most negative ⌫ij’s in
P(0) (steps 7 and 8 in Algorithm 3.1).
The final step of the proof is to show that applying Algorithm 3.1 over [0, T ]
is optimal for the designer. To this end, it su ces to show that modifying
links with lower ⌫ij values is more beneficial to the designer, as Algorithm
3.1 attempts to protect these links. Given the links eij, ekl 2 E , assume that
⌫ij < ⌫kl. Consider the two system matrices A and B, and let vij = 0, vkl = b
and v?ij = b, v
?
kl = 0. Assume that a strategy v dictates applying matrix A
over [t0, t0+  ] and applying the matrix C over [t0+  , t0+2 ]. Also, assume
that according to v?, the designer applies A over [t0+ , t?), B over (t?, t0+ ],
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and C over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]. Following the steps presented in step 2 of the
proof of Theorem 3.1, we conclude that, for   small enough, the quantity
 2 (t0 +     t?) b(⌫kl  ⌫ij) +O ( 2) is negative. It then follows that the gain
obtained by switching to system matrix B at t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] is maintained
over [t0+ , t0+2 ]. Hence, by partitioning the interval (t0+2 , T ] into small
sub-intervals of length   and repeating the above analysis, we conclude that
Algorithm 3.1 is optimal over [0, T ].
3.4.2 The Max–Min Problem
The following theorem specifies the optimal strategies of the adversary and
the designer in the max–min problem. Let F`(u) =  `({(eij, ⌫ij) | eij 2
E(u)}) ⇢ E(u), where we recall that E(u) = E \ {eij 2 E | uij(t) = 1}, for
some u 2 U . If m < 2`, the sets E(u),F`(u) could contain fewer than ` links.
For simplicity, we assume thatm   ` in the following proof, which guarantees
that |F`(u)| = `. However, the result of the theorem applies regardless of
this assumption, and the modification of the proof is straightforward.
Theorem 3.3. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, and for a fixed strategy u of
the adversary, the optimal strategy of the network designer in the max–min
problem is given by
v?ij(u) =
(
b, eij 2 F`(u)
0, eij /2 F`(u)
.
If the designer has an optimal strategy of modifying fewer than ` links, then
either G has a cut of size less than ` or the nodes have reached consensus by
time t. In either of these cases, breaking ` links is also optimal.
Proof. The proof follows the same two steps used to prove Theorem 3.1. For
a fixed strategy of the adversary u, we will show that it is optimal for the
minimizer to rank the links based on their ⌫ij values. Under Assumption
3.1, the function x becomes piecewise continuous. Hence, the function ⌫ij,
for all eij 2 E(u), is also piecewise continuous and its value cannot change
abruptly over a finite interval. As a result, we can regard the system as a
time-invariant one over a small interval [t0, t0 +  ] ⇢ [0, T ], where 0 <    ⌧ ,
and ⌧ was defined in (3.5).
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Let v be an arbitrary strategy of the designer with kvk1 < b`. Over a small
interval, v and v? induce certain system matrices. Let the system matrix
corresponding to v over [t0, t0+ ] be A(u, v) = A. Since the control strategies
of both players are time-invariant over this interval, the state trajectory is
given by (3.11). We want to show that switching from strategy v to strategy
v? at some time t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] can improve the utility of the designer. To
this end, we assume that the matrix induced by v? over [t0, t?) is A, while
the system matrix corresponding to v? over [t?, t0 +  ] is B. Assume that
eij 2 E(u), i.e., uij = 0. Over [t?, t0 +  ], the strategies v and v? are identical
except at link eij, where vij = 0 and v?ij = b, i.e., kvk1 < kv?k1 over this
sub-interval. It follows that:
Bij = aij + b > Aij = aij, Akl = Bkl, 8ekl 6= eij. (3.20)
Following similar steps to those in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we conclude
that it su ces to prove
h(t, x(t0)) = x(t0)
T⇤(t, t?)x(t0) < 0, for t > t
?,
where ⇤(t, t?) was defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For su ciently small
 , we can arrive at the expansion in (3.16). Using (3.20) and properties of
Laplacian matrices, we can then write
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t  t?)
X
r>s
(Asr   Bsr) (xr(t0)  xs(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
=  2(t  t?)b (xj(t0)  xi(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
. (3.21)
For small enough  , the higher order terms are dominated by the first term.
Hence, if there is a link eij such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0), there exists t? such that
h(t, x(t0)) < 0 for t 2 (t?, t0 +  ]. Since t0 was arbitrary, we conclude that
the optimal strategy must satisfy kv?(t)k1 = b` for all t, given that each of
the ` links connects two nodes having di↵erent values.
If no link such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0) exists at a given time t0, the designer
does not need to break additional links, although breaking more links does
not a↵ect optimality because h(t, x(t0)) = 0 in such a case. There are two
cases where the designer cannot find a link to make h(t, x(t0)) < 0, and
they were presented in the proof of Theorem 3.1 in the case of the adversary.
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However, unlike the case of the adversary, Case (i) presents a winning strategy
for the designer as the nodes are in agreement. Case (ii) is not necessarily a
winning or a losing strategy for the designer.
Next, we need to show that the designer will modify the ` links in E(u)
with the lowest ⌫ij values. Let us again restrict our attention to the interval
[t0, t0 +  ] where the designer applies strategy v. Assume (to the contrary)
that the links the designer modifies over this interval are not the ones with
the lowest ⌫ij values. In particular, assume that the designer chooses to
modify link ekl 2 E(u), while there is a link eij 2 E(u) such that ⌫ij < ⌫kl.
Assume that the designer switches at time t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] to strategy v? by
modifying link eij instead of link ekl. Then, (3.21) becomes
h(t, x(t0)) =  2(t  t⇤)b (⌫kl(t0)  ⌫ij(t0)) +O
 
 2
 
.
Hence, by following the same arguments as above, we can conclude that
modifying ekl is not optimal.
The second step of the proof is to show that switching to strategy v?
guarantees an improved utility for the designer regardless of how the original
trajectory corresponding to v changes beyond time t0 +  . To this end, we
will assume that from time t0 +   onward, strategy v? will mimic strategy v.
Assume that strategy v switches from matrix A to matrix C over the interval
[t0+  , t0+2 ]. Hence, strategy v? will also switch from the system matrix B
to matrix C. However, the trajectories corresponding to v and v? will have
di↵erent initial conditions at time t0 +  , due to the switch that strategy v?
made at time t?. Recall that according to A, we have kvk1 < b` and vij = 0.
Here, the system matrix B can di↵er from the matrix A in two ways: either
(i) B dictates modifying one additional link compared to A, or (ii) B dictates
modifying link eij instead of link ekl where ⌫ij < ⌫kl. Consider the behavior
of the system over the interval [t0 +  , t0 +2 ] where we can assume that the
system is time-invariant. To show that the gain obtained over [t0, t0 +  ] by
the switch made by v? is maintained over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ], it su ces to prove
that the integrant L1   L2 is negative, where L1 and L2 were defined in the
proof of Theorem 3.1. For Case (i), by following the steps presented in the
proof of Theorem 3.1, we can write
L1   L2 =  2 (t0 +     t?) b (xj(t0)  xi(t0))2 +O
 
 2
 
.
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For Case (ii), the di↵erence in utilities would be
L1   L2 = 2 (t0 +     t?) (wkl(t0)  wij(t0)) +O
 
 2
 
.
Hence, for small enough  , we conclude that L1   L2 < 0. By partitioning
the interval (t0 + 2 , T ] into small sub-intervals of length   and repeating
the above analysis, we conclude that the gain due to the switch at time t?
is preserved over the remaining time of the problem. This concludes the
proof.
Next, we present the optimal strategy of the adversary. To this end, define
the set
D` =  `({(eij,aij⌫ij) | eij 2 E} [ {(eij, (aij + b)⌫ij) : eij 2 E}).
Theorem 3.4. In the max–min problem, and under Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2, the optimal strategy of the adversary is given by
u?ij(t) =
(
1, eij 2 D`
0, eij /2 D`
.
Further, it is optimal for the adversary to break ` links.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3, we deduce that ku?(t)k1 = `, because the adversary
would be at a disadvantage if he breaks fewer links than the designer. We
first consider the adversary’s strategy over a fixed small interval [t0, t0 +  ]
over which both u and v are fixed. Using a first-order Taylor expansion, the
adversary’s utility over [t0, t0 +  ] is given by (3.19).
In this problem, the adversary has the first-mover-advantage and needs
to dispose of the links that can reduce his utility. The adversary knows
that, according to v?(u), the designer attempts to make the ⌫ij’s smaller by
adding b to the corresponding edge weights. However, we cannot rule out
the possibility that (alk + b)⌫lk > aij⌫ij, for some links ekl and eij. Hence,
the adversary is not only interested in finding the smallest negative (aij +
b)⌫ij’s, but also needs to consider the aij⌫ij’s themselves. It follows that the
adversary needs to find the terms that can become very small (negative) and
set uij = 1 to the corresponding links. But those links are exactly the ones
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included in D`. Formally, we can write
 
X
j>i
eij2D`
(aij + vij)⌫ij   
X
j>i
eij /2D`
(aij + vij)⌫ij,
This confirms that, over the interval [t0, t0 +  ], u? is as claimed.
The final step of the proof is to show that switching from a strategy u
to strategy u? guarantees an improved utility for the designer over [0, T ].
To this end, it su ces to show that modifying links with lower wij values
is more beneficial to the adversary. For the links eij, ekl 2 E , assume that
wij < wkl. Consider the two system matrices A and B, and let uij = 0,
ukl = 1 and u?ij = 1, u
?
kl = 0. Assume that the strategy u dictates applying
matrix A over [t0, t0 +  ] and applying the matrix C over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ].
On the other hand, we assume that according to u?, the adversary applies A
over [t0 +  , t?), B over (t?, t0 +  ], and C over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]. Following the
steps presented in step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.1, we conclude that, for
  small enough, the quantity 2 (t0 +     t?) (wkl   wij) + O ( 2) is positive,
which implies that the gain obtained by switching to system matrix B at
t? 2 [t0, t0 +  ] is maintained over [t0 +  , t0 + 2 ]. Hence, by partitioning
the interval (t0+2 , T ] into small sub-intervals of length   and repeating the
above analysis, we conclude that u? is optimal over [0, T ].
Remark 3.3. (Potential-Theoretic Analogy) When the graph is viewed as an
electrical network, aij + vij can be viewed as the conductance of link eij 2 E,
and xi xj as the potential di↵erence across the link. Therefore, according to
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, the optimal strategy of the designer in both problems
involves finding the links with the highest potential di↵erence (or the lowest
⌫ij’s) and increasing the conductance of those links by setting vij = b. This
leads to increasing the power dissipation across those links, which translates
to increasing the information flow across the network and results in faster
convergence. The optimal strategy of the adversary should therefore involve
breaking the links with the highest power dissipation. But power dissipation
is given by (aij + vij)(xi xj)2, and this is exactly what the adversary targets
according to Theorems 3.1 and 3.4. •
59
3.4.3 From Potential Theory to the Maximum Principle
In this section, we show that the strategies derived in the above theorems
satisfy the first-order necessary conditions for optimality given by the MP.
We will address here the min–max problem; a theorem similar to the one
presented below can be obtained also for the max–min problem. In [64],
we showed that the optimal strategies provided by the MP for the min–
max problem are the same as those derived in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, with
the ranking of the links performed after replacing the quantity ⌫ij with the
quantity (pj   pi)(xi   xj), where p is the costate vector. The next theorem
states that the potential-theoretic strategies satisfy the MP if the controllers
do note switch infinitely many times over [0, T ].
Theorem 3.5. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the optimal strategies in
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 satisfy the canonical equations of the MP.
Proof. See Section 3.8.
3.4.4 Complexity of the Optimal Strategies
We next study the complexity of the optimal strategies. We first start with
the max–min problem. Assuming, as in Remark 3.2, that the players switch
their strategies a total of K times over [0, T ], we conclude that the worst-case
complexity of the strategy of either player isO(K ·m logm) as their strategies
involve merely the ranking of sets of size at most 2m. As for the min–max
problem, the complexity of the adversary’s strategy is O(K ·m logm). The
main bottleneck in the strategy of the designer is step 2 in Algorithm 3.1.
The size of the set P(0) is at most m  `; thus, the worst-case complexity for
the designer is K ·Pm `i=1  m `i   ⇡ K ·P`i=1(m `)i. By comparison with (3.8),
we conclude that the optimal strategies achieve vast complexity reductions.
3.4.5 An Illustrative Example
The goal of this example is twofold: (i) to show how the players execute their
strategies; and (ii) to serve as a counterexample showing that an SPE may
not exist and to provide some guidelines as to when one would exist. We will
study the interaction between the designer and the adversary for the case
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when T = ⌧ , and ⌧ is very small. By Assumption 3.1, we conclude that the
players cannot change the actions they choose at time t = 0. Assume that G
is a complete graph with three nodes with the following weights:
A(0, 0) =
264  4 3 13  5 2
1 2  3
375 .
Define e1 = (1, 2), e2 = (2, 3), e3 = (1, 3). Let ⌫12 =  1, ⌫23 =  2, and
⌫13 =  5. Let x(0) = [1, 2, 3]T and ` = 1. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: (b = 1) Let us first consider the max–min problem. We have
D1 =  1({(e1, 3), (e1, 4), (e2, 4), (e3, 5), (e2, 6), (e3, 10)}) = {e3}.
Hence, according to Theorem 3.4, the adversary breaks e3, and we have that
E(u?) = E \ e3. We also have F1(u?) = {e2}, which means that v? = [0, 1, 0]T
and u? = [0, 0, 1]T . Hence, using (3.19), we can write
V =
Z T
0
k(t) · 2t[3(x1(0)  x2(0))2 + 3(x2(0)  x3(0))2]dt+O
 
 2
 
=
Z T
0
k(t) · 12tdt+O   2  .
For the min–max problem, Algorithm 3.1 uses the following sets L1(0) =
{e3} and P(0) = {(e1, 3), (e2, 4)}. Let S = {e2}, and note that S 2
 (P(0)) = {e1, e2}. We then have vS(1) = [0, 1, 0]T and L1(vS(1)) = {e2}.
Note that L1(0) /2 L1(vS(1)). Hence, the condition in step 2 of the algorithm
is satisfied with this choice of S, and we have v? = vS(1). Then, Theorem
3.2 says that the designer will increase the weight of e2, and Theorem 3.1
says that the adversary will break the same link, i.e., v? = [0, 1, 0]T and
u? = [0, 1, 0]T . We thus have
V =
Z T
0
k(t) · 14tdt+O   2  .
We conclude that in this case V > V , and an SPE does not exist.
Case 2: (b = 0.4) By repeating the above steps, we conclude that in the
max–min problem we have v? = [0, 0.4, 0]T and u? = [0, 0, 1]T , and we can
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write
V =
Z T
0
k(t) · 10.8tdt+O   2  .
For the min–max problem, one cannot find a set S satisfying the conditions
of step 2 in Algorithm 3.1. To execute step 8 of the algorithm, note that
L1(0) = {e3}, and hence  1(P(0)) = {e2}. We therefore have v? = [0, 0.4, 0]T
and u? = [0, 0, 1]T , and hence
V =
Z T
0
k(t) · 10.8tdt+O   2  .
In this case, the pair of inequalities (3.6) are satisfied and an SPE exists.
The main di↵erence between the two cases was that the designer was able to
find a set S that allows him to alter the ranking and deceive the adversary
when b = 1. This made the adversary break e3 in the max–min problem
and break e2 in the min–max problem which led to having V 6= V . When
such a set does not exit, the strategy of the adversary is unchanged in both
problems, and hence the upper and lower values would agree. Hence, for an
SPE to exist, one needs a behavior similar to Case 2 to occur throughout
the problem horizon [0, T ]. This of course depends on the value of b and the
weights aij. Section 3.5 explores the question of existence of an SPE further.
3.5 A Su cient Condition for the Existence of an SPE
Thus far, we have solved the min–max and max–min problems separately
and showed that the derived optimal strategies achieve the upper and lower
values. Hence, to prove the existence of an SPE, it remains to verify whether
the pair of inequalities (3.6) can be satisfied under some assumptions, even
though the action sets of the players are non-rectangular in the max–min
problem. Besides the issue of non-rectangular action sets, the main reason
that the upper and lower values are di↵erent is mainly due to the ability of
the minimizer to deceive the maximizer by altering the ranking of the most
negative values. If we remove this ability from the network designer, we
should expect that an SPE would exist. The following theorem makes this
argument formal. Define   := 4kx0k
2
1
✏2 , ✏ > 0. We assume that ✏ is chosen to
guarantee   > 1.
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Theorem 3.6. Given ✏ > 0, assume that T is small enough such that (3.36)
in Section 3.8 holds. Then, under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, a su cient con-
dition for the existence of an SPE for the underlying zero-sum game between
the designer and the adversary is to select b such that
0  b  min
eij ,ekl2E
| aij   akl| , (3.22)
given that aij 6= akl and aij >  akl whenever aij > akl, for all eij, ekl 2 E.
Proof. It su ces to show that L`(v?) = L`(0) = D` as this would imply that
the adversary would break the same links whether he acts first or second,
and as a result the strategy of the minimizer in both problems will be the
same. This will guarantee that (3.6) is satisfied. This would occur if the
minimizer cannot protect any of the links in L`(0). In other words, this will
happen if the minimizer cannot satisfy the condition in step 2 of Algorithm
3.1 for any i 2 [`]. A su cient condition for L`(v?) = L`(0) = D` to hold is
to require
min
eij2 (P(0))
(aij + b)⌫ij > max
eij2L`(0)
aij⌫ij.
This implies that no matter how the designer changes the weights of the links
in  (P(0)), he cannot make those links more negative than the links in L`(0).
To satisfy this inequality, we will establish that whenever aij⌫ij > akl⌫kl, we
must have (aij + b)⌫ij > akl⌫kl, for all eij, ekl 2 E . We can then re-write the
condition on b as
b  aij⌫ij   akl⌫kl ⌫ij = akl
|⌫kl|
|⌫ij|   aij, 8eij, ekl 2 E (3.23)
Consider the following two cases. If ⌫kl   ⌫ij, then we must have akl > aij.
Then, by assumption we have that akl >  aij. By Lemma 3.1 in Section 3.8,
we can write
akl
|⌫kl|
|⌫ij|   aij  
1
 
akl   aij > 0. (3.24)
Next, consider the case when ⌫ij > ⌫kl. In this case, aij can be larger or
smaller than akl. However, if aij > akl, and recalling that aij⌫ij > akl⌫kl,
then
 akl < aij < akl
|⌫kl|
|⌫ij|   akl,
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which is a contradiction. The case akl = aij is excluded by assumption.
Hence, in this case, we must have aij < akl, and the inequality in (3.24)
applies. Thus, by choosing b as in (3.22), we obtain the condition we are
seeking. Note that we do not need to consider the case when aij⌫ij = akl⌫kl
since the players will be indi↵erent as to which link to choose.
Remark 3.4. The condition derived in the Theorem 3.6 requires the network
to be “su ciently diverse” in the sense that the weights of the links have to
be not only di↵erent from each other, but also a factor   apart. This is due
to the fact that we were seeking uniform bounds on the ⌫ij’s, for all eij 2 E .
If we allow b to vary with time, then one can find less restrictive conditions
to ensure the existence of an SPE. However, this would require (3.23) to be
verified at each time instant. Further, the bound derived in (3.24) is loose,
because it was obtained by bounding |vkl| and |vij| independently. Tighter
bounds could be obtained by studying the dynamics of |⌫kl|/|⌫ij|. However,
studying the time derivative of this ratio is not tractable. •
Remark 3.5. This result highlights the fact that, in general, Stackelberg
games are more natural to study security problems than zero-sum games. In
fact, the leader-follower formulation fits many real-world security scenarios;
see [65] and the references therein. However, the su cient condition we
derive here is a step in the right direction for establishing the existence of an
SPE for the zero-sum game between the designer and the adversary. We are
currently investigating whether this condition is also necessary. •
3.6 Attack-II: Adversary vs. Network Designer
Assume now that both the adversary and the designer are capable of adding
signals to all the nodes in the network in order to carry out their respective
objectives. The dynamics in this case are given by:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + v(t) + u(t), x(0) = x0, (3.25)
where x(t) is the state of the network. Also, u(t) is the signal to be added
by the adversary and that controlled by the designer is v(t). The system
matrix A is time-invariant in this setting and it satisfies the properties in
(3.2) and (3.3), with Aij = aij. To capture physical constraints, we assume
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that both signals must satisfy power and energy constraints. Formally, the
action spaces of the players in this case are
U =  u 2 C1[0, T ] | ku(t)k22  Pmax, 8t 2 [0, T ],
kuk2L2  Emax < TPmax
 
,
V =  v 2 C1[0, T ] | kv(t)k22  Pmax, 8t 2 [0, T ],
kvk2L2  Emax < TPmax
 
.
It will be evident from the structure of the Hamiltonian that if we allow
Emax   TPmax, it is straightforward to show that both v?, u? will have mag-
nitude
p
Pmax throughout [0, T ], and the energy constraint will be satisfied;
see Section 2.4 for a similar case. We thus consider the more interesting case
where the players do not have enough energy to operate at maximum power
throughout [0, T ]. Also, the case where the power and budgets are di↵er-
ent for the players can be readily obtained from the results we demonstrate
below.
As in the previous section, we are interested in studying the interaction
between the designer, who attempts to minimize J(u, v), and the adversary
who is interested in maximizing J(u, v). We make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.3. The matrix A, the time interval [0, T ], the values Pmax
and Emax, and the initial state x0 are known to both players.
Unlike Attack-I, the zero-sum game played by the designer and the adver-
sary admits a pure-strategy SPE as the following theorem proves. To derive
the feedback SPE, we will invoke Theorem 8.1 in [63, p. 427] which provides
a necessary and su cient condition for the existence of a feedback SPE. We
will also derive the open-loop SPE using Theorem 8.2 in [63, p. 428]. Let
V (t, x) be the value function we seek. Define the vector Vx :=
@
@xV . The
Hamiltonian associated with the game can then be written as:
H(x, Vx, u, v) =
k(t)
2
kx  x¯k22 + V Tx (Ax+ u+ v)
+  1(t)(kuk22   Pmax) + ⌫1(kuk22   Emax)
+  2(t)(kvk22   Pmax) + ⌫2(kvk22   Emax),
where  1, 2 2 C1[0, T ] and ⌫1, ⌫2 are constant Lagrange multipliers. Recall
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Isaacs condition [63]:
min
kvk22Pmax
max
kuk22Pmax
H(x, Vx, u, v) = maxkuk22Pmax
min
kvk22Pmax
H(x, Vx, u, v), (3.26)
and note that it is satisfied here because the Hamiltonian is separable in u
and v.
Theorem 3.7. Under Assumption 3.3, the value function V (t, x) = xTXx
satisfies Isaacs condition (3.26), where X   0 is a symmetric matrix that
satisfies the following Riccati di↵erential equation:
X˙ = XA+ ATX +
k
2
M   k
2
I, X(T ) = 0.
Further, the pair
v?(t) =  
p
Emax/T
Xx
kXxk2 , u
?(t) =
p
Emax/T
Xx
kXxk2 ,
constitutes a feedback SPE for the zero-sum game between the network de-
signer and the adversary.
Proof. Note that
argmax
kuk22Pmax
H(x, Vx, u, v
?) = argmax
kuk22Pmax
V Tx u+ ( 1(t) + ⌫1)kuk22
 argmax
kuk22Pmax
kuk2kVxk2 + ( 1(t) + ⌫1)kuk22,
argmin
kvk22Pmax
H(x, Vx, u
?, v) = argmin
kvk22Pmax
V Tx v + ( 2(t) + ⌫2)kvk22
  argmin
kvk22Pmax
 kvk2kVxk2 + ( 2(t) + ⌫2)kvk22,
where the inequalities follow from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. We there-
fore conclude that u? must be aligned with Vx, whereas v? and Vx must have
opposite directions.
To obtain u?, we di↵erentiate the Hamiltonian:
@
@u
H = 2( 1(t) + ⌫1)u+ Vx = 0. (3.27)
Note that optimality requires that both players spend all the energy available
to them. Hence, the energy constraints are, in fact, equality ones. We
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therefore have that  1  0 and ⌫1 6= 0. By complementary slackness, we
have the following two cases.
Case 1: ( 1(t) < 0 =) ku(t)k22 = Pmax, for some t 2 [0, T ]) Using
(3.27), we obtain
  1
2( 1 + ⌫1)
=
kuk22
uTVx
. (3.28)
We thus have
u?1 =
kuk22
kuk2kVxk2Vx =
p
Pmax
Vx
kVxk2 .
Case 2: (ku(t)k22 < Pmax =)  1(t) = 0, for some t 2 [0, T ]) Using
(3.27), we obtain
 1
2⌫1
=
uTVx
kVxk22
, (3.29)
and therefore
u =
uTVx
kVxk22
Vx,
This enables us to write
Emax =
Z T
0
kuk22dt =
Z T
0
(uTVx)2
kVxk22
dt,
which is satisfied by the control
u?2 =
p
Emax/T
Vx
kVxk2 .
It is not clear whether it is optimal to apply u?1 or u
?
2 for some t 2 [0, T ]
or throughout [0, T ]. We need to solve for the Lagrange multipliers in order
to characterize the optimal control. By (3.29), we can obtain
⌫1 =  1
2
kVxk2p
Emax/T
.
Since ⌫1 is time-invariant, it must maintain this value even when  (t) < 0,
i.e., in Case 1. Hence, we can substitute this value in (3.28) to obtain
 1 =
1
2
 
1p
Emax/T
  1p
Pmax
!
kVxk2.
However, Emax < TPmax by assumption, which implies that  1(t) > 0. This
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contradicts the assumption in Case 1. It therefore follows that either  1(t) <
0 for all t 2 [0, T ] or kuk22 < Pmax for all t 2 [0, T ]. The former is impossible
because
R T
0 ku?1k22dt = TPmax > Emax. Hence, u? = u?2 as claimed. By
following the same steps as above, and noting that  2   0 and ⌫2 6= 0, it is
straightforward to show that v? =  u?.
It remains to find Vx to completely characterize u? and v?. To this end,
we can now write [63, (8.9) on p. 426]:
  @
@t
V =
k
2
kx  x¯k22 + V Tx Ax.
Since the cost functional is quadratic in the state, we make the guess that
V (t, x) = xTX(t)x, X   0. Recalling that M = 1n11T , we can write
 xT X˙x = k
2
kx  x¯k22 + xTXAx+ xTATXx
=
k
2
(xTx  2xT x¯+ x¯T x¯) + xTXAx+ xTATXx
=
k
2
(xTx  2xTMx+ xTMx) + xTXAx+ xTATXx.
We therefore conclude that X must satisfy the following Riccati di↵erential
equation:
X˙ = XA+ ATX +
k
2
M   k
2
I, X(T ) = 0,
as claimed. The proof of the theorem is thus complete.
The following theorem derives the open-loop SPE for the zero-sum game.
Theorem 3.8. Under Assumption 3.3, the pair
v?(t) =  
p
Emax/T
p
kpk2 , u
?(t) =
p
Emax/T
p
kpk2 , (3.30)
constitutes an open-loop SPE for the zero-sum game between the network
designer and the adversary, where p is the costate vector:
p(t) =
Z T
t
eA(2⌧ t)(x0   x¯)d⌧,
which can be computed o✏ine, and locally, by both players.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem 3.7. The
di↵erence here is that p is the costate vector (p plays the role of Vx which
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appears in the previous theorem) which must satisfy the costate equation [63,
(8.14) on p. 429]:
p˙ =   @
@x
H =  Ap  2(x  x¯), p(T ) = 0.
It follows that
p(t) = 2
Z T
t
eA(⌧ t)(x(⌧)  x¯)d⌧,
and by substituting the optimal controllers (3.30) in the ODE (3.25), we can
find the optimal trajectory x and write
p(t) =
Z T
t
eA(2⌧ t)(x0   x¯)d⌧,
as claimed.
Remark 3.6. The above two theorems imply that if the graph is connected,
and T is large enough, the nodes would reach consensus even though an ad-
versary is present. This is because the designer is able to cancel the signal
of the adversary completely. Note that this is due to the assumption that
the designer has complete knowledge about A and x. An interesting future
direction is to study this problem in the case where the players have varying
knowledge about the network’s topology and state. This will cast the game
into an asymmetric information setting. We suspect that the designer would
not always be successful in annihilating the adversary’s e↵ect in this case.
This invites one to establish an analogy with communication networks where
an extensive body of research has been devoted to the study of interference
cancelation under di↵erent types of uncertainties. •
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have considered two types of adversarial attacks on a
network of agents performing distributed averaging. Both attacks have the
common objective of slowing down the convergence of the computation at
the nodes to the global average. We introduced a network designer whose ob-
jective is to assist the nodes in reaching consensus by countering the attacks
of the adversary. Attack-I involves an adversary and a network designer
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who are capable of targeting links. We have formulated and solved two prob-
lems that capture the competition between the two players. We considered
practical models for the players by constraining their actions along the prob-
lem horizon. The derived strategies were shown to exhibit a low worst-case
complexity. When Zeno behavior is excluded, we showed that the optimal
strategies admit a potential-theoretic analogy. Finally, we showed that when
the link weights are su ciently diverse, an SPE exists for the zero-sum game
between the designer and the adversary. Attack-II, on the other hand, in-
volves an adversary and a network designer who are able to modify the values
of the nodes by injecting signals of bounded power and energy. We utilized
the maximum principle to completely characterize the optimal strategies of
the players and showed that an SPE exists in this case.
3.8 Additional Proofs
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 3.5. We also provide a technical
result that is instrumental in proving Theorem 3.6.
Proof for Theorem 3.5 . For a fixed strategy v of the designer, it was
shown in [64] that the adversary’s strategy derived using the MP requires
finding the lowest fij = (aij + vij)(pi   pj)(xj   xi) values, for all eij 2
E . However, Theorem 3.1 requires finding the lowest wij’s. The designer’s
strategy relies on finding the lowest (pi   pj)(xj   xi) values according to
the MP, and it requires finding the lowest ⌫ij’s according to Theorem 3.2. In
order to prove the theorem, and since wij = (aij + vij)⌫ij, aij + vij   0, it is
su cient to show that wij  wkl implies that fij  fkl, for all eij, ekl 2 E .
Without loss of generality, we will assume that vij = vkl = 0.
The Hamiltonian associated with the min–max problem is:
H(x, p, u, v) =
1
2
k(t) kx(t)  x¯k22 + p(t)TA(u(t), v(t))x(t),
where p(t) is the costate vector, whose existence is guaranteed by the MP
because an optimal solution for the min–max exists. The first-order necessary
conditions for optimality are (noting that AT = A and recalling that V =
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V (0)) [66]:
p˙ =   @
@x
H
=  k(x  x¯)  Ap, p(T ) = 0 (3.31)
x˙ = Ax, x(0) = x0 (3.32)
u?(v) = argmax
U
H(x, p, u, v), v? = argmax
V
H(x, p, u?(v), v).
To prove the theorem, we will rely on approximating the state and costate up
to first-order using Taylor expansion. To this end, we partition the problem’s
horizon into L > K small sub-intervals of length 0 <    ⌧ , where ⌧ was
defined in (3.5), over which the system is time-invariant. More formally,
define the times 0 = t1 < t2 < . . . < tL < tL+1 = T . Let Ai be the system
matrix corresponding to the interval [ti, ti+1], i 2 [L]. We will denote the i-th
row of matrix Ak by Ak,i and its (i, j)-th element by akij. The proof comprises
two steps:
(i) We establish the claim of the theorem over [tL, tL+1].
(ii) We generalize the argument to hold over [0, T ].
We start by considering the interval [tL, tL+1]. The solutions to ODEs
(3.31) and (3.32) over this interval are:
xAL(t) = e
AL(t tL)xAL(tL)
pAL(t) =
Z T
t
e AL(t ⌧)(xAL(⌧)  x¯)d⌧.
Let Pi(t) := eAit = I + tAi +O ( 2). We can then re-write the above expres-
sions as
xAL(t) = PL(t  tL)xAL(tL)
= (I + (t  tL)A)xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
pAL(t) =
Z T
t
PL(⌧   t)[PL(⌧   tL) M ]xAL(tL)d⌧
=
Z T
t
[PL(2⌧   t  tL) M ]xAL(tL)d⌧
=
Z T
t
[I + (2⌧   t  s)AL  M ]xAL(tL)d⌧ +O
 
 2
 
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= [(T   t)I + (T   t)(T   tL)AL   (T   t)M ]xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
= (T   t)(I  M)xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
,
where the last equality follows because (T   t)(T   tL)AL = O ( 2). Define
⇠(↵,  ) := ↵   , ↵,   2 R, and write
xAL(t) = (I + ⇠(t, tL)AL) xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
pAL(t) = ⇠(T, t)(I  M)xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
. (3.33)
Further, define the matrices
G := I + ⇠(t, tL)AL, R := ⇠(T, t)(I  M),
and write
wij = a
L
ij(xAL,i   xAL,j)(xAL,j   xAL,i)
= aLijxAL(tL)
T (Gi  Gj)(Gj  Gi)TxAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
fij = a
L
ijxAL(tL)
T (Ri  Rj)(Gj  Gi)TxAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
,
where RTi , R
T
i are the i-th rows ofG and R, respectively. Using the definitions
of G and R, we obtain
(Gi  Gj)(Gj  Gi)T =  (Ii   Ij)(Ii   Ij)T   ⇠(t, tL)((Ii   Ij)(AL,i   AL,j)T
+ (AL,i   AL,j)(Ii   Ij)T )
  ⇠(t, tL)2(AL,i   AL,j)(AL,i   AL,j)T .
The last term is quadratic, and thus we can absorb it in O ( 2). We then
have
aLij(Gi  Gj)(Gj  Gi)T   aLkl(Gk  Gl)(Gl  Gk)T = aLkl(Ik   Il)(Ik   Il)T
  aLij(Ii   Ij)(Ii   Ij)T + (aLkl(Ik   Il)(AL,k   AL,l)T
  aLij(Ii   Ij)(AL,i   AL,j)T )⇠(t, tL) + (aLkl(AL,k   AL,l)(Ik   Il)T
  aLij(AL,i   AL,j)(Ii   Ij)T )⇠(t, tL) +O
 
 2
 
.
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Similarly, we have
aLij(Ri  Rj)(Gj  Gi)T   aLkl(Rk  Rl)(Gl  Gk)T = (aLkl(Ik   Il)(Ik   Il)T
  aLij(Ii   Ij)(Ii   Ij)T )⇠(T, t) +O
 
 2
 
.
Let  1 = aLkl(Ik   Il)(Ik   Il)T   aLij(Ii   Ij)(Ii   Ij)T and  2 = aLkl(Ik  
Il)(AL,k   AL,l)T   aLij(Ii   Ij)(AL,i   AL,j)T . We now have
wij   wkl = xAL(tL)T ( 1 + ⇠(t, tL) 2 + ⇠(t, tL) T2 )xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
fij   fkl = ⇠(T, t)xAL(tL)T 1xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
.
If wij   wkl  0, since ⇠(T, t)   0, we can write
⇠(T, t)(wij   wkl) = xAL(tL)T (⇠(T, t) 1 + ⇠(T, t)⇠(t, tL) 2
+⇠(T, t)⇠(t, tL) 
T
2 )xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
 
 0,
or
⇠(T, t)xAL(tL)
T 1xAL(tL) +O
 
 2
   0,
but the left hand side is fij   fkl; hence, wij  wkl implies that fij  fkl as
required.
So far, we have verified the claim of the theorem over the interval [tL, T ]
only. We are now in a position to generalize the statement of the theorem
to the interval [0, T ]. The only complication that arises when studying this
interval is that the terminal condition, i.e. pL 1(tL), is not forced to be zero
as in [tL, T ].
Over the interval [tL 1, tL], the state and costate are
xL 1(t) = eAL 1(t tL 1)xAL 1(tL 1)
pAL 1(t) = e
 AL 1(t tL 1)pAL 1(tL 1) 
Z t
tL 1
e AL 1(t ⌧)(xAL 1(⌧)  x¯)d⌧.
Solving for pAL 1(tL 1) in terms of pAL 1(tL) and substituting back, we can
write pAL 1(t) in terms of pAL 1(tL) as follows:
pAL 1(t) = e
 AL 1(t tL)pAL 1(tL) +
Z tL
t
e AL 1(t ⌧)(xAL 1(⌧)  x¯)d⌧. (3.34)
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By continuity of the state and costate functions, it follows that xAL 1(tL) =
xAL(tL), pAL 1(tL) = pAL(tL). Using a first-order Taylor expansion and
(3.33), we can write
pAL 1(t) = (I + ⇠(tL, t)AL 1)pAL(tL) + ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL 1) +O
 
 2
 
= (I + ⇠(tL, t)AL 1)(⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL(tL))
+ ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL 1) +O
 
 2
 
= ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL) + ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL 1) +O
 
 2
 
.
We can further simplify this expression using xAL 1(t) as follows:
⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL) = ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)eAL 1(tL tL 1)xAL 1(tL 1)
= ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)(I + ⇠(tL, tL 1)AL 1)xAL 1(tL 1)
+O   2 
= ⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL 1) +O
 
 2
 
,
and therefore we have
pAL 1(t) = 2⇠(tL, t)(I  M)xAL 1(tL 1) +O
 
 2
 
. (3.35)
Comparing (3.33) and (3.35), we conclude that the argument used to prove
the claim over the interval [tL, T ] applies over [tL 1, tL]. Hence, wij wkl  0
implies that fij   fkl  0 over [tL 1, tL].
Note that we can generalize (3.34) to any interval [ti, ti+1], i 2 [L], as
follows:
pAi(t) = e
 Ai(t ti+1)pAi(ti+1) +
Z ti+1
t
e Ai(t ⌧)(xAi(⌧)  x¯)d⌧.
Following similar steps to the above, we can arrive at
pAi(t) =
T   ti
 
⇠(ti+1, t)(I  M)xAi(ti) +O
 
 2
 
, t 2 [ti, ti+1],
which maintains the same structure as in (3.35), and the claim therefore
holds for the interval [ti, ti+1], i 2 [L], and the theorem is proved.
Lemma 3.1. Given ✏ > 0 and    ⌧ , ⌧ defined in (3.5), one can select the
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problem horizon T small enough such that
✏  |xi(t)  xj(t)|  2 kx0k1 , 8eij 2 E , (3.36)
for all t 2 [0, T ].
Proof. By the structure of the system matrix in (3.1), we can deduce that
|xi   xj| cannot increase as t! T . Thus
|xi(t)  xj(t)|  max
i,j2[n]
|xi(0)  xj(0)|
 2max
i2[n]
|xi(0)| = 2 kx0k1 .
This provides the uniform upper bound. In order to obtain a uniform lower
bound, we need to ensure that |xi(t) xj(t)| does not approach zero as t! T .
We are seeking a time t? such that for a given ✏ > 0, we have |xi(t) xj(t)|   ✏
for all t < t? and all eij 2 E . We can then fix T < t? to ensure the existence of
a uniform lower bound on |xi(t)  xj(t)|. Let us again restrict our attention
to a small interval [t0, t0 +  ] where the system is time-invariant, and let
the system matrix over this interval be A. We require that the system did
not reach equilibrium over this interval, i.e., x(t0 +  ) 6= x¯. Without loss
of generality, we assume that x1(t0) > . . . > xn(t0)2. Define the following
dynamics:
d
dt
(yi   x1(t0)) =
X
j 6=i
Aij(x1(t0)  yi)
d
dt
(y
i
  xn(t0)) =
X
j 6=i
Aij(xn(t0)  yi),
with initial conditions yi(t0) = 2x1(t0), yi(t0) = 2xn(t0). Note that x˙i =P
j 6=iAij(xj   xi). It follows that y˙i  x˙i  y˙i. By the comparison principle,
we conclude that y
i
  xn(t0)  xi  yi  x1(t0), for i 2 N . Note that we can
readily find the solution trajectories for y and y. By defining ai =
P
j 6=iAij,
we can then write
yi   x1(t0) = e ai(t t0)x1(t0), yi   xn(t0) = e ai(t t0)xn(t0).
2We are making the implicit assumption that x1(0) > . . . > xn(0).
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By solving the equation yi i   x1(t0) = yi   xn(t0), we can find a time t?i
when xi 1 can potentially meet xi:
t?i =
1
ai 1   ai ln
✓
x1(t0)
xn(t0)
◆
+ t0.
If t?i > t0 +  , for all i 2 N , then we need to propagate the solution forward,
and keeping in mind that the system matrix could change, until we find a
time t?i in some interval [t˜, t˜+  ] where yi i = yi for some i 2 N . Then, for a
given ✏ > 0, we can select T < t?i such that |xi xi 1|   |yi yi 1|   ✏; hence,
we conclude that for this choice of T we can guarantee that |xi xj|   ✏ > 0
for all eij 2 E .
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CHAPTER 4
STABILIZATION IN THE PRESENCE OF
MODELING UNCERTAINTY
4.1 Background
In the previous chapters, we have taken a di↵erential game-theoretic ap-
proach toward designing robust strategies to control spread of information.
In this chapter, we take a di↵erent approach, assuming that the adversary
has already acted on the network, and that his intervention has led to a large
modeling uncertainty in the system. Instead of having a centralized network
designer as in the previous chapters, our alternative approach here investi-
gates the ability of the nodes to stabilize the network, in the presence of a
large modeling uncertainty, using a distributed control law.
Logic-based switching supervisory control has been proposed as a method
to overcome limitations of adaptive control schemes [67]. A fundamental
di↵erence between the two approaches is that while adaptive control requires
continuous tuning of parameters, supervisory control relies on logic-based
switching among a collection of candidate controllers. Continuous tuning
su↵ers from well-known issues such as loss of stabilizability. In the classical
supervisory control scheme, a centralized supervisor estimates the state of the
plant, and based on the history of estimation errors, it activates a certain
candidate controller. For a more detailed study of supervisory control, see
Chapter 6 of [68].
Supervisory control has been used in various problems and applications
[69–77]. In [69, 70], the set-point control problem has been studied using a
supervisory control framework. It has also been utilized in path-following
problems for underactuated systems with large modeling uncertainties [72].
Recently, supervisory control has been extended to addresses the problem of
stabilizing uncertain systems with quantized outputs [77].
In this chapter, motivated by its attractive properties, we extend the su-
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pervisory control framework to a distributed setting. A distributed version of
supervisory control can have wide applications in stabilization and tracking
problems over networked systems in the presence of large modeling uncer-
tainties.
4.2 Main Results
The main contribution of this chapter is extending the centralized supervi-
sory control framework to a distributed setting. We first provide a detailed
description of the main components in this scheme. We prove that when
the set in which the unknown parameters take values is finite, the switching
stops in finite time at each node. Further, we provide su cient conditions
for achieving set-point tracking using this framework without requiring the
individual agents to have explicit knowledge of the desired set-point. Finally,
we apply this scheme to the distributed averaging problem in the presence
of unknown parameters.
Organization
In Section 4.3, we introduce the system model and present the problem formu-
lation. The main components of the distributed supervisory control scheme
are provided in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 contains the stability analysis of the
proposed scheme. An application to the distributed averaging problem is
presented in Section 4.6. We conclude the chapter in Section 4.7.
Notation
We denote the i-th row of a matrix X 2 Rn⇥m by [X]i 2 Rm, and the (i, j)-th
entry of that matrix by [X]ij 2 R. Similarly, we denote the i-th entry of a
vector x 2 Rn by [x]i 2 R.
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4.3 System Model
Consider a network with n nodes, and let x 2 Rn be the state of the network,
where [x]i 2 R is the state of node i. It is possible to extend this setting to the
case where the state of the i-th agent is ki-dimensional, where k1+. . .+kn = n;
however, in this chapter, we restrict our attention to the case where the state
of each node is scalar for simplicity. Let u 2 Rn be a vector consisting of the
inputs to all the nodes with [u]i 2 R being a scalar input to node i. Further,
let y 2 Rn be a vector consisting of the outputs of all the nodes with [y]i 2 R
being a scalar output of node i. Similar to the state variables, it is possible
to allow the nodes to take multiple inputs and produce multiple outputs,
and the restriction to the single-input single-output set-up is for purpose of
clarity in presentation.
The network is described by a graph whose topology is unknown, i.e., the
interconnections among the n nodes are not known. Let P = [r] be a finite
index set. To each p 2 P , we associate a graph Gp = (Vp, Ep), where Vp is
the set of vertices, and Ep ✓ Vp ⇥ Vp is the set of edges. The index p? 2 P
is unknown to the nodes, and its corresponding graph, Gp? , describes the
actual network under study. The graphs Gp, p 6= p?, are di↵erent possibilities
of what Gp? might be. To each graph Gp, there corresponds a linear dynamical
system represented by a triple (Ap, Bp, Cp), where Ap, Bp, Cp 2 Rn⇥n. Each
triple represents a di↵erent possibility of the actual system (Ap? , Bp? , Cp?)
that governs the dynamics of the network. In particular, we assume that the
nodes operate according to the following linear dynamics:
x˙ = Ap?x+Bp?u, x(0) = x0,
y = Cp?x.
We define the neighborhood of node i in the graph Gp as
Np(i) = {j 2 Vp | (j, i) 2 Ep}.
Note that we have not explicitly included i in Np(i) to allow for applications
where node i is not able to measure its own state, for example.
In order to capture the underlying network topology, we must have that
the state xi, control ui, and measurement yi of node i can only depend on the
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Ap =
24 0 ⇤ 0⇤ 0 ⇤
0 ⇤ 0
35
Figure 4.1: A path graph with 3 nodes and its corresponding Ap.
states, control inputs, and measurements of the nodes in Np(i). To this end,
we impose the following sparsity constraint on the matrices {Ap, Bp, Cp | p 2
P}:
j /2 Np(i) =) [Ap]ij = [Bp]ij = [Cp]ij = 0, p 2 P . (4.1)
Under this constraint, the matrices Ap, Bp, Cp can be seen as an encoding
of the topology of the graph Gp. To demonstrate the sparsity constraint,
consider the 3-node path graph shown in Fig. 4.1. For this graph, the
matrix Ap must have the shown structure, where “ ⇤ ” can be any nonzero
real number.
Further, in order to be able to design decentralized controllers, we must
restrict the knowledge of node i about the graph Gp. In particular, we assume
that the knowledge of node i about the topology of Gp is only local; this can be
captured by restricting the knowledge of node i to the set {[Ap]i, [Bp]i, [Cp]i}.
Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1. The set P is finite, and the set {[Ap]i, [Bp]i, [Cp]i | p 2 P}
is known to node i.
Our goal is to design decentralized control inputs [u]i, via an extension
of the classical supervisory control scheme, in order to track the following
stable linear reference model:
x˙m = Amxm, xm(0) = x
0
m, (4.2)
ym = Cmxm,
where xm 2 Rn and Am, Cm 2 Rn⇥n. Define the tracking error, eT , as follows:
eT = ym   y.
The problem we are solving here is not the general tracking problem, be-
cause there is no external reference signal. The reason behind introducing
the reference model is motivated by applications where the agents attempt
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to converge to a certain set-point without the explicit knowledge of that point.
An example of such a scenario is the distributed averaging problem where
nodes attempt to compute the average of their initial values, x0, without
knowing the value of the average a priori. We will apply our framework to
the distributed averaging problem in Section 4.6. Moreover, the standard
stabilization problem, i.e., regulating the state x to the origin, is a special
case of the problem we are solving and can be achieved by removing the
reference model, i.e., setting xm ⌘ 0.
In the following section, we will introduce the distributed supervisory con-
trol scheme, and explain the functions of its main components in detail.
4.4 Distributed Supervisory Control Architecture
Figure 4.2 illustrates the general architecture of the distributed supervisory
control scheme. In this scheme, each node has access to a bank of candidate
controllers that take as input the outputs of the nodes in its neighborhood as
well as the tracking error. The “Sparse Filters” block in the figure emphasizes
that the local dynamics and controllers of node i can only use information
from neighboring nodes. It should be noted that there is no centralized sparse
filter implemented, and this block is introduced for the sake of demonstration
only. In this section, we will precisely explain how the information from the
neighboring nodes a↵ect the dynamics and control inputs of node i. Each
node has a local supervisor : a dynamical system that takes as input the
outputs and control inputs of the neighboring nodes and produces a switching
signal. The switching signal provided by the supervisor activates one of
the available controllers. The choice of a given control input is intended to
minimize the tracking error. We will study the supervisor in more detail
next.
4.4.1 The Distributed Supervisor
We will refer to the collection of the local supervisors by the distributed super-
visor. As illustrated in Fig. 4.3, the distributed supervisor has three main
blocks: a multi-estimator, a monitoring signal generator, and a switching
logic component. As in the centralized supervisory control case, there are cer-
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Local Supervisor 
Local 
Controllers 
...
ym
[up]i
Sparse 
Filters 
y i
u i
Node  i
 i
[y]i[u]i
Figure 4.2: Distributed supervisory control architecture.
tain properties we require from the individual blocks of the local supervisors
which are crucial for achieving tracking. In particular, the multi-estimators
must guarantee that at least one estimation error ep is small. This will guar-
antee that switching halts in finite time. As for the candidate controllers,
they must ensure that the closed loop system is detectable with respect to
the estimation error. The switching logic must ensure that the estimation
error is bounded, while avoiding fast switching. Here, we will work with a
specific choice of these three blocks.
Distributed 
Multi-Estimator u p 2 P +
 
e1p
enp µ
n
p
µ1p  1
 n
...
...
Monitoring Signal  
Generator 
Monitoring Signal  
Generator Switching Logic 
Switching Logic 
y
yp
Figure 4.3: The distributed supervisor.
Distributed Multi-Estimator and Candidate Controllers
For now, we assume that the control input u is given. We will explain how
to select the control below. The distributed multi-estimator is a collection
82
of local multi-estimators that are implemented at the nodes. At node i, the
local multi-estimator is a dynamical system that takes as input the outputs
and control inputs of the neighboring nodes, and it produces an estimate
[yp]i, p 2 P . At each node, we adopt the standard Luenberger observer to
design the multi-estimator. Let the matrix Lp be sparse:
j /2 Np(i) =) [Lp]ij = 0. (4.3)
The estimator equations at node i can then be written as
[x˙p]i =
X
j2N(i)
[Ap]ij[xp]j + [Bp]ij[u]j + [Lp]ij[yp   y]j,
[yp]i =
X
j2N(i)
[Cp]ij[xp]j,
with arbitrary initial values [xp(0)]i. To write the estimator equations more
compactly, let xp = [[xp]1, . . . , [xp]n]T and yp = [[yp]1, . . . , [yp]n]T , for all p 2
P . Recalling that the matrices Ap, Bp, Lp, Cp are sparse, we can now write
x˙p = Apxp +Bpu+ Lp(yp   y), xp(0) = x0p,
yp = Cpxp,
where x0p = [[xp(0)]1, . . . , [xp(0)]n]
T . It is important to note that xp, yp are
not stored at any node in the network, since they are centralized quantities,
and are introduced merely for notational simplicity.
We define the estimation error as ep = yp   y, p 2 P . We denote the
estimation error at the i-th node by
eip = [yp   y]i, p 2 P .
As for the candidate control inputs at node i, we assume they are linear and
given by
[up]i =
X
j2N(i)
[Kp]ij[xp]j + [Fp]ij[eT ]j, p 2 P ,
where the gain matrices Kp and Fp must be sparse to guarantee that the
controllers are decentralized. Formally, we have the following constraint on
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the gain matrices:
j /2 N ip =) [Kp]ij = [Fp]ij = 0, p 2 P . (4.4)
Similar to the estimators, for each p 2 P , we collect the control inputs of the
nodes into the vector up = [[up]1, . . . , [up]n]T . We can then write
up = Kpxp + FpeT , p 2 P .
In general, the number of candidate control inputs need not be equal to
|P| = r. However, we will assume in this chapter, for simplicity, that each
node has access to r controllers.
Monitoring Signal Generators
Each node implements a monitoring signal generator which keeps track of
the history of the estimation errors. This allows the switching decisions
(to be explained next) to be based on the history of errors instead of the
instantaneous estimation error values. The monitoring signals can be defined
as any norm of the estimation error. Here, we define the monitoring signal
at the i-th node as the square of the L2 norm of eip. Formally, we write
µip(t) =
Z t
0
keip(s)k22ds. (4.5)
It is more convenient for implementation purposes to express the monitoring
signal as an ODE:
µ˙ip = keipk22, µip(0) = 0, p 2 P .
Switching Logic
The switching logic at each node takes the monitoring signals µip, p 2 P , as
inputs and produces a switching signal  i : [0,+1) ! P which determines
the controller to be applied at each time instant. In particular, we have [u]i =
[u i ]i, i 2 [n]. The chosen controller should correspond to the monitoring
signal that has the lowest value. However, if we set  i = minp2P µip, we run
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into the risk of fast switching, which could be detrimental for the stability of
the system [68]. To this end, we will employ hysteresis switching logic at each
node with hysteresis constant hi > 0. The hysteresis constant is introduced
in order to prevent  i from switching its value too quickly. At each node, we
first initialize the switching signal as follows:
 i(0) = min
p2P
µip(0).
Let pˆi(t) := argminp2P µ
i
p(t). The signal  i switches its value at time t if
µipˆi + hi  µi i . Figure 4.4 illustrates the hysteresis based logic at node i.
 i(0) = min
p P
µip(0)
pˆi = argmin
p P
µip  i = pˆi
µipˆi + hi  µi i
yes no 
Figure 4.4: Hysteresis based switching logic.
4.5 Stability Analysis
In this section, we will obtain su cient conditions for driving the tracking
error to zero. Our approach will consist of two main steps. First, we will show
that switching at all the nodes will halt in finite time. Then, assuming that
the switching has stopped at all the nodes, we will study the detectability
properties of the closed-loop system.
In order to prove that switching terminates in finite time, it is instrumental
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to show that ep? converges to zero exponentially fast. When p = p?, we have
x˙p?   x˙ = (Ap? + Lp?Cp?)(xp?   x).
To guarantee that xp? converges exponentially fast to x, we need to impose
the following condition.
Condition 4.1. The matrix Ap?+Lp?Cp? is Hurwitz with Lp? , Cp? satisfying
(4.1) and (4.3), respectively.
Remark 4.1. This condition can be viewed as a distributed version of de-
tectability for the plant. In the case when Cp = I, for all p 2 P, this condition
can be satisfied via diagonal dominance. Diagonal dominance can be achieved
by choosing
[Lp]ii <  [Ap]ii  max
p2P
X
⌘ 6=i
|[Ap]ij|.
Note that the maximization can be carried out locally at each node because
of Assumption 4.1. To guarantee that Lp is sparse, we can select it to be a
diagonal matrix. With such choice of L, the matrix Ap? + Lp? becomes di-
agonally dominant with negative diagonal entries, and by Gershgorin’s circle
theorem, it follows that the matrix is Hurwitz. •
Under Condition 4.1, xp? converges exponentially fast to x, and conse-
quently e?p = Cp?(xp?   x) converges to zero exponentially fast regardless of
the applied control u. We now have the following proposition, which is an
immediate extension of its counterpart in the centralized architecture [68,78].
Proposition 4.1. For all i 2 [n], there exists a time T ?i and an index q?i 2 P
such that  i(t) = q?i , for all t   T ?i . Moreover, eiq?i 2 L2, for all i 2 [n].
Proof. Since e?p converges to zero exponentially fast, it follows from (4.5)
that µip? is bounded. Let Ki 2 N be such that µip?  Ki. By definition,
µip is a nondecreasing function, for all p 2 P . Hence, each µip must have a
limit. Since P is finite, there exists a time Ti such that either µip   Ki or
µip(t2)   µip(t1) < hi for all t2 > t1   Ti; therefore, at most one more switch
can occur for t   Ti. This in turn implies that there exists a time T ?i such
that  i(t) = q?i , q
?
i 2 P , for t   T ?i . Since µip? is bounded, µiq?i must also be
bounded. By (4.5), it then follows that eiq?i 2 L2.
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Note that after the switching stops, the estimate of node i, q?i , might not
match that of another node j, q?j . In other words, the perception of node i
about the underlying graph will in general be di↵erent than that of node j.
This leads to new analysis challenges that were not present in the centralized
structure.
In order to study the stability of the system following termination of
switching, we first define
xˆq? := [[xq?1 ]1, . . . , [xq?n ]n]
T ,
q? := [q?1, . . . , q
?
n]
T .
Further, we need to construct the following matrices:
Aˆq? :=
2664
[Aq?1 ]1
...
[Aq?n ]n
3775 , Bˆq? :=
2664
[Bq?1 ]1
...
[Bq?n ]n
3775 , Cˆq? :=
2664
[Cq?1 ]1
...
[Cq?n ]n
3775 ,
Kˆq? :=
2664
[Kq?1 ]1
...
[Kq?n ]n
3775 , Fˆq? :=
2664
[Fq?1 ]1
...
[Fq?n ]n
3775 , Lˆq? :=
2664
[Lq?1 ]1
...
[Lq?n ]n
3775 .
With these definitions, we can write the control law u after the switching
stops as
u = Kˆq? xˆq? + Fˆq?eT .
Define x := [xT , xˆTq? ]
T . After the switching stops, the closed-loop system
becomes:
x˙ = Ax+Dxm
eˆq? = Cx,
where
A =
"
Ap?   Bp?Fˆq?Cp? Bp?Kˆq?
 (Bˆq?Fˆq? + Lˆq?)Cp? Aˆq? + Bˆq?Kˆq? + Lˆq?Cˆq?
#
,
D =
"
Bp?Fˆq?Cm
Bˆq?Fˆq?Cm
#
,
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C =
h
 Cp? Cˆq?
i
.
Consider now the matrix
  =
"
Bp?Fˆq? + Lp?
Bˆq?Fˆq? + Lˆq?
#
,
and note that
A    C =
"
Ap? + Lp?Cp?Bp?(Kˆq?   Fˆq?Cˆq?)  Lp?Cˆq?
0 Aˆq? + Bˆq?(Kˆq?   Fˆq?Cˆq?)
#
.
Using output injection, we can write
x˙ = (A    C)x+   eˆq? +Dxm. (4.6)
To achieve tracking, the matrix A     C must be Hurwitz. Hence, in
addition to Condition 4.1, we need to impose the following condition.
Condition 4.2. The matrix Aˆq? + Bˆq?(Kˆq?   Fˆq?Cˆq?) is Hurwitz for all q? =
[q?1, . . . , q
?
n]
T with {q?1, . . . , q?n} ⇢ P , while satisfying (4.1) and (4.4).
Remark 4.2. Assume that Bp = Cp = I, for all p 2 P, and let us select
[Kp]i =  [Ap]i, for all i and p. Note that such selection for [Kp]i is made
possible by Assumption 4.1. In this case, Condition 4.2 simplifies to requiring
 Fˆq? to be sparse and Hurwitz. This can be achieved by selecting Fp = kI,
where k 2 R>0. •
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. Denote the state
to which the reference model converges by x?m.
Proposition 4.2. Under Conditions 4.1 and 4.2, and assuming that xm
converges asymptotically to x?m, the state of the plant x remains bounded,
and it asymptotically converges to
x? =  (Ap? +Bp?(Kˆq?   Fˆq?Cˆq?)) 1Bp?Fˆq?Cmx?m.
Proof. Under Conditions 4.1 and 4.2, the matrix A     C is Hurwitz. We
know from Proposition 4.1 that eiq?i 2 L2 for all i 2 [n]. Noting that
eˆq? = [e1q?1 , . . . , e
n
q?n
], we conclude that eˆq? converges to zero as t!1. Then,
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because xm is bounded, we deduce from (4.6) that x must remain bounded.
Using the fact that eˆq? converges to zero, the steady-state expression follows
immediately from (4.6).
Remark 4.3. Since the objective of the controller is to enable the plant to
track the reference model, we are interested in cases where x? = x?m. Assum-
ing that Bp, Cp, Cm are all equal to the identity matrix, for all p 2 P, the
steady-state expression simplifies to
x? =  (Ap? + Kˆq?   Fˆq?) 1Fˆq?x?m.
Hence, by setting Kp =  Ap for all p 2 P, we will have x? = x?m if and only
if p? = q?, i.e., when all the nodes correctly identify the unknown topology.
Otherwise, there will be a discrepancy between x and the reference trajectory
xm. Nonetheless, in certain scenarios, this discrepancy may be negligible as
we will demonstrate in Section 4.6. •
Finally, we note that the multi-estimators and controllers we used here are
only a specific possibility which we adopted to demonstrate the idea behind
distributed supervisory control. One possible variation is to select the control
inputs as
up = Kpyp + FpeT , p 2 P .
By following similar steps to the above, one can show that, with this choice
of controllers, the matrix that is required to be Hurwitz in Condition 4.2
becomes
Aˆq? + Bˆq?(Kˆq?   Fˆq?)Cˆq? .
Hence, di↵erent choices of the controllers will provide di↵erent conditions
on the system parameters to ensure stability. We are currently investigat-
ing di↵erent design choices that would place less restrictions on the system
parameters.
4.6 Application: Tracking Consensus Dynamics
In this section, we apply the distributed supervisory control scheme to the
distributed averaging problem [12, 79] in the case where the dynamics of
the nodes contain unknown parameters. In distributed averaging networks,
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the nodes attempt to converge to the average of their initial values, x(0),
by performing local averaging. When the dynamics of the nodes contain
unknown parameters, adaptive control techniques have been applied to solve
this problem in [80]. By performing logic-based switching, our scheme enables
convergence to the average without requiring continuous tuning of parameters
as in the adaptive control approach. In [12, 81], the problem of achieving
consensus when the underlying topologies are switching has been studied.
Note that the topology in our case is unknown, but fixed, and the switching
is performed at each node to choose the controller that minimizes the tracking
error.
To specialize the reference model (4.2) to the distributed averaging dy-
namics, we assume that Am is the negative of the weighted Laplacian matrix
of a connected undirected graph. In particular, we have
Am = A
T
m, Am1 = 0,
[Am]ij   0, [Am]ij = 0 () (i, j) /2 E , i 6= j,
where the weights [Am]ij, j 6= i are randomly generated. The connectivity of
the graph corresponding to Am is necessary for the convergence to the average
[12]. We assume that there is full state observation across the network; we
therefore set Cm = I and Cp = I, for all p 2 P . We also set Bp = I, for
all p 2 P . Since the agents attempt to compute the average of their initial
values, we set x0m = x0 and x
0
p = x0, for all p 2 P .
We consider a network of n = 5 agents and set x0 = [1, . . . , 5]T . The agents
will therefore attempt to converge to 151
Tx0 = 3. We let |P| = 10, that is,
there are 10 possible topologies, and we set p? = 10. The matrices {Ap}p2P
are generated at random, without any connectivity requirements.
In order to satisfy Condition 4.1, we pick Lp =  kI, for all p 2 P , where
k 2 R is selected as explained in Remark 4.1. In view of Remark 4.2, we set
Kp =  Ap and Fp = 5I, for all p 2 P , in order to satisfy Condition 4.2.
We will run two experiments, where we generate di↵erent {Ap}p2P , Am
matrices, each time while respecting the connectivity constraint on Am. Fig-
ure 4.5 demonstrates the trajectories of the state of the network x, the state
of the reference model xm, the switching signals  i, and the tracking error
eT for the first experiment. In this case, all the agents correctly converge to
the correct topology Gp? , and, hence, converge to the average value 3. The
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tracking error therefore converges to zero.
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Figure 4.5: All the agents correctly identify the unknown topology.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the same signals for the second experiment. In this
case, agent 3 does not select the correct topology, i.e., q?3 6= 10. Nonetheless,
it converges to 3.09, and the tracking error is very small. The remaining
nodes all converge to 3. A potential future research direction is quantifying
the tracking error in the event where q?i 6= p?.
4.7 Summary
We proposed a distributed version of the classical centralized supervisory con-
trol scheme. Our scheme is based on logic-based switching among candidate
controllers at each node. The switching decisions performed at each node
depend only on information from neighboring nodes. The goal of the con-
trollers is to track a set-point, without requiring the agents to have explicit
knowledge of this point. The classical stabilization or regularization problem
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Figure 4.6: One of the agents does not identify the correct topology.
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is a special case of this set-point tracking problem. We showed that switching
stops in finite time at each node, and we provided su cient conditions for
stability. We applied our scheme to the distributed averaging problem when
the dynamics of the agents contain unknown parameters. Simulation results
demonstrated the e cacy of our scheme.
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CHAPTER 5
VIRUS SPREAD IN NETWORKS:
STABILITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Background
In this chapter, and in preparation for studying various control design ques-
tions in infected networks in the following chapter, we perform stability anal-
ysis for the n-intertwined Markov model [41, 82], which is a virus spread
model that belongs to the SIS class. Epidemiological models for disease
spread among humans constitute important classes of spread dynamics, as
they can potentially provide models for many engineering related phenomena
such as the spread of viruses in computer networks [41, 83–85]. There is a
vast literature on various aspects of epidemiological models and the study of
infection propagation over networks; we refer the reader to [84,86,87] and the
references therein. Characterization of the stability properties of such dif-
fusion dynamics is a crucial first step towards designing e cient algorithms
for controlling the evolution of such dynamics. Most dynamical epidemio-
logical models, including the n-intertwined Markov model studied here, can
possess two equilibrium points, under certain conditions: an all-healthy state
at which the network is cured, and an endemic state at which the infection
persists in the network [11,26,88,89]. A threshold called the basic reproduc-
tion number, whose value depends on the curing and infection rates across
the network as well as the network topology, determines to which equilibrium
point the state of the network will converge [88].
For the n-intertwined Markov model, the basic reproduction number, in-
troduced as a critical threshold in [41, 82], characterizes this threshold phe-
nomenon. In particular, when the basic reproduction number is less than
or equal to 1, the unique equilibrium is the all-healthy state; otherwise, the
endemic state emerges. Our aim in this chapter is to fully characterize the
stability properties of this model over networks with directed topologies.
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A su cient condition for the stability of the all-healthy state over strongly
connected digraphs has been established in [36]. For compartmental SIS
models, a necessary and su cient condition for the global asymptotic stabil-
ity of this equilibrium was presented in [26] using a linear Lyapunov function.
For the same model, the global asymptotic stability of the endemic state over
strongly connected directed graphs has been studied in [26,89,90]—see [89] for
a summary of other approaches to establish this result. The results in [26,90]
rely on the assumption that the state of the model will evolve in the strictly
positive quadrant when the state of the network is initialized away from
the origin. The result in [89] was established using a non-quadratic Lya-
punov function. In contrast, in this chapter, using the theory of positive
systems, we establish the global asymptotic stability of the endemic state
using a quadratic Lyapunov function. This allows us to provide novel re-
sults for the stability properties of epidemic dynamics over weakly connected
topologies; in all the aforementioned results, the underlying graphs were as-
sumed to be strongly connected (or connected when the graph is undirected).
Nonetheless, weakly connected directed graphs are common in practice, and
characterizing the equilibrium points as well as their stability properties over
these graphs present new challenges in studying epidemiological networks.
5.2 Main Results
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows. First, using tools from
the theory of positive systems, we fully characterize the stability properties
of the all-healthy and endemic state equilibrium points of the n-Intertwined
Markov model over strongly connected digraphs. In particular, we show
that the all-healthy state is globally asymptotically stable (GAS) if and only
if the basic reproduction number is less than or equal to one. When the
basic reproduction number is greater than one, we show that the endemic
state is locally exponentially stable, and when the network is not initialized
at the all-healthy state, we show that the endemic state is GAS. Unlike
[26, 90], the proof we present here does not make any assumption on the
evolution of the state, and unlike [89], the stability properties are established
using a quadratic Lyapunov function. Using this key construction, our next
contribution is to study the existence, uniqueness, and stability properties
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of the all-healthy and endemic states over weakly connected digraphs. By
studying the input-to-state stability of the network, we provide conditions
for a GAS endemic state to emerge over weakly connected digraphs. Unlike
endemic states over strongly connected digraphs, we show that at the endemic
states emerging over weakly connected graphs a subset of the nodes could be
healthy while the rest become infected.
Finally, we provide a game-theoretic framework that can prescribe more
general classes of infection dynamics. Using this model, we show that the
n-Intertwined Markov model prescribes the best-response dynamics of a con-
cave game. This allows us to provide a new condition for the stability of the
all-healthy state, which can be checked in a distributed way by the nodes.
Organization
In Section 5.3, we recall the n-intertwined Markov model, and discuss a con-
nection with a game-theoretic formulation. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 contain our
results on the stability of the n-intertwined Markov model over, respectively,
strongly and weakly connected digraphs. Numerical studies are provided in
Section 5.6. We collect our conclusions in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 contains
technical results that are used in proving some of our main results.
5.3 The n-Intertwined Markov Model
In this section, we recall the heterogeneous n-intertwined Markov model that
has recently been proposed [41, 82]. This model is related to the so-called
multi-group SIS model that was proposed earlier in [11]; see also [26, 89].
We prescribe the infection model over a directed graph G = (V , E) with n
nodes, where V is the set of nodes, and E is the set of edges. Each node
in the network has two states: infected or cured. The curing and infection
of a given node i 2 V are described by two independent Poisson processes
with rates  i and  i, respectively. Throughout the chapter, we assume that
 i > 0 and  i > 0. The transition rates between the healthy and infected
states of a given node’s Markov chain depend on its curing rate as well as the
infection probabilities among its neighbors. A mean-field approximation is
introduced to “average” the e↵ect of infection probabilities of the neighbors
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on the infection probability of a given node. This approximation yields a
dynamical system that describes the evolution of the probability of infection
of node i 2 V and is central to our upcoming developments. We briefly
review this dynamical system next.
Let pi(t) 2 [0, 1] be the infection probability of node i 2 V at time t 2 R 0,
and let p(t) = [p1(t), . . . , pn(t)]T . Also, let D = diag( 1, . . . ,  n), P (t) =
diag(p(t)), and B = diag( 1, . . . ,  n). The n-intertwined Markov model is
prescribed by the mapping   : Rn ! Rn, where
p˙(t) =  (p(t))
:= (ATB  D)p(t)  P (t)ATBp(t). (5.1)
It can be shown that when p(0) 2 [0, 1]n, p(t) 2 [0, 1]n, for all t 2 R>0
[41]. Hereinafter, for most parts, we will drop the time index for notational
simplicity.
5.3.1 Equilibrium States of the n-Intertwined Markov Model
We next focus on characterizing the set of equilibria of the dynamical sys-
tem (5.1). We give this characterization using the so-called basic reproduction
number, denoted by Ro, which is defined as the expected number of infected
nodes produced in a completely susceptible population due to the infection
of a neighboring node [88]. For the n-intertwined Markov model, the ba-
sic reproduction number was found in [82], where it was called the “critical
threshold”, to be equal to
Ro = ⇢(D 1ATB).
For connected undirected graphs, it is shown in [82] that the all-healthy
state is the unique equilibrium for the n-intertwined Markov model when
Ro  1. WhenRo > 1, in addition to the all-healthy equilibrium, an endemic
equilibrium, denoted by p?, emerges. In fact, it is shown that p?   0. We
call a strictly positive endemic state strong. When p?   0, we call it a weak
endemic state. A recursive expression for the endemic state p? is provided
in [82], which is shown to depend on the problem parameters only: A,  i,  i,
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i 2 V . To arrive at this expression, consider the steady-state equation
0 = (ATB  D)p  PATBp. (5.2)
Define ⇠i :=
P
j 6=i aji jpj and ⇠
?
i :=
P
j 6=i aji jp
?
j , i 2 V . We can then write
p?i as
p?i =
⇠?i
 i + ⇠?i
= 1   i
 i + ⇠?i
, i 2 V . (5.3)
Since we assumed that  i > 0, we conclude that p?i < 1, for all i 2 V . We
can then re-write (5.2), evaluated at p?, in the following form:
ATBp? = (I   P ?) 1Dp?, (5.4)
where P ? = diag(p?).
5.3.2 The n-Intertwined Markov Model as a Concave Game
In this subsection, we demonstrate that the n-intertwined Markov model can
be cast as the best response dynamical system associated with a noncoop-
erative game. An important by-product of this study is the development
of a larger class of infection dynamics with reasonable convergence prop-
erties. Further, our exposition provides a decision-based interpretation to
virus spread models, which are often based on the theory of Markov chains.
Although our focus here is the study of virus spread, our model can be ap-
plied to other di↵usion phenomena such as the spread of spam in computer
networks.
To this end, consider a digraph G = (V , E) with n nodes, and let 0  xi  1
be the rate with which node i sends messages. We associate an objective
function, denoted by fi : Rn ! R, to node i that is comprised of a local
utility function Ui : [0, 1] ! R, and a component that encapsulates the
influence of the neighboring nodes. The influence of node j on node i is
described via the function g˜ji : [0, 1] ⇥ [0, 1] ! R, where g˜ji ⌘ 0 if and only
if (j, i) /2 E . We can then write the objective function of node i as
fi(xi, x i) = Ui(xi) +
X
j 6=i
g˜ji(xi, xj). (5.5)
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Each node is interested in maximizing its own objective function fi. For-
mally, we can write the problem of the i-th agent as
max
0xi1
fi(xi, x i), for each fixed x i. (5.6)
When fi is concave in xi, and because the objective function of each player
depends also on the actions of other players, problem (5.6) describes a con-
cave game [63,91].
The solution concept we are interested in studying here is the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium (PSNE).
Definition 5.1 ([63]). The vector x? 2 [0, 1]n constitutes a PSNE if, for all
i 2 V, the inequality
fi(x
?
i , x
?
 i)   fi(xi, x? i)
is satisfied for all xi 2 [0, 1].
Note that under the PSNE, no agent has any incentive to unilaterally
deviate from the solution x?. The next proposition establishes the existence
and uniqueness of the PSNE for the game in (5.6), when the game is concave.
Proposition 5.1 ([91]). For each i 2 V, let fi(xi, x i) in (5.5) be strictly
concave in xi 2 [0, 1], for every xj 2 [0, 1], j 2 V , j 6= i. Then the resulting
concave game in (5.6) admits a unique PSNE under the following diagonal
dominance condition:
2
     @2@x2i Ui(xi)
     > X
j 6=i
     @@xj @@xi g˜ij(xi, xj) + @@xj @@xi g˜ji(xj, xi)
     . (5.7)
The following lemma establishes a relationship between virus spread in
networks and concave games. In the virus spread case, the probability of
infection pi plays the role of the transmission rate xi.
Lemma 5.1. The dynamics of the n-intertwined Markov model are best-
response dynamics of a concave game among the nodes, where the decision
variable of node i 2 V is pi 2 [0, 1], and its objective function is given by
fi(pi, p i) =   i
2
p2i + pi
⇣
1  pi
2
⌘X
j 6=i
aji jpj. (5.8)
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Proof. Recall the objective functions defined in (5.5). Let Ui(pi) =    i2 p2i
and g˜ji(pi, pj) = pi(1  pi2 )aji jpj, i 2 V . We then obtain
@2
@p2i
fi(pi, p i) =   i  
X
j 6=i
aji jpj < 0, i 2 V ,
which shows that the fi’s are strictly concave in self-variables. It is now
not hard to see that the dynamics of the n-intertwined Markov model (5.1)
correspond to the gradient flow dynamics when the agents aim at maximizing
their own objective functions (5.8).
5.4 Stability of Epidemic Dynamics over Strongly
Connected Graphs
We start by studying the stability properties of the n-intertwined model over
directed graphs with strongly connected topologies.
5.4.1 Stability of the All-Healthy State
As a stepping stone, we first provide an alternative proof for the necessary
and su cient condition for the global asymptotic stability of the all-healthy
state, see [26,36], using the theory of positive systems. As we will see shortly,
the proof strategy provided here is essential in some of our upcoming results.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose G = (V , E) is a strongly connected digraph. The
origin is GAS if and only if Ro  1.
Proof. Note that the matrix ATB D is Metzler, because the entries of ATB
are nonnegative. Using the convergent regular splitting property of Metzler
matrices, it can be shown that Ro < 1 if and only if µ(ATB  D) < 0, and
Ro = 1 if and only if µ(ATB  D) = 0 [43, Theorem 2.3].
As a result, when Ro < 1, the matrix ATB   D is Hurwitz. Since it is
also Metzler, by Proposition 1.1(iv), there exists a positive diagonal matrix
R1 satisfying (ATB  D)TR1 + R1(ATB  D) =  K, where K is a positive
definite matrix. Consider the Lyapunov function V1(p) = pTR1p. Using (5.1),
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we have
L V1(p) = pT ((ATB  D)TR1 +R1(ATB  D))p
  2pTR1PATBp
 pT ((ATB  D)TR1 +R1(ATB  D))p
=  pTKp   1( K)kpk22 < 0, p 6= 0, (5.9)
where the first inequality follows because pTR1PATBp   0, for all p 2 [0, 1]n,
and (5.9) follows because K is positive definite. This implies that the all-
healthy state is GAS.
When Ro = 1, we have µ(ATB  D) = 0. Since G is strongly connected,
it follows that ATB  D is irreducible [43]. Recalling that ATB  D is also
Metzler, we conclude from Lemma 5.2 that there exists a positive diagonal
matrix R2 such that (ATB D)TR2+R2(ATB D) is negative semidefinite.
Using the Lyapunov function V2(p) = pTR2p, we can write
L V2(p) = pT ((ATB  D)TR2 +R2(ATB  D))p
  2pTR2PATBp
  2pTR2PATBp.
We next prove that pTR2PATBp = 0 if and only if p = 0. Since R2 is a
positive diagonal matrix, we have that pTR2PATBp = 0 if and only if
p2i
X
j 6=i
aji jpj = 0, (5.10)
for all i 2 V . Assume that there is a solution p that satisfies pTR2PATBp = 0
at some time t0 2 R 0, and let pi(t0) 6= 0 for some i 2 V . Then, by continuity
of the state p, there exists an interval ⌧ = [t0, t0+ ],   > 0, such that pi(t) 6= 0,
for all t 2 ⌧ . Using (5.10), we hence conclude that for all j 2 V that are
neighbors of i, i.e., aji 6= 0, we must have that pj(t) = 0 and p˙j(t) = 0
for all t 2 ⌧ , for all j 2 V with aji 6= 0. Then, for some j 2 V such that
aji 6= 0, we have p˙j(t) =
P
k 6=j akj kpk(t) = 0, for all t 2 ⌧ . This implies that
pk(t) = 0 for all t 2 ⌧ and for all k 2 V such that akj 6= 0. By repeating this
argument, we conclude that pl(t) = 0 for all t 2 ⌧ for any node l 2 V from
which there is a directed path to node j. Since G is strongly connected, there
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is a directed path from node i to node j, and we must then have pi(t) = 0
for all t 2 ⌧ , which contradicts our initial hypothesis. It then follows that
pTR2PATBp = 0 if and only if p ⌘ 0. Hence, the all-healthy state is GAS.
This proves the su ciency part.
We will show necessity by proving the contrapositive. The Jacobian matrix
of the vector field in (5.1) evaluated at the origin is given by J(0) = ATB D.
If Ro > 1, we have µ(ATB D) > 0, and we conclude by Lyapunov’s indirect
method that the original nonlinear system is not stable. This proves that
Ro  1 is also necessary for the origin to be asymptotically stable.
It is worth noting that, when R0 < 1, the proof of the global asymptotic
stability of the all-healthy state does not rely on the strong connectivity
assumption. This is also true for the instability proof, when R0 > 1. We
only used the strong connectivity of the graph to prove global asymptotic
stability when Ro = 1.
5.4.2 Existence and Stability of an Endemic State
In this section, we use notions from positive systems theory to prove the local
and global asymptotic stability of an endemic state over strongly connected
digraphs. We first note that the existence of a unique endemic state for (5.1)
over strongly connected digraphs can be concluded from [26, Section 2.2], as
stated next.
Proposition 5.3. Let G = (V , E) be a strongly connected digraph. Then, a
unique strong endemic state p?   0 exists if and only if Ro > 1.
Next, we compute the Jacobian of  , given by (5.1), at p?. Note that
Jii(p
?) =
@
@pi
 i(p
?) =  ( i + ⇠?i ), i 2 V ,
Jij(p
?) =
@
@pj
 i(p
?) = (1  p?i )aji j, j 6= i, j 2 V ,
where  i(p?) is i-th entry of f(p?). Using the definition of p? in (5.3), we
realize that Jii(p?) =   i/(1  p?i ), i 2 V . As a result, we conclude that
J(p?) =  (I   P ?) 1D + (I   P ?)ATB.
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Our first result establishes the local stability of p?.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that G = (V , E) is a strongly connected digraph and
that Ro > 1. Then, the strong endemic state p? is locally exponentially stable.
Proof. We invoke Lyapunov’s indirect method. Since G is strongly connected,
A is irreducible. From (5.4), we deduce that Dp? = (I  P ?)ATBp?. We can
then write
J(p?)p? =  ATBp? + (I   P ?)ATBp?
=  P ?ATBp? ⌧ 0,
where the last strict inequality follows because p?   0, B is a positive di-
agonal matrix, and A is irreducible. The matrix J(p?) is Metzler, because
its o↵-diagonal entries are nonnegative. Then, using Proposition 1.1(ii), we
conclude that J(p?) is Hurwitz.
We are now in a position to state the following result.
Theorem 5.2. Let G = (V , E) be a strongly connected digraph, and assume
that p(0) 6= 0. If Ro > 1, then the strong endemic state p? is GAS.
Proof. Recall that p(t) 2 [0, 1]n for all t 2 R 0. When Ro > 1, Proposi-
tion 5.2 implies that the origin is unstable. Therefore, under this condition,
the set W = [0, 1]n\{0} is invariant under the evolutions of (5.1).
Next, define the state p˜ = p p?. Let P˜ = diag(p˜). The dynamics of p˜ can
then be written as follows:
˙˜p = (ATB  D)(p˜+ p?)  (P˜ + P ?)ATB(p˜+ p?)
= ( D + (I   P ?)ATB)p˜  P˜ATBp.
Define the matrix ⇤(p?) :=  D+(I P ?)ATB, and note that the o↵-diagonal
entries of ⇤(p?) are nonnegative; hence, ⇤(p?) is a Metzler matrix. Since G
is strongly connected, the matrix ⇤(p?) is also irreducible. From (5.4), it
follows that ⇤(p?)p? = 0, and since p? is strictly positive, it follows from
Theorem 1.1 that µ(⇤(p?)) = 0. Thus, it follows from Lemma 5.2 that there
exists a positive diagonal matrix R such that the matrix ⇤(p?)TR + R⇤(p?)
is negative semidefinite.
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Consider the Lyapunov function V (p˜) = p˜TRp˜. We have
L V (p˜) = p˜T (⇤(p?)TR +R⇤(p?))p˜  2p˜T P˜RATBp
  2p˜TRP˜ATBp =  2p˜T P˜RATBp,
where the inequality follows because ⇤(p?)TR+R⇤(p?) is negative semidefi-
nite, and the last equality follows because P˜ and R commute, since they are
both diagonal matrices.
We next prove that pTRPATBp = 0 if and only if p = p?. Since R is a posi-
tive diagonal matrix, we have p˜T P˜RATBp = 0 if and only if p˜2i
P
j 6=i aji jpj =
0, for all i 2 V . Assume that there is a vector p that satisfies p˜T P˜RATBp = 0
while pi 6= p?i , for some i 2 V . We then must have
P
j 6=i aji jpj = 0, which
implies that pj = 0 for all j 2 V such that aji 6= 0. Then, for some j 2 V for
which aji 6= 0, we must also have
P
k 6=j akj kpk = 0, because pj = 0 < p
?
j .
By repeating this argument, we conclude that pl = 0 for any node l 2 V
from which there is a directed path to node j. Since G is strongly connected,
there is a directed path from node i to node j, and we must have pi = 0.
This implies that p = 0, which contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore,
since the set W is invariant under (5.1), we have that V˙ (p˜) = 0 if and only
if p = p?.
Remark 5.1. The novelty of our proof lies in its use of notions from positive
systems theory, which enables us to construct a quadratic Lyapunov function.
A proof for a weaker statement is established in [26,90], where it is assumed
that for p(0) 6= 0, there exists a time T 2 R>0 such that p(t) 2 (0, 1]n for
all t   T . An alternative proof that utilizes a logarithmic Lyapunov function
has recently appeared in [89].
In addition to the useful characteristics of using a quadratic Lyapunov
function for studying additional properties such as convergence rates, our
proof allows for establishing the stability properties of the equilibrium points
over weakly connected digraphs in the next section. •
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5.4.3 A Simplified Stability Condition through a
Game-Theoretic Perspective
The game-theoretic connection we established in Lemma 5.1 enables us to
provide a simplified condition for the global asymptotic stability of the all-
healthy state. In particular, by applying the diagonal dominance condition
in (5.7) to (5.8), we obtain the following su cient condition:
1
2
X
j 6=i
aij j <  i, for all i 2 V . (5.11)
Recall that the conditions R0 < 1 and µ(ATB   D) < 0 are equivalent.
Note the similarities between the conditions µ(ATB D) < 0 and (5.11). The
two conditions are related by the Gershgorin Circle Theorem. While (5.11)
is more restrictive than µ(ATB  D) < 0, it is linear and easier to compute.
More importantly, condition (5.11) can be checked in a distributed fashion,
which makes it more suitable for the design of distributed algorithms.
5.5 Stability of Epidemic Dynamics over Weakly
Connected Graphs
In this section, we study the stability properties of the n-intertwined Markov
model over weakly connected graphs. This class is of great importance,
since it is conceivable that in many practical scenarios there exist connected
components that collectively serve as an infection source, but are not a↵ected
by the rest of the nodes. Such scenarios cannot be captured by strongly
connected topologies.
We start by introducing some notations. When the graph G is weakly
connected, its adjacency matrix can be transformed into an upper triangular
form using an appropriate labeling of the nodes. Assuming that G = (V , E)
contains N 2 Z 1 strongly connected components, we can write
A =
266664
A11 A12 . . . A1N
0 A22 A23 . . .
...
. . . . . . . . .
0 . . . 0 ANN
377775 ,
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where Aii are irreducible for all i 2 [N ], and, hence, correspond to SCCs
in G [43]. For notational simplicity, we will use Ai instead of Aii. The
matrices Aij, j 6= i are not necessarily irreducible. We denote an SCC of
G by Gi = (Vi, Ei), i 2 [N ], where [Ni=1Vi = V and [Ni=1Ei = E . For each
i 2 [N ], we introduce the positive diagonal matrices Di, Bi which contain,
respectively, the curing and infection rates of the nodes in Vi along their
diagonals. We introduce the partial order ’ ’ among SCCs, and we write
Gi   Gj, for some i, j 2 [N ], if there is a directed path from Gi to Gj but not
vice versa.
For a given i 2 [N ], we denote the state of the nodes in Gi by qi 2 R|Vi| and
the state of the k-th node in Vi by qi,k 2 R. The state, p, of the entire network
is given by p = [qT1 , . . . , q
T
N ]. Let ci =
P
j 6=iA
T
jiBjqj 2 R|Vi|, i 2 [N ], be the
input infection from the nodes in G\Gi. We can now write the dynamics of
the nodes in Gi, i 2 [N ], given by the mapping  ˜i : R|Vi| ⇥ R|Vi| ! R|Vi|, as
q˙i =  ˜i(qi, ci)
:= (ATi Bi  Di)qi  QiATi Biqi + (I  Qi)ci, (5.12)
where Qi = diag(qi). When an SCC comprises a single node, ATi Bi   Di is
equal to   i. In what follows, we say Gi is stable to mean that the dynamics
(5.12) are stable. When an endemic state p? emerges over the graph G,
we call the steady-state of qi an endemic state of Gi, and we denote it by
q?i . Hence, the endemic state emerging over the entire network is given by
p? = [q?T1 , . . . , q
?T
N ]
T .
We first state some results about the special case where the network topol-
ogy is given by a DAG.
Proposition 5.4. Let G = (V , E) be a DAG and suppose  i > 0 for all i 2 V.
Then the origin is the unique equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is GAS.
Proof. Let us denote the steady-state of (5.1) by p(1). The steady-state
equation for the source nodes of the DAG is of the form 0 =   ipi(1),
i 2 Ssource, which implies that pi(1) = 0 for all source nodes. For a node
i 2 SN-source, its steady-state equation can be written as 0 =   ipi(1)+ (1 
pi(1))
P
j2Ssource aij jpj(1). The sum evaluates to zero, and again we obtain
pi(1) = 0. By repeating this argument, we conclude that pi(1) = 0, for all
i 2 SN-source. By propagating this argument all the way to the sink nodes,
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we conclude that zero is the unique solution of the steady-state equation.
Next, we prove the second statement. In a DAG, the dynamics of the
source nodes become p˙i =   ipi, i 2 Ssource. Hence, all source nodes are
globally exponentially stable. Let vi :=
P
j2Ssource aij jpj, and define the
following linear dynamical system for all i 2 SN-source
˙¯pi =   ip¯i + vi, p¯i(0) = pi(0).
Then, we have from (5.1) that p˙i  ˙¯pi, for all i 2 SN-source. By the comparison
lemma, it follows that pi  p¯i, for all t and all i 2 SN-source. It is well-known
that if the input of an exponentially stable linear system converges to zero,
its state converges to zero. Thus, since vi converges to zero, p¯i must also
converge to zero, for all i 2 SN-source. Since pi   0, we conclude that pi
converges to zero for all i 2 SN-source. The proposition follows by repeating
this argument for the remaining nodes in the graph.
We begin by studying the existence, uniqueness, and the stability proper-
ties of an endemic state over a weakly connected digraph consisting of two
SCCs; the generalization to multiple SCCs is straightforward.
Proposition 5.5. Let Gi = (Vi, Ei) be an SCC, i 2 [N ], and let q?i be its
endemic state equilibrium. If q?i,i1 > 0 for some i1 2 Vi, then q?i   0.
Proof. Let i1 2 Vi be a node with q?i,i1 > 0. Since Gi is strongly connected,
for any node im 2 Vi, where m is an integer satisfying m  |Vi|, there exists
a directed path from node i1 to node im. Let i2 2 Vi be a node along this
path such that (i1, i2) 2 Ei. It follows from (5.3), that q?i,i2 > 0. By the same
argument, it follows that q?i,ik > 0 for every node ik 2 Vi along the directed
path from i1 to im, including im. Since nodes i1 and im were arbitrary, the
proof is complete.
Let Rio := ⇢(D 1i ATi Bi) be the basic reproduction number corresponding
to Gi. We have the following existence and uniqueness result.
Theorem 5.3. Let G = (V , E) be a weakly connected digraph consisting of
two SCCs G1, G2 such that G1   G2. Assume that qi(0) 6= 0 for all i 2 [2].
Then the following statements hold:
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(i) If R1o > 1, and R2o being arbitrary, then p = 0 and p? = [q?T1 , q?T2 ]T are
the only possible equilibrium points over G, where q?1 and q?2 are unique
strong endemic equilibrium points over G1 and G2, respectively.
(ii) If R1o  1 and R2o > 1, then p = 0 and p? = [0T , q?T2 ]T are the only
possible equilibrium points over G, where q?2 is a unique strong endemic
equilibrium point over G2.
(iii) If Rio  1, i 2 [2], then p = 0 is the only possible equilibrium over G.
Proof. In all the cases, the fact that p = 0 is an equilibrium point follows
directly from the structure of the dynamics. Since G1   G2, we have c1 = 0,
i.e., the dynamics of the nodes in G1 are not a↵ected by those in G2.
We first prove (i). First, consider the case when R2o > 1. Since R1o > 1
and G1 is an SCC, we conclude by Theorems 5.3 and 5.2 that there exists a
strong endemic state q?1   0 over G1, which is GAS, assuming that q1(0) 6= 0.
Hence, c2 converges to c?2 := A
T
12B2q
?
1, which is a nonnegative vector. We can
now write the steady-state equation for G2 as
(AT2B2  D2)q2  Q2AT2B2q2 + (I  Q2)c?2 = 0, (5.13)
or
AT2B2q2   diag(AT2B2q2)q2   (D2 + C?2)q2 + c?2 = 0,
where C?2 = diag(c
?
2). Define G2 = D2+C2, and note that this is an invertible
diagonal matrix because D2 is a strictly positive diagonal matrix. We then
conclude that
G 12 A
T
2B2q2   (I + diag(G 12 AT2B2q2))q2 +G 12 c?2 = 0,
or
q2 = (I + diag(G
 1
2 A
T
2B2q2))
 1G 12 (A
T
2B2q2 + c
?
2). (5.14)
Since G2 is an SCC, A2 is irreducible, and therefore G 12 AT2B2 is irreducible
as well. Furthermore, we have G 12 c
?
2 ⌧ 1 by construction. It then follows by
Theorem 5.5 in Section 5.8 that there exists a unique strong endemic state
q?2 over G2. From (5.4), it follows that the steady-state of any node in G2
that is connected to a node in G1 is strictly positive. Then, it follows from
Proposition 5.5 that [q?1, 0] cannot be an equilibrium over G, and [q?T1 , q?T2 ]T
is the unique equilibrium over G in this case.
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When R2o  1, it follows from (5.4) that the steady-state of any node in G2
that is connected to a node in G1 is strictly positive. Hence, by Proposition
5.5, there exists a strong endemic state q?2 over G2. Finally, and because the
steady-state equation over G2 is given by (5.14), it follows from Proposition
5.7 in Section 5.8 that q?2 must be unique.
For (ii), since c1 = 0 andR1o  1, it follows by Proposition 5.2 and Theorem
5.3 that the only valid equilibrium over G1 is q1 = 0, which is GAS. Hence,
in steady-state, G2 can be viewed as an isolated irreducible graph, and it
follows from Theorems 5.3 and 5.2 that there exists a unique strictly positive
equilibrium q?2 over G2.
Finally, for (iii), and similar to (ii), the only possible equilibrium over G1 is
q1 = 0, which is GAS. This in turn leads to having c?2 = 0, and since R2o  1,
the only possible equilibrium over G2 is q2 = 0.
From (ii), we conclude that a weak endemic state could emerge over weakly
connected graphs. A strong endemic state could emerge in case (i), and the
all-healthy state is the only possible equilibrium in case (iii). It is impor-
tant to note that the endemic state q?2 resulting in cases (i) and (ii) are not
necessarily the same.
Next, we study the stability properties of weak and strong endemic equi-
libria.
Theorem 5.4. Let G = (V , E) be a weakly connected digraph consisting of
two SCCs G1, G2 such that G1   G2. Assume that qi(0) 6= 0 for all i 2 [2].
Then, G2 is input-to-state stable (ISS). Further, the equilibrium over G is
GAS.
Proof. First, note that the dynamics over G1 are not a↵ected by G2. Hence,
the global asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (all-healthy or strong en-
demic, depending on the value of R1o) over G1 follows immediately. We will
start by proving that G2 is ISS for di↵erent values of R1o and R2o. Consider
the following cases.
(i) R2o < 1: In this case, we have µ(AT2B2   D2) < 0, and therefore
the matrix AT2B2   D2 is Hurwitz. Since it is also Metzler, it follows from
Proposition 1.1 that there exists a positive diagonal matrix R which satisfies
(AT2B2  D2)TR +R(AT2B2  D2) =  K,
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where K is a positive definite matrix. Similar to the proof of Proposition
5.2, consider the Lyapunov function VR(q2) = qT2 Rq2. We have
L ˜2VR(q2) = qT2 ((AT2B2  D2)TR +R(AT2B2  D2))q2
  2qT2 RQ2AT2B2q2 + 2qT2 R(I  Q2)c2
  qT2 Kq2 + 2qT2 Rc2,
where the inequality follows because qT2 RQ2A
T
2B2q2   0, for all q2 2 [0, 1]n,
and qT2 RQ2c2   0, for all c2, q2 2 [0, 1]n. Let 0 < ✏ < 1. We can then write
L ˜2VR(q2)   (1  ✏)qT2 Kq2   ✏qT2 Kq2 + 2qT2 Rc2.
We will prove that there exists a class K1 function,  , such that  ✏qT2 Kq2+
2qT2 Rc2  0 for kq2k2    (kc2k2). To this end, note that qT2 Rc2  kRk2 ·
kq2k2 · kc2k2. Also, because K is positive definite, we can write qT2 Kq2  
 n(K)kqk22 > 0. Define  (r) := 2kRk2·r✏ n(K) , where r 2 R. We then have
 ✏qT2 Kq2 + 2qT2 Rc2  0 for kq2k2    (kc2k2), and hence
L ˜2VR(q2)   (1  ✏)qT2 Kq2, kq2k2    (kc2k2).
This implies that the system G2 is ISS when R2o < 1 and R1o is arbitrary.
(ii) R2o = 1: Following the same reasoning in the proof of Proposition
5.2, we conclude that there exists a positive diagonal matrix S such that
(AT2B2   D2)TS + S(AT2B2   D2) is negative semidefinite. Then, using the
Lyapunov function VS(q2) = qT2 Sq2, we can write
L ˜2VS(q2)   2qT2 Q2SAT2B2q2 + 2qT2 Sc2
  qT2 Q2SAT2B2q2 + 2
p
nkSk2 · kc2k2,
where the second inequality follows by using the bound kq2k2 
p|V2|  pn.
Define the function ⇢ : R! R as ⇢(kc2k2) = 2pnkSk2 · kc2k2, and note that
⇢ 2 K1 since it is linear in kck2. Define the function g : Rn 0 ! R as
g(q2) = 2qT2 Q2SA
T
2B2q2. Following similar steps to those in the proof of
Proposition 5.2, we can show that g(q2) = 0 if and only if q2 = 0. Note that
g(q2) > 0 for all q2 2 Rn 0 such that q2 6= 0. Furthermore, the function g
is continuous and radially unbounded. Hence, it follows by [92, Lemma 4.3]
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that there exists a class K1 function ↵ : R! R such that g(q2)   ↵(kq2k2).
We therefore have
L ˜2VS(q2)   ↵(kq2k2) + ⇢(kc2k2).
As a result, it follows from [93, Remark 2.4] that the system G2 is ISS when
R2o = 1 and R1o is arbitrary.
(iii)R2o > 1: Define the state q˜2 = q2 q?2, and the control input c˜2 = c2 c?2,
where c?2 was defined in the proof of Theorem 5.3 as the steady-state of c2.
Let Q˜2 = diag(q˜2), Q?2 = diag(q
?
2), and C
?
2 = diag(c
?
2). The dynamics of q˜2
can then be written as
˙˜q2 = (A
T
2B2  D2)(q˜2 + q?2)  (Q˜2 +Q?2)AT2B2(q˜2 + q?2)
+(I   Q˜2  Q?2)(c˜2 + c?2)
= ( D2 + (I  Q?2)AT2B2)q˜2   Q˜2AT2B2q2
+(I  Q2)c˜2   Q˜2c?2 (5.15)
= ( D2   C?2 + (I  Q?2)AT2B2)q˜2   Q˜2AT2B2q2
+(I  Q)c˜2, (5.16)
where (5.15) follows from the steady-state equation in (5.13) evaluated at
q2 = q?2, and (5.16) follows because Q˜2c
?
2 = C
?
2 q˜2.
Next, define the matrix ⇤˜(q?2) =  D2   C?2 + (I   Q?2)AT2B2, which is
Metzler since its o↵-diagonal entries are nonnegative. Since G2 is an SCC,
the matrix ⇤˜(q?2) is also irreducible. We wish to study the sign of µ
⇣
⇤˜(q?2)
⌘
.
Using the steady-state equation in (5.13) evaluated at q2 = q?2, it follows
that ⇤˜(q?2)q
?
2 =  c?2, where we recall that c?2 ⌫ 0. Consider the following two
cases.
(iii.a) R1o  1 and R2o > 1: In this case, the all-healthy state is GAS over
G1; see Proposition 5.2. Then, c?2 = 0, and ⇤˜(q?2)q?2 = 0. Since q?2 is strictly
positive, it follows from Theorem 1.1 that µ
⇣
⇤˜(q?2)
⌘
= 0. Thus, it follows
from Lemma 5.2 that there exists a positive diagonal matrix R such that the
matrix ⇤˜(q?2)
TR + R⇤˜(q?2) is negative semidefinite. Consider the Lyapunov
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function VR(p˜) = p˜TRp˜. We have
L ˜2VR(p˜) = q˜T2 (⇤˜(q?2)TR +R⇤˜(q?2))q˜2   2q˜T2 Q˜2RAT2B2q2
+2q˜T2 R(I  Q2)c˜2
  2q˜T2 Q˜2RAT2B2q2 + 2q˜T2 R(I  Q2)c˜2
  2q˜T2 Q˜2RAT2B2q2 + 4
p
nkRk2 · kc˜2k2, (5.17)
where the last inequality follows from kq˜2k2  kq2k2+ kq?2k2  2
p
n, and the
fact that kI   Q2k2  1. Define the scalar function ⇢(kc˜2k2) := 4pnkRk2 ·
kc˜2k2, and note that ⇢ 2 K1, since it is linear in kc˜2k2. Following similar steps
to those in the proof of Theorem 5.2, one can show that q˜T2 Q˜2RA
T
2B2q2 = 0 if
and only if q˜2 = 0. Then, using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem
5.4, we conclude that there exists a class K1 function ↵ : R ! R such that
2q˜T2 Q˜2RA
T
2B2q2   ↵(kq˜2k2). We therefore have L ˜2VR(p˜)   ↵(kq˜2k2) +
⇢(kc˜2k2), and it follows from [93, Remark 2.4] that the system G2 is input-
to-state-stable when R1o  1 and R2o > 1.
(iii.b) R1o > 1 and R2o > 1: In this case, the endemic state is GAS over
G1; see Theorem 5.2. Then, c?2   0, and ⇤˜(q?2)q?2   0. Since q?2 is strictly
positive, it follows from [26, Theorem 2.4] that µ
⇣
⇤˜(q?2)
⌘
< 0; therefore,
⇤˜(q?2) is Hurwitz. Thus, it follows from Proposition 1.1(iv) that there exists a
positive diagonal matrix S such that the matrix ⇤˜(q?2)
TS+S⇤˜(q?2) is negative
definite. Hence, using VS(p˜) = p˜TSp˜, one can derive the same bound as in
(5.17), with R replaced with S, and by repeating the same steps as above,
one can show that G2 is input to state stable when R1o > 1 and R2o > 1.
Since G1 is GAS, and G2 is ISS, it follows from [92, Lemma 4.7] that the
equilibrium of the cascaded system is GAS. In particular, when R2o  1 and
R1o  1, it follows from Theorem 5.3(iii) that the all-healthy state is GAS.
When R2o  1 and R1o > 1, it follows from Theorem 5.3(i) that the strong
endemic equilibrium [q?T1 , q
?T
2 ]
T is GAS, assuming that qi(0) 6= 0 for all i 2 [2].
When R2o > 1 and R1o  1, it follows from Theorem 5.3(ii) that the weak
endemic state [0T , q?T2 ]
T is GAS, assuming that q2(0) 6= 0. Finally, when
when R2o > 1 and R1o > 1, it follows from Theorem 5.3(i) that the strong
endemic state [q?T1 , q
?T
2 ]
T is GAS, assuming that qi(0) 6= 0 for i 2 [2].
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorems 5.3 and
5.4.
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Corollary 5.1. Let G = (V , E) be a weakly connected digraph consisting of
N SCCs ordered as G1   . . .   GN . Assume that qi(0) 6= 0 for all i 2 [n].
(i) If Rio  1 for all i 2 [N ], then the all-healthy state is GAS.
(ii) If Rko > 1 for some k 2 [N ], and Rio  1 for i 2 [k   1], then the
endemic state p? = [0, . . . , 0, q?Tk , . . . , q
?T
N ]
T is GAS.
5.6 Numerical Studies
We demonstrate the emergence of a weak endemic state over the Pajek GD99c
network [94], which is a weakly connected directed network shown in Fig.
5.1. The network consists of 105 nodes and it contains 66 SCCs. The nodes
marked “red” in Fig. 5.1 constitute an SCC, which we refer to as G1.
Figure 5.1: The Pajek GD99c network. The “red” nodes belong to G1 for
which R1o > 1. The “black” nodes are the only ones with no direct path
from G1.
We will select the curing rates over G1 to be low in order to make R1o > 1.
For the remaining nodes, we will set  i =
P
j 6=i aji j+0.5, which is a su cient
condition to ensure Rio < 1 as per (5.11). The infection rates  i and the
weights aij are all selected to be equal to 1. There are only 4 nodes for which
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there is no directed path from G1, and they are marked “black” in Fig. 5.1.
The initial infection profile is selected at random.
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Figure 5.2: Infection probabilities of the nodes.
Figure 5.2 plots the state trajectories. By examining the histogram of the
values to which the state converges, which is shown in Fig. 5.3, we notice
that there are 13 nodes with high infection probabilities, and those are the
nodes comprising G1. Note that G1 is asymptotically stable even though it
takes input from other SCCs, as shown in the figure, and R1o > 1. There are
4 nodes that become healthy, and those are the “black” nodes which are not
reached by a directed path from G1. The remaining nodes all have positive
infection probabilities with varying levels depending on their distance from
G1, with the nodes that are farthest from G1 enjoying the lowest infection
probabilities.
Next, we will demonstrate the global asymptotic stability of p? over con-
nected undirected graphs, which follows from Theorem 5.2. The infection
rates, the edge weights, and the initial infection profile were generated ran-
domly. The curing rates were selected such that Ro > 1.
Figure 5.4 shows the state of a ring graph with 20 nodes. The figure
also plots the Lyapunov function V (p˜) = 12 p˜
T p˜. As claimed, the system
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Figure 5.3: A histogram of the endemic state value across the network.
converges to the strictly positive state p?, and the Lyapunov function decays
monotonically to zero.
Figure 5.5 shows the same simulation for a connected undirected random
graph with 100 nodes. The probability that an edge occurs in the graph
was selected to be 310 . The specific graph realization used in this experiment
contained 1704 edges. Again, we observe that the state converges to p?. It is
interesting to note that convergence here is faster than the case of the ring
graph.
5.7 Summary
We have utilized tools from positive systems theory to establish the stability
properties of the n-intertwined Markov model over digraphs. For strongly
connected digraphs, we have proved that when the basic reproduction num-
ber is less than or equal to 1, the all-healthy state is GAS. When the basic
reproduction number is greater than 1, however, we have shown that the en-
demic state is GAS, and that locally around this equilibrium, the convergence
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Figure 5.4: Stabilization of a ring graph with 20 nodes.
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Figure 5.5: Stabilization of a random graph with 100 nodes and 1704 edges.
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is exponentially fast. Furthermore, we have studied the stability properties of
weakly connected graphs. By viewing an arbitrary weakly connected graph
as a cascade of SCCs, we were able to establish the existence and unique-
ness of weak and strong endemic states. We have also studied the stability
properties of weakly connected graphs using input-to-state stability. Finally,
we have proposed a dynamical model that describes the interaction among
nodes in an infected network as a concave game and demonstrated that the
n-intertwined Markov model is a special case of our model. This alternative
description provides a new condition, which can be checked collectively by
agents, for the stability of the origin.
5.8 Additional Proofs
In this Section, we collect and prove some results pertinent to the develop-
ment in he main body of the chapter. We start with the next result, which
is key in proving some of the results in Sections 5.4 and 5.5.
Lemma 5.2. Let X 2 Rn⇥n be an irreducible Metzler matrix such that
µ(X) = 0. Then, there exists a positive diagonal matrix R 2 Rn⇥n such
that the matrix XTR +RX is negative semidefinite.
Proof. From Theorem 1.1, it follows that there exists a vector ⌫ 2 Rn⇥n such
that ⌫   0 and X⌫ = 0. Since  (X) =  (XT ), we have µ(AT ) = 0. Using
Theorem 1.1 again, we conclude that there exists a vector ⇠ 2 Rn⇥n such that
⇠   0 and XT ⇠ = 0. Let R 2 Rn⇥n be a positive diagonal matrix defined
with Rii = ⇠i/⌫i, for all i 2 [n]. Consider now the matrix XTR + RX. The
matrix RX is Metzler, since R is a positive diagonal matrix. For the same
reason, and because X is irreducible, we conclude that RX is irreducible.
By a similar argument, XTR is also an irreducible Metzler matrix. Since the
sum of two Metzler matrices is Metzler, the matrix XTR + RX is Metzler.
Also, because both RX and XTR are Metzler and irreducible, the matrix
XTR + RX is also irreducible. Further, by construction, we have (XTR +
RX)⌫ = XTR⌫ = XT ⇠ = 0. Since XTR + RX is symmetric, it has real
eigenvalues, and since ⌫ is strictly positive, it follows from Theorem 1.1 that
XTR +RX is negative semidefinite.
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Next, we prove an instrumental result, which can be thought of as a non-
homogeneous extension of a result of [26]. We start by providing two key
properties of the continuous mapping T : [0, 1]n ! [0, 1]n defined as
T (p) := (I + diag(Xp)) 1(Xp+ y).
Proposition 5.6. Let X 2 Rn⇥n be a nonnegative matrix, and let y 2 Rn be
a vector satisfying 0   y ⌧ 1. Then, the mapping T is monotonic.
Proof. Let the vectors p, q 2 Rn be such that p   q. For i 2 [n], we have
Ti(p) =
(Xp)i + yi
1 + (Xp)i
= 1  1  yi
1 + (Xp)i
 1  1  yi
1 + (Xq)i
= Ti(q),
where the inequality follows because X is nonnegative. This implies that the
mapping T is monotonic.
Proposition 5.7. Let X 2 Rn⇥n be a nonnegative matrix, and let y 2 Rn
be a vector satisfying 0   y ⌧ 1. If the mapping T has strictly positive fixed
point, then it must be unique.
Proof. We will prove the claim by contradiction. Assume that there are two
fixed points p?, q? 2 Rn, p? 6= q?. We will first show that p?   q?. To this
end, define
⌘ := max
i2[n]
p?i
q?i
, k := argmax
i2[n]
p?i
q?i
.
Note that p?   ⌘q?. For p?   q? to hold, we must have ⌘  1; assume that,
to the contrary, ⌘ > 1. Then, using Proposition 5.6, we have
p?k = Tk(p
?)  Tk(⌘q?) = ⌘(Xq
?)k + yk
1 + ⌘(Xq?)k
< ⌘
(Xq?)k + yk
1 + (Xq?)k
= ⌘Tk(q
?) = ⌘q?,
where the strict inequality follows from the assumption that ⌘ > 1, and
the last equality follows because q? is a fixed point. By definition, we have
p?k = ⌘q
?
k. Hence, if ⌘ > 1 were true, we would have p
?
k < ⌘q
?
k = p
?
k, which
is a contradiction. Hence, we must have ⌘  1 and p?   q?. By switching
the roles of p? and q?, and repeating the above steps with ⌘ˆ = maxi2[n]
q?i
p?i
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instead of ⌘, we conclude that p? ⌫ q?. Thus, p? = q?, and the fixed point is
unique.
We are now ready to prove the main result.
Theorem 5.5. Let X 2 Rn⇥n be a nonnegative irreducible matrix such that
⇢(X) > 1, and let y 2 Rn be a vector satisfying 0   y ⌧ 1. Then, the map-
ping T : [0, 1]n ! [0, 1]n has a unique fixed point, which is strictly positive.
Proof. We will prove that there exists a closed sub-interval of (0, 1)n which
is invariant under T . By Theorem 1.2, it follows that X has an eigenvector
v   0 satisfying Xv = ⇢(X)v. Without loss of generality, we assume that
v   1, which can be achieved by an appropriate scaling of the eigenvector
corresponding to ⇢(X).
Define  :=
q
⇢(X)+ymax
1+⇢(X) , and note that  < 1. Let us choose ✏ > 0 such
that   ✏vmin. Note that with such a choice of ✏, we can guarantee, for all
i 2 [n], that ✏vi < 1, since vi  1 and  < 1. This choice of ✏ implies that
✏vi    or (✏vi)2   ⇢(X)+ymax1+⇢(X) , for all i 2 [n]. This in turn implies, for i 2 [n],
✏vi   1
✏vi
· ⇢(X) + yi
1 + ⇢(X)
>
✏⇢(X)vi + yi
1 + ✏vi⇢(X)
= Ti(✏vi), (5.18)
where the last inequality follows since ✏vi < 1. We therefore have T (✏v) < ✏v.
Define  := ⇢(X)+ymin 11+⇢(X) , and note that  < 1, as ymin < 1. Let us choose
✏ > 0 such that 0 < ✏vmax  . Then, for all i 2 [n], we have
✏vi  ⇢(X) + yi   1
⇢(X) + 1
<
⇢(X) + yi   1
⇢(X)
.
We thus have ✏⇢(X)vi + 1 < ⇢(X) + yi, for all i 2 [n]. Equivalently, for all
i 2 [n], we can write
✏vi < ✏vi
⇢(X) + yi
✏⇢(X)vi + 1
<
✏⇢(X)vi + yi
✏⇢(X)vi + 1
= Ti(✏v), (5.19)
where the second strict inequality holds since ✏vi <  < 1. We therefore have
T (✏v) > ✏v.
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Since v   0 and ✏ > 0, we have ✏v   0. We also have that ✏ > ✏ because
✏   
vmin
>
2
vmin
=
⇢(X) + ymax
vmin(1 + ⇢(X))
>
⇢(X) + ymin   1
vmax(1 + ⇢(X))
=

vmax
  ✏,
where the first strict inequality follows because  < 1. This implies that
✏v ⌧ ✏v. Further, by construction, we have ✏vi < 1, for all i 2 [n], and
therefore ✏v ⌧ 1. To summarize, we have the following bounds: 0 ⌧ ✏v ⌧
✏v ⌧ 1.
We can now define the closed and bounded set
K := {p 2 [0, 1]n | ✏1v   p   ✏2v} ⇢ (0, 1)n.
By (5.18) and (5.19), and since T is monotonic as proved in Proposition
5.6, we conclude that T : K ! K. Since T is continuous, it follows from
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem that there exists a strictly positive fixed point
p? 2 K such that T (p?) = p?. Finally, it follows from Proposition 5.7 that
p? must be unique.
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CHAPTER 6
VIRUS SPREAD IN NETWORKS:
CONTROL DESIGN
6.1 Background
In this chapter, we focus on control design problems for networks whose
dynamics are given by the n-intertwined Markov model described in Chapter
5. To this end, we view the curing rates as control inputs, and we investigate
the design of stabilizing and optimal control laws.
We have seen in the previous chapter that stabilizing the all-healthy state
requires allocating high curing rates across the network. However, for net-
works that contain a large number of nodes, allocating a high curing rate to
each and every node could incur a high cost. Motivated by this challenge, we
investigate the possibility of stabilizing the all-healthy state when the curing
rates of only a limited number of nodes can be controlled.
A common approach in the literature to stabilize the all-healthy state has
been to assign constant curing rates across the network [32, 36–38, 95–98].
This approach seems to be quite wasteful, especially if the infection proba-
bility of a given node approaches the healthy state, in which case that node
would not need a high rate of curing. Here, using nonlinear control designs,
we study the behavior of dynamic controllers that are able to exploit the state
of the network. Moreover, we study multiple optimal control problems that
are designed to yield controllers capable of minimizing the total infection in
the network at a low cost.
6.2 Main Results
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows. When the curing rates
of a limited number of nodes can be controlled, we identify conditions un-
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der which the network can be stabilized to the origin, and we identify graph
classes that can be stabilized using a limited number of controllers. Further,
we propose a dynamic optimization framework that allows the network de-
signer to design an optimal controller that minimizes the total infection in the
network at minimum cost. We show that this controller is of the bang-bang
type, and that it may exhibit multiple switches. In addition, we propose
two static control laws: one is obtained by optimizing the vaccination levels
at time zero, and the other one is based on a second-order approximation.
We demonstrate that the optimal dynamic controller and the static control
laws exhibit similar performances over sparse graphs. Finally, we transform
the network dynamics into a form that is linear in controls, and we study
an optimal control problem subject to these dynamics. We show that the
optimal controller of this problem exhibits at most one switch. By analyzing
the switching behavior of the dynamic controllers, we observe that optimal
controllers reduce the curing rates of those nodes that are approaching the
healthy state, which matches our intuition.
Organization
Section 6.3 contains our results on the design of stabilizing controllers for
infected networks. An optimal control problem is formulated and studied in
Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, we propose a static optimization framework and
compare the performances of dynamic and static control laws. In Section 6.6,
we study another optimal control problem subject to a transformed version
of the n-intertwined Markov model. The main results of the chapter are
summarized in Section 6.7.
6.3 Stabilization
Consider a network of n nodes described by a connected undirected graph
G = (V , E), where V is the set of vertices, and E 2 V ⇥ V is the set of edges.
Recall the n-intertwined Markov model introduced in the previous chapter:
p˙ = (AB  D)p  PABp, p(0) = p0, (6.1)
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where A is the adjacency matrix of G, P = diag(p), B = diag( 1, . . . ,  n),
and D = diag( 1, . . . ,  n).
In this section, we will investigate the possibility of reducing the infection
by altering the curing rates at a limited number of nodes belonging to a
set Scontrol ⇢ V , and we define r := |Scontrol|. For this reason, throughout
this section, we replace  i with ui(t), where i 2 Scontrol. Given the necessary
conditions presented in the recent paper [99], we will use the assumption that
there exists a small curing rate of ↵i at any node in F = V\Scontrol. This
amount of self-healing may, however, not be enough to stabilize the system
to the origin. Recall from Proposition 5.2 that Ro  1 is a necessary and
su cient condition for the all-healthy state to be GAS; we are interested in
answering the following question: When the condition Ro  1 is initially
violated, can we stabilize the system to the origin by controlling the nodes in
Scontrol only?
By construction, we have Scontrol \ F = ; and Scontrol [ F = V . Let U(t)
be a diagonal matrix such that Uii(t) = ui(t) if and only if i 2 Scontrol, and
zero otherwise. Similarly, let   be a diagonal matrix such that  ii = ↵i if
and only if i 2 F , and zero otherwise. The n-intertwined Markov model
dynamics introduced in Chapter 5 can then be written as:
p˙ = (AB      U)p  PABp.
Note that this system is a ne in controls. To see this, define h(p) = (AB  
 )p PABp and gi(p) :=  piei, where {e1, . . . , en} is the fundamental basis.
We can then write
p˙ = h(p) +
X
i2Scontrol
gi(p)ui.
In what follows we consider two special cases for which a limited number
of controllers can stabilize the system.
Lemma 6.1. In a star graph, the all-healthy state can be stabilized by placing
an appropriate controller at the root node and arbitrarily small ↵-self-loops
everywhere else.
Proof. We will proceed by showing that the function V (p) = 12p
Tp is a control
Lyapunov function (CLF). Without loss of generality, let node 1 be the root.
The dynamics of all other nodes is then given by p˙i =  ↵ipi+(1 pi)ai1 1p1.
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A necessary and su cient condition for V (p) to be a CLF is
@
@p
V (p)Tg1(p) =  p21 = 0 =)
@
@p
V (p)Th(p) < 0, p 6= 0.
But when p1 = 0, we have
@
@p
V (p)Th(p) = pT (AB    )p  pTPABp =  pT p,
which is negative. Hence, V (p) is indeed a CLF, and we can stabilize the
system using Sontag’s universal controller [100].
Note that Sontag’s controller requires the controlling node to have knowl-
edge of the entire state. In the above, the root node is connected to all the
nodes, and hence it has access to the state vector p.
Lemma 6.2. In an odd (or even) length path graph, a maximum of (n 1)/2
(or n/2) controllers are required to stabilize the all-healthy state, provided that
all other nodes implement arbitrarily small ↵-self-loops.
Proof. The proof is similar to the star graph case. We will show that V (p) =
1
2p
Tp is a CLF. Let us place the controllers at nodes {2, 4, . . .}. Then, from the
structure of A, it follows that pTABp = 0 when @@pV (p)
T (g2(p), g4(p), . . .) =
 Pi2Scontrol p2i = 0. This implies that @@pV (p)Th(p) =  pT p, and V (p) is a
CLF. The size of Scontrol follows from the way we have placed the controllers.
This concludes the proof.
Similar results can be obtained for other classes of graphs. The key idea
behind the above results is to place the controllers in such a way that no
path can be drawn between two nodes in F without passing through a node
in Scontrol. For example, in a tree with an even number of levels, stabilization
can be achieved by controlling the nodes in every other level, and placing
arbitrarily small ↵-self-loops everywhere else. The following corollary is im-
mediate.
Corollary 6.1. In a binary tree with an even number of levels, `, it su ces
to control 13(2
`   1) nodes to stabilize the all-healthy state.
The above results characterize the number of controllers that would be suf-
ficient to stabilize the network. For the nodes in Scontrol, there is a variety of
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choices for the specific control law to be implemented. We will next compare
the performance of Sontag’s universal controller [100] to that of a constant
controller based on the cost of control as given by
R T
0 ui(t)dt. Sontag’s uni-
versal controller is a state-feedback controller that is used to stabilize systems
that are a ne in controls. It relies on deriving a control Lyapunov function
V : Rn⇥n ! R for the system under study, and it is given by the following
universal formula:
uSontag(p)=
8<:   ⇠+
p
⇠2+k⌘k42
k⌘k22 b, ⌘ 6= 0
0, ⌘ = 0
,
⇠(p)=
@
@p
V (p)Th(p), (6.2)
⌘(p)=

@
@p
V (p)T g1(p), . . . ,
@
@p
V (p)T gr(p)
 T
. (6.3)
Consider a star graph with 10 nodes. By Lemma 6.1, we know that it
su ces to control the root node to stabilize the network. Let node 1 be at
the root. Recalling from the proof of Lemma 6.1 that V = 12p
Tp is a CLF for
the n-intertwined model over star graphs, and the gains ⇠, ⌘ in (6.2), (6.3)
in this case become
⇠(p) = pT (AB    )p  pTPABp,
⌘(p) =   ⇥p21, 0, . . . , 0⇤T .
We assume that the rest of the nodes implement a self-loop ↵ = 0.1.
The horizon of the simulation, T , is chosen to be 100. Fig. 6.1 depicts
the performance of a constant controller u1 = 8, while the performance of
Sontag’s universal controller is shown in Fig. 6.2. We observe that the
stabilization properties of both controllers are similar. However, Sontag’s
universal controller incurs a lower cost compared to the constant controller;
the total cost incurred by the constant controller is 800, while that incurred
by Sontag’s controller is 738.6.
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Figure 6.1: A star graph with a constant controller implemented at the
root. n = 10.
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Figure 6.2: A star graph with Sontag’s universal controller implemented at
the root. n = 10.
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6.4 Optimal Control
We now focus on designing optimal controllers for infected networks. We
assume that the designer can control the curing rates of all nodes. To capture
this, we re-label the matrix D in (6.1) as U , where U = diag(u1, . . . , un). We
assume that there are upper and lower bounds on the curing rates: u 
ui(t)  u, for all i 2 V and all t 2 R 0, where u corresponds to the natural
immunity of the node, and u corresponds to the maximum vaccination level
available. The action set of the designer can be written as
W = {w 2 Rn | u  wi  u}.
The set of admissible controls, U , consists of all functions that are piecewise
continuous in time and whose range is W . Given a time interval [0, T ], we
can formally write
U = {u : [0, T ]! W | u is a piecewise continuous function of t} .
The designer aims at reducing the infection probabilities across the network,
while minimizing the cost associated with modifying the curing rates. Let
c 2 Rn 0 be the cost associated with the state, and let d 2 Rn 0 be the cost
associated with the control. We can then write the cost functional of the
designer as follows:
J(u) =
Z T
0
[cTp+ dTu]dt.
In order to minimize the cost associated with the state, the designer must
attempt to stabilize the state to the origin. To this end, we will linearize the
dynamics in (5.1) around the origin to obtain p˙ = (AB   U)p. Noting that
pi
P
j 6=i aij jpj   0, for all i 2 V and p 2 [0, 1]n, we conclude that
(AB   U)p  PABp  (AB   U)p.
This serves as a confirmation of the fact that the linear part of the dynamics
is what is important when the focus is stabilization to the origin. We will
therefore work with the linearized dynamics hereinafter.
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Consider the following optimal control problem:
inf
u2U
J(u)
subject to p˙ = (AB   U)p, p(0) = p0. (6.4)
Proposition 6.1. The optimal dynamic controller for node i 2 V for the
above optimal control problem is given by
u?i =
8><>:
u, di   p?i q?i < 0
u, di   p?i q?i > 0
{u, u}, otherwise
. (6.5)
where p? is the optimal trajectory and q? is the costate vector provided by
the canonical equations of the MP. Further, su ciently close to the terminal
time T , the optimal controller is u? = u1.
Proof. The existence of optimal control for this problem follows by a straight-
forward application of Filippov’s existence theorem [58]. The Hamiltonian
associated with this problem is
H(p, q, u) = cTp+ dTu+ qT (AB   U)p,
where q is the costate vector. The MP dictates that there exists a costate
vector q satisfying the following canonical equations along the optimal tra-
jectory:
p˙? = (AB   U?)p?, p?(0) = p0, (6.6)
q˙? =   @
@p
H =  (AB   U?)T q?   c, q?(T ) = 0. (6.7)
Further, the optimal controller minimizes the Hamiltonian:
u? = argmin
u2W
H(p?, q?, u),
which yields the solution in (6.7). Using the continuity of q? and the terminal
condition imposed on it, we conclude that when su ciently close to the
terminal time T , u? = u1.
Next, we demonstrate that the optimal controller (6.5) can exhibit multiple
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switches. Consider the network shown in Fig. 6.3, and let d = [1, 1, 10, 1, 1]T
such that node 3 has a high cost on control. Also, let p(0) = [0.1, 0.01, 0.9,
0.01, 0.01]T , where we assigned a high probability of infection to node 3. Let
u = 0.1, u = 1, T = 100, and c = 1. Unity infection rates were assigned to
all the nodes, i.e.,  i = 1 for all i 2 [6]. The edge weights aij were generated
randomly.
1 2 3
4
5
Figure 6.3: An infected graph with node 3 having high probability of
infection and high cost on control.
Figure 6.4 shows the state of the network above after implementing the
controller given in (6.5). Note that u3 = u throughout [0, T ], because con-
trolling this node is expensive. Nevertheless, although the neighboring nodes
have low initial probability of infections, the optimal controller intelligently
increases the curing rates of these nodes, which enjoy low control cost, in
order to help cure node 3. It is interesting to note that all the controllers,
except u3, exhibit multiple switches between u and u.
Remark 6.1. It is important to note that the designer was able to cure the
entire network without needing to apply the maximum vaccination level to
node 3. This demonstrates that curing the network does not require applying
high vaccination levels to the entire network. •
6.5 Static Approaches
Note from (6.5)-(6.7) that the state, costate, and optimal control are inter-
related and cannot be solved in closed form. Hence, besides simulations, it
is not apparent how one can analytically study the properties of the optimal
controller, such as the number of switches between the bounds u and u.
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Figure 6.4: State and optimal controller of a network with a highly infected
node whose control cost is high.
We have shown above that the optimal controller (6.5) can exhibit multi-
ple switches between the vaccination levels, which may not be practical for
certain scenarios. For scenarios where a static controller, i.e., a controller
that does not exhibit any switching, is more appropriate, it is instructive
to compare the performances of static controllers with that of the optimal
controller in (6.5). In this section, we will propose two approaches to obtain
an e cient static controller.
6.5.1 Optimal Static Controller
Instead of allowing the control input u to change its value dynamically, we
would like to choose the control input at t = 0 and fix it for the remaining
portion of the problem’s horizon. We will denote the static controller by uci ,
i 2 V . When the controller is fixed, we can readily obtain the solution of the
linearized dynamics in (6.4) as
p = e(AB U
c)tp0, (6.8)
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where U c = diag(uc). The objective function of the designer in this case
becomes
J(uc) =
Z T
0
cT e(AB U
c)tp0dt+ Td
Tuc,
and his optimization problem becomes
min
uc2W
J(uc).
Since J(uc) is continuous in uc, andW is closed and bounded, it follows from
Weierstrass’s Extreme Value Theorem that a globally optimum solution ex-
ists. Hence, although the objective function is not convex for all parameter
values, we can still obtain the global minimum using standard search algo-
rithms. However, in general, it is not possible to obtain the optimal static
controller, uc?, in closed form.
6.5.2 Sub-Optimal Static Controller
When the horizon of the problem is small enough, we can obtain a static con-
troller in closed form. To this end, consider the first order Taylor expansion
of (6.8)
e(AB U
c)tp0 = p0 + t(AB   U c)p0 +O
 
t2
 
.
The objective function, up to second order, can then be written as
Jˆ(uc) = TcTp0 +
T 2
2
cT (AB   U c))p0 + TdTuc.
Using this objective function, an alternative optimization problem for the
designer is
min
uc2W
Jˆ(uc).
The solution of this problem can be readily obtained, and it is given by
uˆc?i =
8><>:
u, di <
T
2 cipi(0)
u, di >
T
2 cipi(0)
{u, u}, otherwise
.
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6.5.3 Performance Comparison
We will now compare the performances of the optimal dynamic controller u?,
the optimal static controller uc?, and the sub-optimal static controller uˆc? for
di↵erent graphs. Let p0 = 0.51, T = 1, c = 51, and d = 1. Also, let B = I,
aij = 1 for all (i, j) 2 E , and u = 0.1. Depending on the graph, the value
of u is chosen to ensure that Ro is satisfied, and hence that the all-healthy
state is GAS as per Proposition 5.2.
Figure 6.5 compares the cost incurred by the three control laws for a path
graph with a varying number of nodes. The maximum vaccination level
was fixed at u = 2. As expected, the dynamic controller achieves the best
performance, while the static controllers incur the same cost. A similar
scenario arises over a cycle graph as shown in Fig. 6.6, while the performances
of all three control laws are almost identical over a star graph as shown in
Fig. 6.7.
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Figure 6.5: Costs incurred by dynamic and static control laws over a path
graph.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the performances of each of the three control laws
over a complete graph with a varying number of nodes. The value of u
was chosen to be 23. Unlike the above experiments, the performance gap
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Figure 6.6: Costs incurred by dynamic and static control laws over a cycle
graph.
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Figure 6.7: Costs incurred by dynamic and static control laws over a star
graph.
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between the dynamic controller and the static ones is quite large. Further, the
performance gap between the optimal and the sub-optimal static controllers
is also large.
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Figure 6.8: Costs incurred by dynamic and static control laws over a
complete graph.
Remark 6.2. The performances of the dynamic and static control laws is
comparable over sparse networks such as paths and stars. However, the per-
formance gap becomes significant in graphs with many connections as in the
complete graph case. It is worth noting that the sub-optimal static controller
uˆc? achieved a performance comparable to that of the optimal static controller
uc?, although in the derivation of uˆc? we relied on second-order terms only.
Future work will focus on characterizing these gaps analytically. •
6.6 Linear Transformation
The fact that the system we are studying is a ne in controls makes the
canonical equations provided by the MP intractable. As a sub-optimal ap-
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proach, consider instead the following linear-in-control dynamics:
p˙i =   ipi +
X
j 6=i
aij jpj   ui,
or in matrix form
p˙ = (AB  D)p  u. (6.9)
Note that the dynamics in (6.9) provide a lower bound to those in (5.1).
Hence, using the comparison lemma, the cost associated with the state in
(6.9) provides a lower bound for the cost associated with the state in (5.1).
Moreover, similar transformations have been studied in the literature, where
the control input ui is interpreted as extra vaccination provided to node
i 2 V [39]. The problem we want to solve now is
inf
u2U
J(u)
subject to p˙ = (AB  D)p  u,
0  pi  1, 8i 2 V ,
u  ui  u, 8i 2 V ,
where we have added a constraint on the state pi to ensure that it is a valid
probability of infection, for all i 2 V , and all t 2 R 0. The following theorem
provides the solution to this problem.
Theorem 6.1. For all i 2 V, the optimal controller is given by
u?i =
8><>:
u, di   q?i < 0
u, di   q?i > 0
{u, u}, otherwise
. (6.10)
For all i 2 V, the optimal controller u?i switches at most once. If u?i exhibits
a switch at time t? 2 R 0, then u?i = u for t  t?, and u?i = u for t > t?.
Proof. The Hamiltonian in this case becomes
H(p, q, u) = (c   )Tp+ (d  q)Tu+ qT (AB  D)p,
where   is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the positivity constraint
on p. From the Hamiltonian minimization condition provided by the MP, we
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conclude that the optimal controller is as claimed. In order to completely
characterize the optimal controller, we must find  . By complementary slack-
ness, when pi > 0, we have  i = 0. When, pi = 0, we must have  i > 0.
However, optimality dictates that ui = u when pi = 0; hence, we do not need
to find the explicit value of  i in this case.
To determine the switching behavior, we study the costate equation. The
costate equation is given by
q˙ =  (AB  D)T q   c+  , q(T ) = 0,
whose solution is
q =
Z T
t
e (AB D)
T (t ⌧)( (⌧)  c)d⌧.
Note that q is independent of d. When di = 0 for some i 2 V , i.e., there is no
cost on control, optimality dictates that we must have u?i = u. This implies
that q?i > 0 for all t 2 [0, T ). Using the terminal condition qi(T ) = 0, and
since i was arbitrary, we conclude that qi is nonnegative for all t 2 [0, T ],
for all i 2 V . Further, from the structure of q, we conclude that qi   di
can become zero at most once. Also, from the terminal condition and the
continuity of q, it follows that there is an ✏ > 0 such that q(t) = 0 for all
t 2 [T   ✏, T ], and therefore (6.10) implies that ui(t) = u for all t 2 [T   ✏, T ].
Using these facts, we conclude that if ui exhibits a switch at time t? 2 R 0,
then ui = u for t  t?, and ui = u for t > t? as claimed.
Remark 6.3. The fact that the optimal controllers in (6.5) and (6.10) switch
to u towards the end of the horizon demonstrates that applying high curing
rates across the entire horizon of the problem is not required. Most of the
current approaches in the literature require applying constant curing rates
across the entire horizon of the problem; the optimal control framework we
provide here (based on linear approximation) and the one provided in Section
6.4 prove that this is in fact wasteful, and one can switch to low curing rates
once the nodes start approaching the all-healthy state. •
In Fig. 6.9, we repeat the same experiment, but we implement the optimal
controller provided in Theorem 6.1. We observe similar behavior as that
shown in Fig. 6.4; however, each control input switches at most once as
shown.
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Figure 6.9: A demonstration of the optimal controller provided by Theorem
6.1.
6.7 Summary
We derived su cient conditions for stabilizing the all-healthy state for a
class of graphs using a limited number of controllers. We compared the
performances of constant and nonlinear controllers. Further, we formulated
the infection di↵usion and control of curing in networks as an optimal control
problem and studied the switching behavior of the optimal controller. We
proposed two static control laws: one is based on optimizing the vaccination
levels at time zero, and the other one is based on a second-order expansion of
the objective function. We compared the performances of the dynamic and
static controllers and identified graph classes over which the three control
laws exhibit comparable performances. Finally, we studied an optimal control
problem subject to a transformed version of the n-intertwined dynamics and
showed that the optimal controller in this case exhibits at most one switch.
The optimal controller was shown to switch to the lowest possible vaccination
level when the nodes approach the all-healthy state, which demonstrates that
high levels of vaccination are not required across the entire time horizon of
the problem as previously assumed in the literature.
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CHAPTER 7
OPEN PROBLEMS
The problems we have studied in the previous chapters point to many unex-
plored avenues in the area of control of spread of information. We identify
several potential directions below.
Chapters 2 & 3
• We have assumed that the players know the state and the network
topology completely. An interesting line of research is to derive the
optimal strategies when the knowledge of the players about the state
and the topology is restricted.
• When applying necessary conditions for optimality, e.g., the MP, to the
min–max or the max–min problem, one must first prove the existence
of optimal controllers. Such results can be viewed as existence results
for equilibria in the general framework of Stackelberg games, which are
not available in the literature.
• Other future directions include: removing Assumption 3.1 and show-
ing that Zeno behavior can be ruled out in optimality, formulating the
problems in discrete time, and deriving the optimal randomized strate-
gies for both players.
Chapter 4
• We have assumed that the adversary has already acted on the network
and introduced a modeling uncertainty, and as a result, the system
matrix was time-invariant. The logical next step would be to allow
the system to be time-varying, which would translate to the scenario
where the adversary is continuously attacking the network. Modeling
the adversary as a switching signal, and characterizing the worst-case
switching behavior would add a robustness notion to this problem.
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• Making Condition 4.2 less strict would strengthen the framework. The
problem can also be generalized to tracking of a reference model with
a reference input signal, instead of set-point tracking.
• In the distributed supervisory control framework, game-theoretic no-
tions can be applied to this problem in order to design incentive schemes
to ensure that the majority of the agents identify the underlying net-
work.
Chapters 5 & 6
• We identified the number of controllers required to stabilize a class of
undirected graphs. Finding the optimal set of nodes to control in order
to stabilize the network is the next logical step. However, this problem
might be NP-hard. An alternative approach in this case would be
to construct a polynomial-time algorithm that provides near-optimal
solutions.
• The e↵ort towards stabilizing an infected network using a limited num-
ber of controllers that are bounded starts by quantifying the amount of
control needed to stabilize the network. The first step required to solve
this problem is to find conditions under which a single controller can
make the closed-loop system stable, when arbitrarily small self-loops
are implemented at the remaining nodes.
• When stabilizing the all-healthy state is not possible, finding control
laws capable of minimizing the probability of infection at the endemic
state is an important development.
• Studying the e↵ect of malicious nodes on the evolution of probability of
infections is an important future direction. In such scenarios, a game-
theoretic approach would be appropriate, and di↵erent competitions
between friendly and malicious nodes can be formulated.
• We have focused on the n-intertwined model in our study of infected
networks. However, the proof methods we developed can be applied to
other, more general, epidemiological models.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we focused on designing optimal and stabilizing controllers for
the purpose of controlling spread of information in networks. We considered
two models to describe information spread: linear distributed averaging and
the n-intertwined model. Designing controllers with practical constraints was
the main feature of our designs for both dynamical models.
For distributed averaging networks, we considered two types of adversar-
ial attacks. Both attacks have the common objective of slowing down the
convergence of the computation at the nodes to the global average. We intro-
duced a network designer whose objective is to assist the nodes in reaching
consensus by countering the attacks of the adversary. Attack-I involves an
adversary and a network designer who are capable of targeting links. We have
formulated and solved two problems that capture the competition between
the players in this attack.
We considered practical models for the players by constraining their actions
along the problem horizon. The derived strategies were shown to exhibit a
low worst-case complexity. We also proved that the optimal strategies admit
a potential-theoretic analogy. Finally, we showed that when the link weights
are su ciently diverse, an SPE exists for the zero-sum game between the
designer and the adversary.
Attack-II, on the other hand, involves an adversary and a network de-
signer who are able to modify the values of the nodes by injecting signals
of bounded power and energy. We utilized the maximum principle to com-
pletely characterize the optimal strategies of the players and showed that an
SPE exists in this case.
When the adversary introduces a large modeling uncertainty in the system,
we have proposed a distributed mechanism for the agents to stabilize the net-
work. We extended the classical centralized supervisory control framework to
a distributed setting, and we provided su cient conditions for the nodes to
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achieve set-point tracking by relying on local information only, and without
requiring the individual agents to have explicit knowledge of this set-point.
This is particularly useful for distributed computation, distributed optimiza-
tion, and synchronization problems, where agents use local information in
order to compute quantities that are unknown to them a priori.
For infected networks, we borrowed tools from positive systems theory to
characterize the stability properties of the n-intertwined Markov model over
arbitrary networks. For strongly connected digraphs, we proved that when
the basic reproduction number is less than or equal to 1, the all-healthy
state is GAS. When the basic reproduction number is greater than 1, we
proved that the endemic state is globally asymptotically stable, and that
locally around this equilibrium, the convergence is exponentially fast. Fur-
thermore, we studied the stability properties of weakly connected graphs,
and we showed that a weak endemic state could emerge over such networks.
By viewing weakly connected graphs as a cascade of nonlinear systems, and
establishing input-to-state stability for those systems, we proved the global
asymptotic stability of the equilibria that emerge over such graphs.
Moreover, we have proposed a dynamical model that describes the interac-
tion among nodes in an infected network as a concave game and demonstrated
that it subsumes the n-intertwined Markov model. This alternative descrip-
tion provides a new condition, which can be checked collectively by agents,
for the stability of the origin. We have also formulated multiple control de-
sign questions over infected networks. In particular, we provided su cient
conditions for stabilizing various networks by controlling a limited number of
nodes. Further, we have proposed an optimal control framework that allows
a network designer to minimize the total infection in the network at minimal
cost.
This thesis serves as a demonstration of control and game theoretic ques-
tions that arise in the area of control of spread of information over networks.
We have studied various problems, developed solution methodologies, and
highlighted that this new emerging area leads to interesting theoretical ex-
plorations. We have also identified open problems for research in the longer
term.
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